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Abstract
This thesis examines the effectiveness o f corporate governance regulations in the UK’s and Germany’s 
corporate governance systems. The UK and Germany are chosen for this study because they exhibit different board 
structures, legal systems and capital markets. The differences and similarities across these two corporate 
governance systems provide an opportunity to explore the effectiveness o f firm-level and country-level corporate 
governance regulations in different corporate governance systems. Using a sample o f 120 firms from the UK and 
Germany for the period 2007-2011, this thesis investigates: (a) the relationship between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and the performance o f firms; and (b) the types and quality o f explanations reported for 
non-compliance with the corporate governance codes. Unlike previous studies, this study focuses on compliance 
and the explanations reported for non-compliance with a corporate governance code. The concepts o f ‘comply’ and 
‘explain’ are claimed to be the two most important pillars o f an effective corporate governance system. Using an 
index-based approach, this thesis develops a ‘comply or explain’ index for each firm in the sample. The index 
captures the level o f compliance as well as the quality o f explanations reported for non-compliance with the 
corporate governance codes. Furthermore, a generalised method o f moments (GMM) model is used to investigate 
the govemance-performance relationship and a mechanistic (quantitative) content analysis method is applied to 
examine the quality o f explanations reported in response to non-compliance with the corporate governance codes.
The results from the univariate analysis reveal that the UK and Germany exhibit significant differences in 
terms of compliance with the corporate governance codes, board structures and ownership structures o f firms. The 
results for govemance-performance relationship show that the ‘comply or explain’ index is significantly and 
positively associated with the operating performance o f German firms, while in the UK, the ‘comply or explain’ 
index has a positive impact on the market valuation (Tobin’s Q) o f UK firms. However, the impact o f the ‘comply 
or explain’ index is statistically not significant for the accounting-based measure o f firm performance in the UK, 
and for the market-based measure o f firm performance in Germany. The results provide some evidence that the 
quality o f corporate governance (measured by the ‘comply or explain’ index) has positive implications for firms’ 
performance in both countries. The findings are different for the accounting-based and market-based measures of 
firm performance, and the mixed empirical evidence is supported by the different theories o f corporate governance. 
For instance, board structure (the percentage o f non-executive directors) is positively associated with the operating 
performance (ROA) of UK firms and with the market valuation (Tobin’s Q) o f German firms. However, board 
structure is negatively associated with the market-based measure o f firm performance in the UK. The positive and 
negative impact of board structure on different measures o f firm performance can be explained through the lens of 
agency theory and stewardship theory, respectively. The results for blockholders’ ownership show that non- 
institutional blockholders have a positive impact on the performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) o f German firms. 
Institutional blockholders’ ownership is positively associated with the operating performance o f firms in the UK. 
However, the impact o f institutional blockholders’ ownership is negative for the market-based measure o f firm 
performance in both countries, which raises concerns about the monitoring role o f institutional shareholders in both 
countries.
The results from the content analysis o f 600 corporate governance reports show that non-compliant firms 
across the UK and Germany do exploit the ‘explain’ option and flexibility granted by the ‘comply or explain’ 
principle. The explanations reported in response to non-compliance are largely uninformative and the content o f  
such explanations mostly remained similar over the time and across the firms.
Overall, the mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between governance and firm performance 
indicate that the govemance-performance relationship cannot be examined through the lens o f a single and 
universal theory o f corporate governance. A multiple theoretical perspective could be very helpful in examining the 
govemance-performance relationship in different corporate governance systems. In fact, investigating the complex 
govemance-performance relationship using multiple theories and multiple methods may take us closer to 
developing a more comprehensive theory of corporate governance.
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1.1 Background of the study
The birth of a corporate form of business organisation resulted in a separation of 
ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932), with managers having sufficient control 
in running the day to day affairs of an organisation. It is unlikely that managers would 
always act in the best interests of the owners. This phenomenon was first pointed out by 
Adam Smith in 1776 and was formally presented in the form of agency theory by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), opportunistic behaviour 
by managers would cause a conflict of interests between owners and managers, thereby 
affecting a firm’s financial performance negatively. Recent research by Cheffins (2012) 
also shows that corporate governance issues have existed for many centuries and are likely 
to continue in the near future as long as business activities are undertaken by the corporate 
sector. This could mean that the society is likely to face more corporate scandals in the 
future.
In the past 20 years, we have witnessed the failures of large corporations around the 
world. The fall of Enron and WorldCom in the USA, and the collapse of Polly Peck and 
the Maxwell Corporation in the UK are the leading examples of failures in corporate 
governance and internal control systems of large organisations. The recent 2007 financial 
crisis has further highlighted the importance of firm-level and country-level corporate 
governance arrangements. Each corporate scandal/failure leaves some unanswered 
questions in the mind of a common investor, such as: What have the directors been doing? 
Where were the regulators? Why could the corporate governance codes/regulations not 
prevent the situation? Where were the non-executive directors, who were charged with
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effective monitoring on behalf of shareholders? Why did the internal control systems and 
the risk management systems fail? Why did the internal corporate governance mechanisms 
fail to improve a firm’s financial performance? How could corporate governance 
disclosure practices be improved to minimise the information gap between owners and 
managers (see Tricker, 2012, p. 19)?
In response to corporate scandals, corporate governance reforms emerged in the 
shape of corporate governance codes throughout the world. In many countries, such as in 
the UK, Australia and the majority of EU countries, these codes are largely based on the 
principle of ‘comply or explain’, where listed companies are required to comply fully or 
otherwise explain the reasons for non-compliance with corporate governance codes. The 
‘comply or explain’ principle rejects the ‘one-size-fits-alT approach as implemented in the 
USA, where each listed company is required to comply fully with the provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In the UK, the Cadbury Report (1992) was the first corporate 
governance code which was based on the principle of ‘comply or explain’. The Cadbury 
Report (1992) emphasised the appointment of non-executive directors to oversee a 
company’s management. The Report also focused on greater transparency and 
accountability in the UK listed companies by introducing three board committees, such as 
the nomination, remuneration and audit committee. The idea of regulating companies’ 
through a corporate governance code was to protect the interests of shareholders by 
introducing various mechanisms to reward and monitor the management. The corporate 
governance code in the UK has evolved over time and the Financial Reporting Council in
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the UK has regularly engaged in consultations with various stakeholders (companies, 
auditors and investors), aiming to improve corporate governance practices in the UK.
With the introduction of corporate governance codes, accounting and finance 
researchers have examined the relationship between internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and the performance of firms. Internal governance mechanisms (also known 
as firm-level governance mechanisms) are those mechanisms which operate within the 
firm. Some commonly used internal corporate governance mechanisms are the board of 
directors, managerial incentives, capital structure,1 company bye-laws and charter 
provisions2 and internal control systems. Many corporate governance studies have focused 
on the relationship between compliance with the corporate governance codes and its 
impact on the performance of firms in different countries (e.g., Drobetz et al., 2004; Bauer 
et al., 2004; Beiner et al., 2006; Bauwhede, 2009).
In the UK, after the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992), researchers have 
examined extensively the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance. For instance, Dahya et al. (2002) examined the relationship between 
Chief Executive Officers’ (hereafter CEOs) turnover and firm performance for a sample of 
460 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1989 and 1996. Dahya et al. 
(2002) argued that CEOs in poorly performing firms would be likely to lose their jobs
1 Debt financing (gearing) can be used as an alternative corporate governance mechanism to monitor a firm’s 
management (Jensen, 1993). Debt holders are likely to demand strict compliance with debt agreements 
(which may also be known as debt covenants) and will closely monitor a firm’s management (Gillan, 2006, 
p. 388).
2 Bye-laws and charter provisions are ‘those governance features that serve as potential barriers to the market 
for corporate control’, for example, anti-takeover measures (Gillan, 2006, p. 388). One purpose of such anti­
takeover measures is to force potential acquirers to negotiate with the target company boards so that 
shareholders receive a higher premium in the case of acquisition (Gillan, 2006, p. 388).
following poor corporate financial performance. An important feature of their study is that 
it examined senior management turnover before and after the publication of the Cadbury 
Report (1992). Dahya et al. (2002) found a significantly negative relationship between firm 
performance and senior management turnover before and after the issuance of the Cadbury 
Report’s recommendations and this relationship is stronger after the issuance of the 
Cadbury Report. The findings also show that board-level monitoring by the non-executive 
directors in the UK has significantly improved and many UK firms changed their policies 
in replacing their non-performing CEOs, following the publication of the Cadbury Report 
(1992).
Weir and Laing (2001) examined the relationship between compliance with the 
Cadbury Report and firm performance for the period 1992 to 1995 for a sample of 200 
firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. They focused on compliance with the three 
aspects of the Cadbury Report, namely: (a) the duality of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and Chairman roles; (b) the percentage of non-executive directors; and (c) the 
presence of a remuneration committee. Weir and Laing (2001) found that full compliance 
with the Cadbury Report did not necessarily improve the performance of firms. However, 
they reported an increasing trend in the appointment of non-executive directors following 
the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992). Weir and Laing (2001) argued that board 
structure (as measured by the percentage of non-executive directors) is an endogenous 
variable, which means that firms with poor performance in one year are likely to appoint 
more non-executive directors in the following year. This implies that the govemance-
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performance research using econometric techniques is affected by endogeneity problems 
and the findings of govemance-performance research should be interpreted with caution.
The governance literature has predominantly focused on the relationship between 
internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. External corporate 
governance mechanisms include the market for corporate control, such as mergers, 
acquisitions and takeover activities. By investigating the interaction between internal and 
external corporate governance mechanisms, Weir et al. (2002) tested the hypothesis 
whether poorly performing firms were more vulnerable to being taken over in the capital 
market. Using a sample of non-financial firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
between 1994 and 1996, Weir et al. (2002) did not find any significant relationship 
between the percentage of non-executive directors and firm performance. Discussing the 
limitations of internal corporate governance mechanisms, Weir et al. (2002) argued that 
compliance with the Cadbury Report did not improve firms’ performance, although poorly 
performing firms were vulnerable to the threats of hostile takeovers. In other words, they 
suggest that the relationship between internal corporate governance and firm performance 
is a complex phenomenon.
Dahya and McConnell (2007) examined the relationship between changes in board 
composition and firm performance for a sample of 1,124 UK firms, using the accounting- 
based and market-based measures of firm performance (ROA and stock returns). The study 
also covered two unique time periods, the pre-Cadbury era and the post-Cadbury era. Two 
methods, regression analysis and event study methodology were used to measure the 
relationship between corporate governance and ROA and stock returns respectively. For
the market-based measure of firm performance, Dahya and McConnell (2007) found that 
the stock market reacts positively to firms’ announcement relating to compliance with the 
non-executive directors requirements of the Code. This shows that investors perceive that 
the appointment of non-executive directors enhances a firm’s monitoring and control. For 
the accounting-based measure of firm performance, Dahya and McConnell (2007) found 
that the operating performance of compliant firms was significantly higher than that of 
their peers who were non-compliant with the Code.
Recently, the level of compliance with the corporate governance code in the UK
has increased substantially, and the Grant Thornton (2012, p. 8) survey shows that more
than 50 per cent of the FTSE 350 firms were fully compliant with the requirements of the
corporate governance code between 2010-2012, compared with a 28 per cent compliance
rate in 2005. This increasing trend in compliance has now shifted the perspective of
regulators, investors and corporate governance researchers towards the quality of
explanations reported for non-compliance with the recommended codes of best practice.
For instance, Arcot et al. (2010) investigated the effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’
system of corporate governance in the UK by examining the level of compliance for a
sample of 245 non-financial firms for the period 1998-2004. They found that, although the
level of compliance improved, the quality of explanations for non-compliance did not
improve and non-compliant firms tended to report standard explanations3 for non-
compliance. Arcot et al. (2010) further argued that companies with a concentrated
ownership structure tended to comply less compared with those having a dispersed
3 Also known as boiler-plate explanations. These explanations are largely uninformative. Examples include
the use of standard phrases, such as ‘in the best interest of the company’  ‘the board believes that’ .....
‘we believe that’ etc.
ownership structure. The quality of disclosure, as measured by the quality of reported 
explanations for non-compliance, is also poor for firms with a concentrated ownership 
structure and this could be attributed to the fact that firms with dominant blockholders 
(insiders) have less incentive to disclose public information, owing to minimum 
information asymmetries in firms with highly concentrated ownership structures.
The empirical research by La Porta et al. (1998) has been the foundation of cross­
country corporate governance research. La Porta et al. (1998) find that common law 
countries provide the strongest protections for shareholders and creditors; French civil law 
countries give the weakest protections for investors; and German and Scandinavian civil 
law protection falls between common law and the French civil law system. For instance, 
Anderson and Gupta (2009) examined the interaction between firm-level corporate 
governance mechanisms and country-level corporate governance mechanisms for a sample 
of 1,736 firms operating in a market-based system and a bank-based system of corporate 
governance. The findings show that firms operating in a market-based system achieve 
higher market valuation as compared with their counterparts (of a similar size) operating in 
a bank-based system of corporate governance. The findings imply that country-level 
corporate governance regulations have a significant influence on firm-level corporate 
governance mechanisms and subsequently on firm performance and market valuation.
Empirical research shows that firms operating in weaker legal systems (with weak 
investor protection) can adopt strong corporate governance mechanisms, as they have an 
incentive to obtain a higher market valuation and to access the capital markets on better 
terms and conditions. For instance, Dahya et al. (2008) argue that large shareholders may
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appoint independent non-executive directors to enhance the performance of firms 
operating in weaker legal regimes. Using data on board composition and share ownership 
of 839 firms located in 22 countries, Dahya et al. (2008) found that large shareholders can 
offset the negative impact on a firm’s performance that results from its location in a 
weaker legal regime by enhancing monitoring and control through the appointment of 
independent non-executive directors on the board. Other cross-country corporate 
governance studies show that similar corporate governance and control mechanisms could 
yield similar results in different corporate governance systems (Conyon and Schwalbach, 
2000; Franks and Mayer, 1997). Conyon and Schwalbach (2000) examined executive 
compensation practices in the UK and Germany and they found a strongly positive 
association between executive pay and the performance of firms in both countries. The 
findings imply that some of the fundamental assumptions of agency theory may also hold 
across a stakeholder-based system of corporate governance (Germany). For instance, 
agency theory suggests that executive compensation can be used as a tool to minimise a 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers.
Researchers have also examined the role of board of directors in the context of listed 
companies (Yermack, 1996; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Pathan and Faff, 2013). These 
studies have focused on different board attributes, such as board size, the percentage of 
independent non-executive directors, the frequency of board meetings and the role of debt 
financing. However, empirical results on the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance are inconclusive. The compliance or non-compliance indices used in 
earlier studies have focused only on the one aspect of a ‘comply or explain’ principle. The 
explain element of a ‘comply or explain’ principle has largely been ignored in the
governance research. The debate about the effectiveness of a unitary board system vs a 
two-tier board system (Davies, 2000) and the effectiveness of a common law system vs a 
civil law system (La Porta et al., 1998) also provides an opportunity for researchers to 
examine the effectiveness of corporate governance regulations in a cross-country setting 
and a comparative study could better explain the differences of and implications for 
national corporate governance regulations. This inconclusive evidence indicates that the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is still an unresolved 
issue which needs further investigation. Therefore, this study re-examines the govemance- 
performance relationship in a cross-country setting.
1.2 Objectives of the study and research questions
This study investigates the relationship between internal corporate governance 
mechanisms (such as compliance with the corporate governance codes, board size, the 
percentage of non-executive directors, the frequency of board meetings, gearing) and the 
operating and financial performance of firms in the UK and Germany. Comparative 
corporate governance research is a relatively new and under-researched area. The UK and 
Germany have been chosen for this study because they exhibit different board structures, 
with the UK having a unitary board stmcture and Germany a two-tier board stmcture. Also 
the two jurisdictions have different legal backgrounds -  a common law system in the UK 
as opposed to a civil code in Germany. However, both countries have implemented formal 
governance codes. The two jurisdictions therefore provide a rich context against which to 
explore the effectiveness of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and national 
corporate governance regulations. The second objective of the study is to compare the
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level of compliance with the corporate governance codes in the UK and Germany. Finally, 
for non-compliant firms, this study focuses on the quality of explanations reported by non- 
compliant firms in the UK and Germany. For this purpose, each explanation reported by a 
non-compliant firm in response to non-compliance with The UK Corporate Governance 
Code and The German Corporate Governance Code4 has been critically analysed. The 
reported explanations for non-compliance with the corporate governance codes are divided 
into different categories based on whether they are less informative or highly informative 
and the results are compared across these two countries. The following two broader 
questions have been addressed in this thesis:
a. How have internal corporate governance mechanisms affected firm 
performance across different corporate governance systems?
b. How do the types, quality and pattern of explanations for non-compliance with 
the corporate governance codes vary across the UK and Germany?
1.3 Motivation of the study
Since the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992) in the UK, researchers have 
extensively examined the effectiveness of corporate governance regulations in the UK and 
other parts of the world. This comparative study investigates the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the performance of firms in two major European economies, 
the UK and Germany. Although there are differences in the ownership structures, board 
structure, legal systems and capital markets, there are similarities across the UK and
4 The 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 versions of The German Corporate Governance Code and the 2006, 2008 
and‘2010 versions of The UK Corporate Governance Code are applicable during the reporting period 2007- 
2011 .
German corporate governance systems. For instance, the corporate governance codes in 
both countries are based on a ‘comply or explain’ principle. These differences and 
similarities have attracted the attention of regulators and academics in terms of exploring 
alternative corporate governance regimes and to choose the best corporate governance 
practices from a bundle of international corporate governance regulations.
Corporate governance codes around the world are based on the assumption that 
strong internal corporate governance or firm-level corporate governance mechanisms could 
help in protecting the interests of shareholders (Gompers et al., 2003). Firms with strong 
internal corporate governance mechanisms can access capital markets on better terms and 
conditions (Aggarwal et al., 2010) and investors are willing to pay a premium for 
companies that are well governed (e.g., fully compliant with a corporate governance code) 
(Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009). Strong internal corporate governance mechanisms are 
likely to improve a firm’s operating and financial performance. However, empirical 
evidence on the relationship between internal corporate governance and firm performance 
is inconclusive. Therefore, this study examines the effectiveness of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms in two different corporate governance systems, namely the UK 
and Germany.
This study also investigates the quality of corporate governance disclosure in the 
‘comply or explain’ regimes -  the UK and Germany. Compliance and the explanations 
reported for non-compliance with a corporate governance code are claimed to be the two 
most important pillars of an effective corporate governance system (Hooghiemstra and 
Van Ees, 2011). Recently, the UK and EU regulators have raised concerns about the
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quality of the reported explanations for non-compliance (corporate governance disclosure). 
The whole idea of the ‘comply or explain’ principle is to avoid a rules-based (one-size-fits- 
all) approach to corporate governance so that firms have a choice to adopt a code’s 
provision or implement strong internal corporate governance mechanisms in response to 
those provisions recommended by the code of corporate governance (Hooghiemstra and 
Van Ees, 2011). The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) states that companies should 
avoid using ambiguous statements when they choose not to comply with a provision of the 
Code. The Code strongly encourages the investor communities to pay significant attention 
to the quality of explanations reported by non-compliant firms. Theoretically, from an 
agency theory perspective, the flow of information arising from voluntary corporate 
disclosure may also reduce the information asymmetry between owners and managers. 
Therefore, this study also investigates the quality of corporate governance disclosure or the 
quality of reported explanations for non-compliance with The UK Corporate Governance 
Code and The German Corporate Governance Code.
1.4 Contribution of the study
1.4.1 Contribution to the literature
This research fills an existing gap in the literature by contributing to the existing 
comparative corporate governance research in an area which has been under-researched, 
namely, the context of a unitary board structure (UK) and a two-tier board structure 
(Germany). This study contributes to the corporate governance disclosure and govemance- 
performance literature in several ways. First, a unique feature of this study is that it focuses 
on the ‘explain’ element of the ‘comply or explain’ principle and has examined the
different types of explanations reported by non-compliant firms in the UK and Germany. 
This is the first study which analyses the longitudinal pattern of changes in the types and 
quality of explanations reported by non-compliant firms across different corporate 
governance systems. Using a mechanistic (quantitative) content analysis approach, 600 
corporate governance reports were analysed for a sample of 120 companies across the UK 
and Germany for the period 2007-2011. Prior studies (e.g., Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 
2011; Seidl et al., 2012) have examined the quality of explanations for only one accounting 
period. This study extends the work of Hooghiemstra and Van Ees (2011) and Seidl et al. 
(2012) and provides evidence on how the quality of explanations reported for non- 
compliance varies over time and across different firms and different countries. The 
categories of explanations used in this research are different from those reported in prior 
studies (Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 2011; Seidl et al., 2012). For instance, when 
categorising (coding) the explanations reported by non-compliant firms, two new 
categories emerged. This indicates that a longitudinal study of a large sample of 
compliance statements could yield better results as compared with a study that has been 
carried out for one financial year.
Second, the ‘comply or explain’ index used in this study is more comprehensive 
than those used by previous corporate governance studies. For example, prior govemance- 
performance studies have either focused on the level of compliance or non-compliance 
with corporate governance codes by developing a corporate governance index for each 
firm (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006) or by using commercially available indices from different 
rating agencies, such as: (a) the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) data on
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corporate governance (Gompers et al., 2003); (b) the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia 
(CLSA) governance index (Klapper and Love, 2004); (c) the Deminor corporate 
governance ratings for EU firms (Bauer et al., 2004; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008); and 
(d) the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data on corporate governance (Aggarwal et 
al., 2010). The ‘comply or explain’ index used in this study not only captures the level of 
compliance with corporate governance codes but also focuses on the quality of 
explanations reported for non-compliance with The UK Corporate Governance Code and 
The German Corporate Governance Code.
1.4.2 Theoretical contribution
Corporate governance researchers have predominantly examined the govemance- 
performance phenomenon through the lens of agency theory. The empirical results 
reported in this study support the assumptions of agency theory, stewardship theory, 
resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory. This suggests that corporate 
governance researchers need to adopt multiple theoretical perspectives to analyse the 
relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. A 
multiple theoretical perspective could be very helpful in examining the govemance- 
performance relationship in different corporate governance systems. For instance, an 
agency theory framework could better explain the governance issues in a shareholder- 
based system of corporate governance (such as the UK), while stakeholder theory would 




This study has used a number of methods to examine the effectiveness of corporate 
governance regulations in different corporate governance systems. A generalised method 
of moments (GMM) model is used to examine the relationship between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. A mechanistic (quantitative) content 
analysis method is applied to investigate the quality of explanations reported in response to 
non-compliance with the corporate governance codes. The explanations for non- 
compliance were also used in developing a ‘comply or explain’ index for each firm in the 
sample. This shows that corporate governance researchers should focus on both aspects of 
a ‘comply or explain’ principle, particularly when carrying out a research in the context of 
a principles-based system of corporate governance, which is based on a ‘comply or 
explain’ principle.5 In other words, focusing only on the compliance aspect of a ‘comply or 
explain’ principle would undermine the second important pillar of a ‘comply or explain’ 
system of corporate governance -  the explanations reported for non-compliance with the 
corporate governance codes.
Another contribution of the study is the use of the generalised method of moments 
(GMM) model in a comparative corporate governance research. The findings reported in 
prior studies on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance should be ‘interpreted with caution’ because the econometric techniques used 
in these studies fail to control for different kinds of endogeneity -  a situation when the 
causality may run from performance to governance (Schultz et al., 2010 , p. 146). Wintoki
5 In terms of a ‘comply or explain’ principle, companies are required to comply with a corporate governance 
code or otherwise explain the reasons for non-compliance.
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et al. (2012) identified three sources of endogeneity and the existence of even one source 
of endogeneity in the model will generate inconsistent results. These three sources of 
potential endogeneity are: (a) unobserved heterogeneity; (b) simultaneity or reverse 
causation; and (c) dynamic endogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity arises when the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is affected by an 
unobservable factor (for instance, firm-specific characteristics), which may be unknown to 
the researcher. Simultaneity or reverse causation arises when governance and performance 
affect each other simultaneously. For example, prior research has found that compliance 
with corporate governance code enhances a firm’s financial performance and valuation, 
however firms with higher market valuation are likely to implement strong corporate 
governance mechanisms (Dumev and Kim, 2005). Dynamic endogeneity arises when a 
firm’s past/current performance affects the current/future governance structure of a firm 
(Wintoki et al., 2012, p. 582). For example, poor corporate performance in one year may 
cause changes in the governance structure (removal of one or more directors from the 
board by shareholders) of a firm in the following year. Keeping in view the dynamic nature 
of the govemance-performance relationship, the GMM model includes the lagged effect of 
the dependent variables (firm’s past financial performance) as an instrument (explanatory 
variable) to control for the endogeneity being caused by simultaneity (Wintoki et al., 
2012). The fixed-effects and random-effects models are also known as static panel data 
models, which means that these models do not allow for the lagged values of the 
dependent variable (financial performance) to be included in the econometric model. The 
inconclusive empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance could also be attributed to the use of inappropriate econometrics
techniques applied by previous researchers. The use of the GMM model could be 
considered as part of the methodological developments in corporate governance research. 
Finally, the conceptual and methodological framework used in this study provides a new 
direction for corporate governance researchers.
Both the ordinary least squares regression and the fixed-effects models fail to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity respectively. Unobserved 
heterogeneity can potentially be controlled by applying a fixed-effects estimation 
technique under the assumption of strict exogeneity, which implies that current corporate 
governance mechanisms of a firm (e.g., independent variables) are completely unaffected 
by any changes in a firm’s past, present and expected financial performance (e.g., 
dependent variables ROA and Tobin’s Q). In reality, this is not the case and firms with 
poor performance in one year are likely to modify their governance arrangements (board 
size, the percentage of non-executive directors) in the following year. Therefore, applying 
these models (OLS and fixed-effects) in the govemance-performance research would 
generate inconsistent and biased results (Wintoki et al., 2012). In fact, one of the reasons 
for the inconclusive empirical evidence in the govemance-performance literature could 
therefore be attributed to the use of these econometric techniques, which do not fully 
control for the endogeneity issues. However, prior empirical studies acknowledged the 
limitations of these econometric techniques (Denis, 2001) and the emergence of GMM 
methodology in the governance research could potentially be considered as an extension of 
these econometric techniques (such as the ordinary least squares regression and fixed-
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effects models).6 A GMM model, although based on the fundamental assumptions of 
ordinary least squares regressions, improvises the model by allowing additional variables 
of lagged values of the dependent variable, and, by transforming the data, removes 
endogeneity (fixed effects) (Roodman, 2009).
In the past 23 years, since the publication of the Cadbury Report and with the 
emergence of index-based govemance-performance studies, accounting and finance 
researchers have been frequently criticised for using econometric techniques which did not 
control fully for endogeneity issues in the govemance-performance research (Wintoki et 
al., 2012). For instance, most corporate governance researchers have either used OLS 
regression (Weir et al., 2002; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004) or a fixed- 
effects model (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Ammann et al.,
2011) to estimate the relationship between governance and performance. The emergence of 
a GMM methodology in the corporate governance research would therefore resolve some 
of the unanswered questions raised over the govemance-performance research in the past 
two decades.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is stmctured as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on the literature review, 
which provides a theoretical and empirical link between internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and the performance of firms, particularly in the context of two different 
corporate governance systems (the UK and Germany). Chapter 2 also reviews the existing
6 The author acknowledges the fact that, until now, the OLS has been believed to be a popular econometric 
technique in the accounting and finance literature. Therefore, this study also reports the results for the OLS 
analysis.
19
literature on corporate governance disclosure and outlines the research questions and a 
conceptual framework for this thesis. Furthermore, a brief history of the development of 
corporate governance codes in the UK and Germany is also provided in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 explains and justifies the chosen research methodology that is used in 
carrying out this research. It also discusses the data and sample selection procedures and 
provides a definition for each variable used in this research. Chapter 3 also explains how 
the two empirical methods (quantitative content analysis and econometric analysis) work 
together as a coherent methodological framework to answer the two broader research 
questions.
Chapter 4 presents empirical results from the content analysis of the 600 corporate 
governance reports for a sample of 120 non-financial firms selected from the UK and 
Germany over the period 2007-2011. Chapter 4 compares the level of compliance with the 
corporate governance codes across the UK and Germany. For non-compliant firms, the 
reported explanations for non-compliance are analysed and the results are compared for 
these two countries.
Chapter 5 reports the findings regarding the relationship between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and the performance of firms for the same number of firms 
chosen from the UK and Germany for the period 2007-2011.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and summarises the main findings, 
implications and limitations of the study and suggests avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
Section 2.7 The impact of different legal systems on firm performance
Section 2.6 The impact of ownership structure on firm performance
Section 2.1 Introduction
Section 2.3 Theoretical framework
Section 2.2 Definition of corporate governance
Section 2.11 Rationale for this study and research questions
Section 2.8 The development of corporate governance codes in the UK
and Germany
Section 2.10 Corporate governance disclosure across different corporate 
governance systems
Section 2.9 Compliance with the corporate governance codes and firm
performance
Section 2.5 The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in 
different corporate governance systems
Section 2.4 The link between internal corporate governance mechanisms
and firm performance
2.1 Introduction
This thesis investigates the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms in two 
different corporate governance systems (the UK and Germany) during the period 2007 and 
2011. The time period 2007-2011 has been chosen because full corporate governance and 
financial data was available for all the sample firms at the time of data collection for this study, 
which was carried out between 2012 and 2014. The thesis also investigates an under-examined 
aspect of the value relevance and effectiveness of corporate governance disclosure by focusing 
on the quality of explanations reported by firms which are non-compliant with The UK 
Corporate Governance Code and The German Corporate Governance Code. The UK and 
Germany are the major EU economies, and have different legal systems, board structures, 
ownership structures and capital markets. Section 2.10 provides justifications and rationale for 
choosing these two countries for this research. The following section discusses the various 
definitions of corporate governance.
2.2 Definition of corporate governance
There is no universal definition of corporate governance: policy makers, practitioners, 
researchers and academics have presented different definitions of corporate governance. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737) define corporate governance as:
‘The ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return 
some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the 
capital they supply or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control 
managers?’
Parkinson (1994, p. 6) defines corporate governance as ‘the process of supervision and 
control (of “governing”) intended to ensure that the company’s management acts in accordance
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with the interests of shareholders’. The above definitions primarily concentrate on the 
relationship between managers and shareholders and explain the scope of corporate governance 
from an agency theory perspective. In other words, it is proposed that protection of 
shareholders’ interest is a primary concern of corporate governance. Therefore, the main role of 
corporate governance is seen to ensure the effective and efficient use of firm’s resources so that 
the interests of owners (shareholders) are well protected.
Corporate governance issues, such as the shareholder-manager relationship in modem 
corporations and the potential conflict of interest between owners and managers, could be seen 
as a possibility as early as 1776, when these issues were highlighted by Adam Smith. According 
to Smith (1776, p. 700):
‘The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery7 frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are 
apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very 
easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a 
company’.
Much later, Berle and Means (1932, p. 69) outlined the separation of ownership and 
control in large corporations and characterised the modern corporation as having the ‘ownership 
of wealth without appreciable control and control of wealth without appreciable ownership’. 
Following Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the agency theory 
of the firm and argued that the separation of ownership and control in the modem organisation 
can give rise to a conflict of interest between owners and managers, which potentially affects
7 According to the Oxford English Dictionary Online, the term copartner is defined as ‘a partner or associate, 
especially an equal partner in a business’ and having joint interest in the firm.
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adversely the interests of the owners of the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also suggest that 
appropriate incentive schemes or effective control (governance) mechanisms are likely to re­
align the interests of owners and managers. Based on the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), a good deal of academic research on corporate governance has been developed in the 
field of business administration. A recent research study on the history of corporate governance 
concludes that ‘the possibility of conflict of interest between owners and managers has been 
with us for centuries and will continue as long as business activity is conducted through the 
corporate form’ (Cheffins, 2012, p. 23).
In order to resolve the agency problem and align owner-manager interests, Jensen 
(1993) outlines four categories of corporate governance mechanisms, which are: (a) capital 
markets; (b) the legal/political/regulatory system; (c) product market competition; and (d) an 
internal control system headed by the board of directors. These four corporate governance 
mechanisms can be further divided into two broader categories: internal and external corporate 
governance. Internal governance mechanisms (also known as firm-level governance 
mechanisms) are those mechanisms which operate within the firm. Some commonly used 
internal corporate governance mechanisms are the board of directors, managerial incentives, 
capital structure, company bye-laws and charter provisions and internal control systems. 
External governance mechanisms operate outside the firm’s operating environment, for 
example, legal and regulatory mechanisms, product market competition and the market for 
corporate control, such as mergers, acquisitions and takeovers (Gillan, 2006).
External corporate governance mechanism, such as capital markets, may exercise a 
significant disciplinary role over poorly performing companies in different ways (Solomon,
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2007, p. 19). First, shareholders of a poorly performing firm may vote in favour of a takeover 
bid, which may result in a potential executive turnover after the acquisition. Second, firms that 
are fully compliant with the corporate governance codes may find it convenient to raise 
additional capital on better terms and conditions as compared with non-compliant firms 
(Aggarwal et al., 2010). These external pressures may also align managers’ interests with those 
of shareholders’ interests. Similarly, laws and regulations also serve as an external corporate 
governance mechanism (Jensen, 1993). Various rules and regulations are developed to control 
and monitor the corporate sector, such as company laws, taxation laws and labour laws. These 
regulations cover a wide range of corporate issues from the formation of a company to the 
winding-up of a company. Failures to comply with such binding regulations may result in 
extensive fines and penalties. For instance, Lehman Brothers Holdings Incorporation was 
forced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to pay a compensation of US$ 50 
million for violating disclosure related requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Tricker, 2012, 
p. 156). Product market competition is another external corporate governance mechanism. 
Denis (2001, p. 207) argues that poorly performing firms with inefficient management are 
likely to lose their market share in competitive markets, which could result in financial distress 
and bankruptcy.
The importance and limitations of internal and external governance mechanisms have 
been debated in earlier research. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that both 
internal and external governance mechanisms are important in minimising the agency problem. 
Discussing the limitation's of external governance mechanisms, Jensen (1993, p. 27) also states 
that ‘the legal/political/regulatory system is far too blunt an instrument to handle the problems
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of wasteful managerial behaviour effectively’. Similarly, the market for corporate control 
(mergers and acquisitions) could result in additional conflict of interests between owners and 
managers (Denis, 2001; Gillan, 2006). For instance, the post-acquisition value to the acquirer 
(bidder) may be negative or zero and the deal could have been poorly advised by inefficient 
managers, being motivated to increase their control over the firm (Gillan, 2006, p. 396). 
Therefore, implementing strong internal governance mechanisms at firm-level could help in 
minimising the need for expensive and lengthy external governance mechanisms (such as legal 
actions). In fact, majority of the recommendations in the corporate governance codes around the 
world relate to the effectiveness of firm-level internal corporate governance mechanisms. The 
empirical literature on corporate governance has largely emphasised the relationship between 
internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. Keeping in view the 
limitations of external corporate governance mechanisms, and in line with the previous 
empirical research, this study also focuses on the effectiveness of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.3 reviews the theoretical 
framework underlying corporate governance research; Section 2.4 examines the link between 
internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance; Sections 2.5 and 2.6 consider 
the effectiveness of corporate governance regulations in different legal systems; Section 2.7 
looks at the development of corporate governance reforms in the UK and Germany; Sections 
2.8 and 2.9 review the academic literature on the relationship between governance and firm 
performance and the effectiveness of corporate governance disclosure in various corporate
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governance systems; and finally, Section 2.10 identifies the research gap and presents research 
questions.
2.3 Theoretical framework
A number of theories has been proposed and used by scholars as a theoretical foundation 
for corporate governance research. These theories include: (a) agency theory; (b) stewardship 
theory; (c) resource dependence theory; and (d) stakeholder theory. In the light of these 
theories, the theoretical link between corporate governance and firm performance is discussed 
below.
2.3.1 Agency theory
This theory focuses on the contractual relationship between a firm’s managers and its 
shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 5) define an agency relationship as ‘a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority 
to the agent’. It is unlikely that the agent (managers) will always work in the best interests of 
the principals (shareholders). This opportunistic behaviour by a firm’s managers may result in a 
conflict of interest between principals (owners) and agents (managers). This phenomenon (also 
known as the agency dilemma) creates agency costs for the firm, thereby affecting a firm’s 
value negatively. Agency costs can be reduced if the agents (managers) pursuing their self- 
interests are properly monitored by shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). For 
monitoring purposes, corporate governance codes require the appointment of non-executive 
directors to oversee the resources of a firm. Monitoring managers can be costly in many ways. 
First, a shareholder, who owns a small number of shares, may lack industry expertise and may
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not be able to differentiate between good and bad managerial decisions, particularly when 
exercising his/her monitoring (voting) powers in the annual general meeting. Second, small 
shareholders do not have enough incentive to monitor managers because they may invest in 
many firms, and the cost of monitoring each of the firms in a diverse portfolio can outweigh the 
potential benefits (Denis, 2001, p. 196). Third, the monitoring process evolves with the changes 
in the ownership structure of a company (Solomon, 2007, p. 19). For instance, an individual 
investor who directly invests in a company may have different incentives to monitor a 
company’s management as compared with institutional investors, who manage investment on 
behalf of individual investors. However, recent regulations in the UK {The UK Stewardship 
Code, Financial Reporting Council, 2012a) require institutional investors to disclose fully in 
their annual report on how they monitor their investee companies.
According to Denis (2001, p. 196), ‘the most obvious solution to an agency problem 
would seem to be a contract that bonds the agent to do as the principal would like’. This could 
partly mitigate the agency problem because employment contracts are incomplete owing to 
many uncertainties in the real world. First, it is difficult to determine what action an employee 
should take in a particular situation. Second, it is also difficult to ascertain ‘what is the value- 
maximizing action in every situation’ (Denis, 2001, p. 196). In addition, appropriate incentives 
in the form of stock ownership and market-based competitive compensation can help in 
mitigating the level of agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Denis, 2001). In most 
cases, it is likely that bonding and monitoring may increase the potential benefits to a firm. 
However, it is also possible that the monitoring costs may exceed the potential benefits to a 
firm. This reduction in shareholders’ benefits which arises from excessive monitoring costs is
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known as the cost of residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence, in practice it is unlikely 
to eradicate completely the agency problem and the potential agency costs.
The flow of information from managers (adequate disclosure) may also result in 
minimising the conflict of interests between owners and managers (Hooghiemstra, 2012). A 
good example is the ‘comply or explain’ principle, which is based on the idea that effective 
governance (monitoring) can be achieved if firms adopt the recommended provisions in a 
corporate governance code or otherwise fully explain and justify the reasons for non- 
compliance so that shareholders can make a better judgement based on such disclosure in the 
annual reports (Cadbury, 1992). The information arising from voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure reduces the information asymmetries (differences in the available information) 
between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hooghiemstra, 2012). 
Therefore, voluntary corporate governance disclosure is of potential benefit to the reporting 
firm because it reduces the likelihood of any firm-specific risk that may arise as a result of any 
information gap between owners and managers. It also lowers a firm’s cost of capital (Botoson, 
1997, cited in Hooghiemstra, 2012, p. 7). For example, firms which are fully compliant or 
which fully disclose the reasons for non-compliance can access the capital markets on better 
terms and conditions and can borrow at a relatively lower rate (Klapper and Love, 2004). These 
external benefits from the capital markets may provide an incentive to the firm to be fully 
compliant or otherwise fully explain and disclose the justification for non-compliance with a 
corporate governance code (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009).
Corporate governance mechanisms help in reducing agency costs and improving a 
firm’s performance by aligning the interests of shareholders and managers. From a monitoring
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perspective, corporate governance mechanisms, such as the board composition and board size, 
play a key role in mitigating the agency problem. For example, agency theory suggests that 
boards with more outside directors (non-executive directors) can increase the monitoring 
efficiency and performance of a firm (Fama, 1980). In other words, non-executive directors are 
considered more independent and better monitors as compared with inside directors (executive 
directors). Likewise, the existence of non-executive directors (monitors) on the board can 
introduce a balance of power between shareholders and management. Therefore, the outside 
directors can effectively prevent the expropriation of firms’ resources.
Different corporate governance codes (regulations) around the world are developed 
based on the core assumptions of agency theory and require additional monitoring and oversight 
over the directors and managers in public listed companies. In the past 20 years, various 
corporate governance codes in the UK have also emphasised the increasing role of non­
executive directors. For example, the required proportion of non-executive directors has 
gradually increased from three in the Cadbury Report (1992) to one third in the Hampel Report 
(1998); and to at least one half in the recent UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2012b).
With better corporate governance practices, in terms of compliance with the corporate 
governance codes, managers are likely to invest in profitable projects because efficient 
monitoring reduces the chances of excessive waste of organisational resources (Love, 2011, p. 
45). Aggarwal et al. (2010) argue that well-governed firms are less risky and the investors are 
better protected. Therefore, such firms are able to attract external finances at a lower cost of 
capital, which improves their performance. A recent research study on the performance of
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commercial banks during the 2007 financial crisis shows that firms with strong corporate 
governance mechanisms are likely to avoid risks that may negatively affect shareholders’ value 
(Beltratti and Stulz, 2011, p. 7). Some studies have also shown a positive relationship between 
good governance mechanisms and a firm’s performance (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Gompers et al., 
2003; Brown and Caylor, 2009). These studies have reported a positive impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on different aspects of a firm’s performance.8 In the context of the UK, 
Dahya et al. (2002) and Dahya and McConnell (2007) found that the presence of non-executive 
directors on the UK boards improved firm-level monitoring and the performance of firms.
In the context of agency theory, it can be argued that smaller boards with higher 
proportion of non-executive directors are active monitors of firm resources. Therefore, the 
board of directors plays a significant role in minimising agency costs and thereby in improving 
a firm’s financial performance. On the other hand, it is also expected that full compliance with a 
corporate governance code or full disclosure in the case of non-compliance would be positively 
valued by the capital markets. Section 2.4.1 and Section 2.4.2 report additional empirical 
evidence on the assumptions of agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence 
theory.
2.3.2 Stewardship theory
Agency theory assumes that managers are rational human beings who maximise their 
own interests, although monetary rewards (compensation) and monitoring could partly mitigate 
the conflict of interests between owners and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This
8 These financial performance measures are: (a) operating performance (return on assets, return on equity); (b) 
market-based measures of firm performance (as measured by Tobin’s Q -  the ratio of the market value of assets 
relative to the book value of assets) and (c) stock returns.
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assumption of ‘economic man’ or opportunistic behaviour may not hold true for all individuals 
(Davis et al., 1997, p. 20). Stewardship theory, which is derived from the disciplines of 
sociology and psychology, is a perspective about individuals (managers) that is different from 
agency theory. According to stewardship theory, managers are trustworthy stewards of a firm’s 
resources and they would pursue actions that maximise organisational interests over their own 
interests (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Table 2.1 below presents a 
comparison of agency theory and stewardship theory.
Table 2.1 A comparison of agency theory and stewardship theory
Agency theory Stewardship theory
1. Model o f  man Economic man Self-actualising man9
2. Behaviour Self-serving Collective-serving
Psychological mechanisms
3. Motivation Lowest-order/economic 
needs (physiological, 
security, economic).





4. Management philosophy Control-oriented Involvement-oriented
5. Risk orientation. Control mechanisms Trust
6. Time frame Short term Long term
7. Objective Cost control Performance enhancement
8. Cultural differences Individualism Collectivism
High power distance Low power distance
Source: Adapted from Davis et al. (1997, p. 37).
The idea of agency theory is based on individualism, which leads to opportunistic 
behaviour and short-termism, while stewardship theory is based on collectivism. For instance, 
stewardship theory argues that managers are likely to attain organisational objectives
9 According to the Oxford English Dictionary Online, the term self-actualisation refers to ‘the realization or 
fulfilment of one’s talents and potentialities, especially considered as a drive or need present in everyone’.
(profitability), which will eventually benefit both owners and managers in the form of dividends 
and increased remuneration.
Agency theory suggests the need for a strong body of non-executive directors to monitor 
independently the resources of firms. Alternatively, stewardship theorists argue that 
shareholders’ and managers’ interests can be better aligned if the executives are provided with 
non-monetary rewards, such as the provision of authority, responsibility and recognition of 
successful performance. According to stewardship theory, the executive directors (stewards), as 
employees of the organisation, possess more information than non-executive directors. 
Proponents of this theory suggest that a higher number of executive directors represented on the 
board can improve the performance of the board, because the executive directors have a better 
understanding of the business as compared with the non-executive directors (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). Another argument in support of a higher percentage of executive directors is that 
non-executive directors allocate limited time to their companies, and they may not be able to 
understand fully the complex organisation structure and business model of a company (Tricker,
2012). Therefore a significant proportion of executive directors (or executives) on the board can 
ensure effective and efficient decision making.
Stewardship theory also emphasises the legal responsibilities of the board of directors 
and assumes that the board has a ‘fiduciary duty’ to act in the best interests of the owners of the 
company. Giving his judgement in the London High Court in 1874, Lord Cairns held that ‘no 
man, acting as agent, can be allowed to put himself in a position in which his interest and his 
duty will be in conflict’ (Parker (Public Officer o f National Bank) v McKenna and others, 
1874). Tricker (2012) argues that, in the real world, some assumptions of stewardship theory
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may not hold true, but this does not undermine the underlying basic concept of ‘stewardship’. 
Proponents of this theory also suggest that managers should identify key corporate stakeholders, 
but under the law, their primary responsibility is to maximise shareholders’ wealth.
Corporate governance researchers have widely used the assumptions of stewardship 
theory to test the relationship between certain board attributes and the performance of firms. For 
example, using a sample of 337 firms listed in the USA, Donaldson and Davis (1991) examined 
whether CEOs holding dual roles of CEO and chairman10 improved the performance of firms or 
not. Agency theory suggests the separation of CEO and Chairman roles and the corporate 
governance codes around the world also require separation of these two roles so that one person 
does not hold too much power. Proponents of stewardship theory suggest more authority for the 
CEO over the company. In the majority of US companies, the roles of CEO and Chairman are 
combined (Solomon, 2007). Donaldson and Davis (1991) tested the assumptions of agency 
theory and stewardship theory by examining the impact of CEO duality on the performance of 
firms. The results support the assumption of stewardship theory and they suggest that firms with 
a combined role of CEO and Chairman have improved shareholder return compared to those 
that have split the roles of CEO and Chairman.
Kiel and Nicholson (2003) examined the relationship between board demographics and 
the performance of 500 firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. Kiel and Nicholson 
(2003) reported a positive relationship between the percentage of executive directors and the 
market-based measure of firm performance. These empirical results are consistent with the
10 The Cadbury Report (1992) recommended that the roles of Chairman and CEO should not be fulfilled by one 
person.
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assumptions of stewardship theory and support the idea that companies should maintain a good 
balance between executive and non-executive directors and that boards should not be entirely 
dominated by external non-executive directors (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, p. 202).
2.3.3 Resource dependence theory
According to resource dependence theory, the board of directors plays an important role 
in linking an organisation with its external environment and resources. Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978, p. 163) observe that ‘when an organization appoints an individual to a board, it expects 
that the individual will come to support the organization, will concern himself with its 
problems, will variably present it to others, and will try to aid it’. They argue that directors 
bring four types of benefits to the organisation: (a) information and advice; (b) better access to 
external resources; (c) channels for communicating information to an outside organisation; and 
(d) legitimacy/strengthening the public image of the organisation. This implies that, in addition 
to the monitoring function of the board, non-executive directors also provide useful resources to 
the organisation. In addition, the firm-specific knowledge and information possessed by the 
executive directors are crucial in the long-term strategy setting of the organisation. Hence, the 
composition of the board (represented by a diverse group of executives and non-executive 
directors) is viewed as a resource that can add value to the firm. For example, Hillman et al. 
(2000) suggest that every non-executive director possesses different information, skills and 
linkages to other external organisations, which are directly related to firm performance. Tricker
(2012) explains that companies need to adopt a balanced approach when appointing external 
non-executive directors. He warns that it is possible that politically connected directors or 
directors appointed by a majority shareholder (e.g., bank), who may bring various resources,
35
would also empower the directors to dictate board meeting agendas/decisions on their own 
terms and conditions.
Taking a more strategic view of resource dependence theory, Steams and Mizmchi 
(1993) find that non-executive directors, particularly the representatives of financial institutions 
on the board, can also affect a firm’s access to external financial resources or capital. Such 
representation from financial institutions enhances financial institutions’ confidence in the firm 
because it is less likely that managers would not disclose information to those (financial 
institutions) that already have representations on a firm’s board of directors (Steams and 
Mizmchi, 1993, p. 604). From a resource dependence theory perspective, a larger board could 
be considered an important resource for an organisation. Researchers take a narrow view of 
resource dependence theory and limit the scope of resources to external resources and linkages. 
However, a larger board may not only link an organisation with its external environment, it can 
also be helpful in contributing to the other aspects of board activities, such as strategy 
formulation, monitoring and advice (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, p. 17). In other words, resource 
dependence theory integrates some of the assumptions of agency theory, stewardship theory and 
a stakeholder theory. For example, the notion that a director brings resources could be applied 
to executive directors (stewardship theory), non-executive directors (agency theory) and 
stakeholder representatives on the board (stakeholder theory). In the context of Australia, Kiel 
and Nicholson (2003) found a significantly positive relationship between board size and the 
performance of firms. The findings support the assumptions of resource dependence theory that 
larger boards could benefit an organisation in different ways (e.g., in terms of skills, advice, 
monitoring, strategy formulation and linkages with external resources). The findings also show
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that larger firms have a larger board size, as they need more linkages with external 
organisations.
Using an event study and a regression analysis, Larmou and Vafeas (2010) examined the 
association between board size and a firm’s market value and stock returns for a sample of 257 
small firms listed in the USA with a three-year history of poor operating performance between 
1994 and 2000. Larmou and Vafeas (2010) find that the capital market react positively to a 
firm’s announcement about increasing its board size and vice versa. The positive reaction from 
the capital markets supports the assumptions of resource dependence theory, which means that 
any increase or decrease in a firm’s board size has important implications for investors, and, 
furthermore, investors consider the appointment of board members as an important resource for 
an organisation.
2.3.4 Stakeholder theory
According to agency theory, corporate governance mechanisms should safeguard the 
interests of shareholders. However, stakeholder theory takes a different view of corporate 
governance. Stakeholder theory argues that the board of directors should acknowledge the 
interests of a wide range of stakeholders, such as: (a) employees; (b) unions; (c) suppliers; (d) 
bankers; and (e) shareholders (Freeman, 1984). Opponents of this theory argue that 
implementing a stakeholder approach may result in a potential conflict of interests between 
various stakeholders because different stakeholders have different and ‘irreconcilable’ 
expectations (Sterberg, 2000, cited in Tricker, 2012, p. 71). The Hampel Report (1998, p. 12) 
also concluded, in reference to the UK, that ‘directors are responsible for relations with 
stakeholders; but they are accountable to the shareholders’. In some Anglo-Saxon countries,
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such as in the UK and USA, shareholders’ wealth maximisation (or shareholders’ primacy) is 
the key focus of many listed companies when making ordinary business decisions. Similarly, 
the corporate law and corporate governance codes in these countries also concentrate on the 
protection of shareholders’ interests (Hopt, 2011, p. 28). On the other hand, the majority of EU 
countries, including Germany, has a corporate governance system not only incorporating 
protection of shareholders’ interests but also explicitly focusing on the value maximisation of 
other key corporate stakeholders (such as banks and labour). For instance, the German 
Codetermination Act 1976n requires that half of the supervisory board must be elected 
representatives of employees, while the remaining members must be elected by the 
shareholders. Therefore, the labour representation on German boards is often considered a very 
important corporate governance mechanism which can facilitate additional monitoring and 
oversight of company management, thereby protecting the interests of employees as well as 
those of the shareholders. However, it is possible that such representation may create costs for 
the firm in the form of slow decision making, which can create a potential conflict of interest 
between labour representatives and shareholders’ representatives on the board (Hopt, 2011, p. 
54).
Empirical research shows that investment in stakeholder relations could lead to 
improved shareholder returns (Hillman and Keim, 2001). Using a sample of 500 US firms, 
Hillman and Keim (2001, p. 125) find that investment in stakeholder relations could have a long 
term positive impact on a firm’s financial performance. For example, firms which have a strong
11 German Codetermination Act 1976 s 1(1)1.
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relationship with their key stakeholders have a higher shareholder value and a competitive 
advantage in the form of employees’ loyalty and firm reputation.
Stakeholder engagement has important implications for a firm’s corporate governance 
practices, corporate social responsibility initiatives and financial performance. For instance, 
Ayuso et al. (2014) examined the impact of stakeholder engagement12 on the financial 
performance of 946 firms from 31 countries. The findings show that increased stakeholder 
engagement is positively related with the financial performance of firms, as measured by the 
return on equity (ROE). The next section discusses how the theories of corporate governance 
are interrelated with each other.
2.3.5 Integration of different theories
Corporate governance theories predict a relationship between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms (in particular, the board of directors and compliance with the corporate 
governance codes) and firms’ performance. A recent editorial by Kumar and Zattoni (2015), 
which is published in the Corporate Governance: An International Review journal, also 
recommends the use of multiple theories and multiple methods in corporate governance 
research, particularly when investigating the govemance-performance relationship in different 
corporate governance systems. A study by Nicholson and Kiel (2007a) finds that no single 
theory explains the relationship between corporate governance and firms’ performance, 
although each theory could explain and predict the relationship to some extent. In other words,
12 Stakeholder relationship measure was developed based on a number of questionnaire responses relating to a 
firm’s relationship with its primary stakeholders (e.g., customers and employees) and secondary stakeholders (e.g., 
local communities, non-governmental organisations and the government, etc.) (Ayuso et al., 2014, p. 423).
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these theories explore the relationship between corporate governance and firms’ performance 
from a different perspective. For instance, agency theorists assert that ‘a key activity for boards 
is monitoring management on behalf of shareholders and that effective monitoring can improve 
firm performance by reducing agency costs’ (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, p. 383). Since non­
executive directors are more independent as compared with executive directors, agency theory 
therefore predicts a positive relationship between such directors’ representation and firms’ 
performance. In contrast, stewardship theory argues that directors have a fiduciary duty to 
safeguard the interests of shareholders rather than maximising their own personal interests. 
Stewardship theory suggests that non-monetary rewards, such as recognition and the need for 
achievement, not only empower the stewards but also help in maximising a firm’s performance. 
All these theories predict a positive relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm performance. For example, the appointment of independent outside directors not only 
enhances an organisation’s links to its external resources (a resource dependence theory 
perspective), but it can also improve the monitoring capacity of outside directors (agency 
perspective). On the other hand, stakeholder theory takes into account the interests of all key 
corporate stakeholders, such as employees, banks, suppliers as well as those of the shareholders. 
This research is based on the primary assumptions of agency theory, and the three 
complementary theories (e.g., stewardship theory, resource dependence theory and stakeholder 
theory) are also used to establish a link between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance. Based on the assumptions of these theories, the next section examines the 
empirical evidence on individual internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance.
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2.4 The link between internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance
The above theoretical framework shows that internal corporate governance mechanisms, 
particularly the board of directors, play an important role in aligning the interests of owners and 
managers. Other internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as the ownership and debt 
structure and an appropriate compensation plan, can also reduce the agency costs of a firm 
(Jensen, 1993; Denis, 2001). Besides the traditional function of the board of directors to ‘hire, 
fire and compensate the chief executive officer (CEO)’ (Jensen, 1993, p. 862), the directors are 
also responsible to the owners for the overall performance of the firm. According to Zahra and 
Pearce (1989), the board of directors affects a firm’s performance by assuming three important 
roles, which are: (a) the control or monitoring role, which is based on agency theory; (b) the 
service or stewardship role; and (c) the strategic or resource dependence role. A stakeholder 
theory assumes that, if the interests of all stakeholders are acknowledged, it will improve a 
company’s relationship with key corporate stakeholders, both inside and outside the 
organisation. Therefore, different board attributes such as board size, board composition and 
board structure can influence board performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Yermack, 1996).
The empirical literature on board size, board composition, frequency of board meetings 
and other internal corporate governance mechanisms is discussed in the following sub-sections.
2.4.1 Board size
Board size is an important determinant of corporate governance that affects firm 
performance. The effectiveness of smaller and larger boards has been compared and debated in 
previous studies. For example, Lipton and Lorsch (1992, p. 67) suggest an optimal board size of 
eight to nine directors. According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), when board size increases
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beyond ten directors, it creates additional costs for the organisation in the form of slow decision 
making and poor coordination. Moreover, the directors of a small board are able to 
communicate freely their ideas -  a process which can be very useful for the firm in setting a 
corporate strategy. The corporate governance codes do not prescribe any upper or lower limits 
on board size. It is entirely the responsibility of each company to appoint its board of directors, 
keeping in view the size, structure and operations of the organisation. Psychologists also 
suggest that any board size between eight and ten could be ideal in terms of coordination 
between board members and timely decision making. Moreover, larger boards may be subject 
to boardroom politics and reaching a consensus becomes more problematic (Tricker, 2012, p. 
304). However, smaller boards are very effective as they can reach a consensus more easily in 
comparison with a large board with different opinions and ideas (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, p. 
65). Thus, the costs associated with a larger board outweigh the potential benefits that can be 
achieved by appropriate monitoring. Jensen (1993, p. 865) argues that a small board having 
seven or eight members can be easily controlled by the CEO in comparison with a larger board. 
Therefore, a small number of directors can effectively coordinate the board’s activities in order 
to control the management. However, proponents of the resource dependence theory (e.g., 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989) argue that a large board provides a link between the organisation and 
its external resources. In addition, every director represents a diversity of skills, information and 
external linkages (Hillman et al., 2000). Therefore, larger boards with personal skills and 
external resources can be useful in improving organisational performance. Empirical evidence 
also shows that larger firms have larger boards to oversee the complex operations and cross- 
border trading of a large multinational firm (Beiner et al., 2006).
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There are mixed empirical results on the relationship between board size and firm 
performance. For example, Yermack (1996) examines the relationship between board size and 
firm performance for a sample of 452 large US firms from 1984 to 1991. He documents a 
negative relationship between board size and firm performance and firm value.13 Consistent 
with Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996, p. 194) argues that, as the board size increases, the 
communication and coordination becomes more difficult. Yermack compared the mean values 
of board size with the mean values of Tobin’s Q. The findings show that, as the mean value for 
board size increases, Tobin’s Q decreases and vice versa. However, Eisenberg et al. (1998) 
argue that the findings reported by Yermack (1996) would have been more useful if he had 
included small firms in his sample, since the agency problems in small and medium sized firms 
may not be similar to those of large firms. Therefore, Eisenberg et al. (1998) investigated the 
board size effect for 879 small and medium sized Finnish firms from 1992 to 1994. Consistent 
with Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998) also find a negative relationship between larger 
board size and firm profitability. In the context of the 2007 financial crisis, Pathan and Faff
(2013) reported a negative relationship between larger board size and firm performance for a 
sample of 300 US banks. They argue that increasing board size as a result of mergers and 
acquisitions to accommodate directors from subsidiaries may be sub-optimal. Such attempts 
would indirectly increase the existing board size of a firm, which may further increase the 
burden of unexpected operating costs in already turbulent economic times.
The board of directors is considered an important corporate governance mechanism 
across all corporate governance systems. De Andres et al. (2005) examine the impact of board
13 According to Yermack (1996), the value of a firm is measured by Tobin’s Q, while firm performance is 
measured by the following financial ratios: (a) sales to assets ratio; (b) return on assets; and (c) return on sales.
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size for 450 firms across three countries from market-based systems14 (UK, USA, and Canada) 
and seven countries from the relationship-based system (Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) for the year 1996. De Andres et al. (2005) report a 
significantly negative relationship between larger board size and firm performance across these 
two corporate governance systems. Similarly, using a large sample of 2,746 UK companies, 
Guest (2009) finds that larger board size is negatively related to firm profitability and valuation. 
These results are consistent with the findings reported by Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. 
(1998).
In contrast, several studies have reported a significantly positive association between 
larger board size and firm performance. For instance, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) and Beiner et 
al. (2006) find a positive relationship between larger board size and firm performance13 for a 
sample of Australian and Swiss firms respectively. In line with resource dependence theory, 
these findings suggest that larger boards provide a link between the organisation and its external 
environment.
The above discussion indicates that empirical evidence on board size and firm 
performance is inconclusive, which means that further research is needed. This study will 
further investigate this relationship in two different corporate governance systems, as will be 
outlined later.
14 Refer to Section 2.5 for a detailed discussion on market-based systems and relationship-based systems.
15 Consistent with prior literature, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) and Beiner et al. (2006) have also used Tobin’s Q as 
a measure of firm performance.
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2.4.2 Board structure
A number of recent studies (e.g., Davies, 2000; Hopt and Leyens, 2004; Jungmann, 
2006; Hopt, 2011) has compared the effectiveness of two frequently used board structures: a 
unitary board structure in the UK and a two-tier board structure in Germany and other European 
countries. These studies have identified functional and structural differences between the UK 
and German board models. According to Davies (2000), the unitary board structure in the UK 
combines the strategy setting and monitoring function which is performed by the executive and 
non-executive directors respectively. On the other hand, these functions are separately 
performed by the management board and the supervisory board in a two-tier board system. In 
the UK, both the executive and non-executive directors are elected by the shareholders. The 
shareholders also have the powers to remove the directors from office.1*’ However, The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010) (Financial Reporting Council, 2010a) also requires that at 
least half of the board of the FTSE 350 companies should consist of non-executive directors. 
Similarly, under Section A.4 of The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2010a, p. 11), the non-executive directors are required to ‘scrutinise the 
performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the reporting 
of performance’. In contrast with this, the supervisory board members in Germany are 
appointed by the shareholders and their responsibility is to advise and supervise the 
management board. Unlike the UK, where executive and non-executive directors are on the 
same board, the supervisory board members in Germany do not participate in the meetings of 
the management board. As a result, the supervisory board may not be able to provide guidance 
on strategic issues that may significantly affect corporate performance (Jungmann, 2006). In
Companies Act 2006 s 168 (1).
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most countries, the corporate governance regulations require a greater representation of non­
executive directors. In the UK, the proportion of non-executive directors has gradually 
increased from only three in the Cadbury Report (1992) to one third in the Hampel Report 
(1998). The recent UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) requires that at least one half of the 
board should consist of non-executive directors (Financial Reporting Council, 2012b).
Comparing the effectiveness of board structures in the UK and Germany, Davies (2000) 
argues that non-executive directors in a unitary board structure have easy access to information 
because the executive and non-executive directors are part of the same unitary board structure. 
In terms of information asymmetry, the unitary board structure is regarded as superior to the 
German two-tier board structure, because the flow of information from the management board 
to the supervisory board is lengthy and time consuming (Davies, 2000). In the context of the 
Netherlands, using a questionnaire-based survey method, Bezemer et al. (2014) examined the 
challenges faced by non-executive directors in a two-tier board system. These challenges 
include: (a) the relationship between individual directors in the management and supervisory 
boards; (b) information asymmetries between the two boards; and (c) the defensive behaviour 
of management board members in addressing critical questions asked by the non-executive 
directors.
Many studies (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Yermack, 1996; De Andres et al., 
2005) have examined the relationship between board structure (in terms of board composition) 
and a firm’s performance. In these studies, board composition variable is defined by the ratio of 
non-executive directors to total board size of a firm. However, empirical studies on the 
relationship between board structure (in terms of board composition) and firm’s performance
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are inconclusive. For instance, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) found no relationship between 
board composition and firm performance. On the other hand, Yermack (1996) finds a negative 
relationship between firm performance and board composition. In the context of the 2007 
financial crisis, Pathan and Faff (2013) examined the relationship between board structure and 
firm performance for a sample of 300 commercial banks listed in the United States over the 
period 1997 and 2011. They argue that after the crisis, banks were forced to comply with the 
regulatory, requirements regarding the appointment of non-executive directors, even if such 
appointments were sub-optimal for the organisation. Pathan and Faff (2013) reported a negative 
relationship between the percentage of non-executive directors and firm performance. 
Explaining the causes of that negative relationship, they argue that the labour market for truly 
independent and professional non-executive directors is limited and regulatory restrictions on 
non-executives from holding multiple directorships may also affect the supply of independent 
non-executive directors. In the context of the UK, Weir and Laing (2000) reported a negative 
relationship between the percentage of non-executive directors and the performance of firms.
Using a sample of 1,500 firms from Standard and Poor’s composite stock index, Francis 
et al. (2012) found a negative relationship between non-executive directors and firm 
performance. Explaining the reasons for this negative relationship, Francis et al. (2012, p. 40) 
conclude that all non-executive directors may not be ‘truly independent’ as required by the 
corporate governance codes. This could affect their abilities to be effective monitors on behalf 
of shareholders. In another similar study, Erkens et al. (2012) examined 296 financial 
institutions from 30 countries during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. They found that firms with 
more non-executive directors on their boards suffered relatively more during the crisis period
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and were subsequently bailed out by their governments. Other researchers also believe that the 
non-executive directors are ineffective and particularly that they did not fully understand the 
complex operations of an organisation (Tricker, 2012). In the light of these studies, it can be 
argued that the non-executive directors failed to understand and predict a firm’s risk exposure 
before the financial crisis.
Other studies conducted in the context of the 2007 financial crisis have found a positive 
relationship between the percentage of non-executive directors and firm performance. For 
instance, Liu et al. (2012) examined the relationship between independent non-executive 
directors and firm performance for Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. They argue that the financial crisis provided an incentive for investors to monitor 
closely their investee companies. Furthermore, in a crisis period, both managers and large 
shareholders may expropriate a firm’s resources and such activities negatively affect the stock 
prices; hence a greater role for independent non-executive directors may significantly reduce 
these expropriation problems in public listed companies.
Similarly, De Andres et al. (2005) did not find any significant relationship between the 
percentage of non-executive directors and firm performance for a sample of 450 companies 
from the Anglo-Saxon and Continental European corporate governance systems. In the context 
of Germany, Bermig and Frick (2010) examined the impact of board structure on the 
performance of 294 large and medium-sized German companies between 1997 and 2007. 
However, Bermig and Frick (2010) did not find any significant relationship between the 
percentage of non-executive directors and the performance of firms. These studies show that 
increasing the number of non-executive directors on boards does not necessarily improve
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performance. The above discussion indicates that the empirical evidence on the relationship 
between board structure and firm performance is inconclusive. One reason for such 
inconclusive results could be that the empirical methods applied in prior research fail to control 
for endogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2012). Therefore, this study will also examine the impact of 
non-executive directors as well as executive directors on firm performance across different 
corporate governance systems.
2.4.3 Number of board meetings
Theoretically, from a monitoring and control perspective, board activity (measured by 
the frequency of board meetings) is another important internal corporate governance 
mechanism, which has implications for a firm’s value (Vafeas, 1999). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
argue that the time spent by the board of directors could be considered as a resource provided to 
the organisation. In fact, corporate governance codes around the world also restrict the 
executive directors from holding multiple non-executive directorships in other listed companies 
so that they can allocate sufficient time to their own companies. From a stewardship theory 
perspective, it is the legal duty of executive and non-executive directors to perform their duties 
and act in the best interests of the shareholders. Jensen (1993) argues that non-executive 
directors spend limited time and they may not be able to challenge critically corporate strategy 
and such limited engagement with an organisation may undermine their expected role of 
monitoring and control. Vafeas (1999, p. 114) emphasises that firms can improve their internal 
control mechanisms by increasing their board activities (e.g., frequency of board meetings) and 
that this can be relatively less costly and more convenient than changing other internal 
governance attributes, such as changing the board composition, and ownership structure. Vafeas
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(1999) argues that increasing board activities could be beneficial for shareholders in the form of 
setting corporate strategies and monitoring management. These benefits mitigate the potential 
costs associated with board meetings, such as directors’ meeting fees and travel expenses, 
which is a relatively small percentage of the total operating costs of a large organisation. In his 
seminal work on the effectiveness of board meetings, Vafeas (1999) reported an inverse 
relationship between the frequency of board meetings and a firm’s market valuation. He argues 
that capital markets may not necessarily reward increasing board activities. However, firms 
with frequent board meetings show a positive impact on their operating performance. On the 
other hand, for a sample of Forbes 500 firms operating between 1989 to 1995, Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) reported a significantly negative relationship between the number of board 
meetings and the operating performance (ROA) of firms.
Brick and Chidambaran (2010) argue that a financial crisis triggers investors’ and 
regulators’ attention in the form of increased oversight and regulations. These external 
pressures significantly influence a firm’s management to change its governance arrangements, 
for example increasing board activities (meetings), changing the size and membership of key 
corporate governance committees (audit, remuneration and nomination) and introducing new 
governance committees, such as risk management and internal control committees. Brick and 
Chidambaran (2010) find that pressures from investors and regulators have had a positive 
impact on the overall performance of a firm during the financial crisis period.
Empirical evidence on the relationship between board meetings and firm performance is 
inconclusive. This research re-examines the relationship between board meetings and firm 
performance for UK and German companies.
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2.5 The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in different corporate 
governance systems
Corporate governance mechanisms and corporate governance systems are clearly 
differentiated in the academic literature. Corporate governance mechanisms are the methods 
employed at the firm-level to solve corporate governance problems. On the other hand, a 
corporate governance system is defined as ‘a more-or-less country specific framework of legal, 
institutional, and cultural factors shaping the pattern of influence that shareholders (or 
stakeholders) exert on managerial decision making’ (Weimer and Pape, 1999, p. 152).
Franks and Mayer (1997) classify corporate governance systems into two types: the 
insider-dominated system and the outsider-dominated system. In the insider-dominated system, 
a small number of major shareholders controls listed companies. In contrast, large firms in the 
outsider-dominated system are owned by outside shareholders and controlled by managers. The 
first system is associated with countries in Continental Europe (such as Germany) and Japan, 
while the latter corporate governance system is associated with Anglo-Saxon countries (in 
particular, the USA, UK, etc.). The corporate governance system of the USA and UK is also 
considered as a market-based system. In a market-based system, corporate ownership is 
comparatively less concentrated. On the other hand, German and Japanese governance systems 
are categorised as relationship-based systems, having a concentrated ownership structure. In 
addition, the board structure also varies across these systems. For example, companies in a 
market-based system have a unitary board structure. On the other hand, companies in an 
insider-dominated system (in particular Germany, etc.) are required by law to have a two-tier 
board structure, which consists of a supervisory board and a management board (Franks and
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Mayer, 1997). Recently, a study was conducted by Heidrick and Struggles (a professional 
services firm) about the prevailing board systems in Europe. The findings show that the UK is 
the only country in Europe that has a 100 per cent one-tier board system (Heidrick and 
Struggles, 2011). On the other hand, Germany and Austria have a 100 per cent two-tier board 
system, while the remaining European countries have adopted a mixed board structure.17
Corporate governance models around the world can be classified further into two 
broader categories: a rules-based approach, as in the USA, and a principles-based approach, as 
in the UK (Tricker, 2012, p. 184). There are significant differences between these two systems. 
For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200218 requires all listed companies in the USA to 
comply fully with legislation and stock exchange requirements. Moreover, a rules-based 
approach to corporate governance does not provide any flexibility for non-compliance. For 
example, non-compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provisions in the USA can be very 
costly in terms of a company’s de-listing and imposition of a wide range of penalties.
On the other hand, The UK Corporate Governance Code19 is based on the principle of 
‘comply or explain’ (Financial Reporting Council, 2010a, p. 4). According to the UK Code, 
every listed company in the UK has the choice of either complying with the Code 
recommendations or explaining in its annual reports why it has not complied with specific code 
provisions. Similarly, companies in Germany can also deviate from certain code provisions but 
they are required to disclose such deviations in their annual reports. However, it is mandatory
17 ‘The mixed system of two boards (a non-executive board and an executive board) meeting separately, but 
usually with the same chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) and some executives sit on non-executive board’ 
(Heidrick and Struggles, 2011, p. 10).
18 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 s 3(1).
19 Previously known as The Combined Code.
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for companies in Germany to follow the two-tier board structure requirements under the 
relevant German law (Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code, 2010). 
Consequently, the German corporate governance system lies between self-regulation and state 
regulation and it can be categorised as ‘self-regulation in the shadow of the law’ (Hopt, 2011, p. 
15). This implies that a principles-based approach in the UK and Germany relies on voluntary 
disclosures and more self-regulation rather than a strict regulatory compliance as under the 
rules-based approach in the USA.
Agency issues, such as the conflict of interest between owners and managers, are very 
common in a market-based system. In comparison, a typical owner-manager conflict is 
relatively uncommon in an insider-dominated system. For example, the close ties between 
owners and managers in an insider-dominated system (e.g., Germany) reduce the agency 
problems. Discussing the advantages and disadvantages of concentrated ownership, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997, p. 758) observe that:
‘Large investors represent their own interests, which need not coincide with the 
interests of other investors in the firm, or with the interests of employees and managers.
In the process of using his control rights to maximise his own welfare, the large 
investor can therefore redistribute wealth -  in both efficient and inefficient ways -  from 
others’.
Research has suggested that different corporate governance mechanisms can be used in 
different governing systems in order to mitigate these agency issues. For instance, Franks and 
Mayer (1997) argue that both types of corporate governance systems employ different internal 
or external governance mechanisms (or a mix of both) to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders. Examples of such governance mechanisms include monitoring by non-executive
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(outside) directors, pay for performance and a market for corporate control (e.g., takeover 
activities).
Comparative research on corporate governance provides different evidence about these 
two governance systems. Franks and Mayer (1997) show significant differences in the 
ownership structures and control across the UK, Germany and France. However, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) argue that corporate governance systems in the UK, USA, Germany and Japan 
incorporate the essential elements of a good governance system. Therefore, these systems are 
more effective than other corporate governance systems in the world (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997). Similarly, Kaplan (1997) compares executive compensation and corporate performance 
across the USA, Germany and Japan. He does not identify any clear differences between these 
three governance systems. However, Kaplan (1997) finds that managers in all three countries 
are likely to lose their jobs in response to poor corporate earnings’ or stock performance. These 
findings are subject to criticisms because it is difficult for common shareholders to ascertain 
whether such poor corporate earnings’ or stock performance arises as a result of good or bad 
managerial decision making (Denis, 2001, p. 196).
Following Kaplan (1997), Franks and Mayer (2001) studied whether corporate losses 
lead to high board turnover for a sample of 171 non-financial firms in Germany over the period 
1989-1994. Consistent with Kaplan (1997), they conclude that management board turnover in 
Germany is higher following poor financial performance (losses) and vice versa. This shows 
that different corporate governance systems (e.g., the UK, the USA and Germany) adopt similar 
disciplinary mechanisms to monitor the board of directors of a poorly performing firm. Franks 
and Mayer (2001) argue that these losses arise as a result of poor corporate governance, such as
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inappropriate monitoring and strategy setting. However, in practice, companies can sustain 
trade losses which cannot be directly associated with the monitoring and strategy setting 
function of the board of directors. On the other hand, Franks and Mayer (2001) did not find any 
significant relationship between board turnover and performance in firms with a highly 
concentrated ownership structure. Thus, these results provide evidence that concentrated 
ownership structure in Germany is used to avail of the ‘private benefits of control’20 rather than 
necessarily benefit overall shareholders’ interest (Franks and Mayer, 2001, p. 943).
Another comparative study by Jungmann (2006) used board turnover and firm 
performance as a proxy for an effective governance mechanism for a sample of 25 companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Consistent with 
Kaplan (1997) and Franks and Mayer (2001), Jungmann (2006) has also reported a higher board 
turnover in the UK and Germany following poor financial performance. This implies that the 
corporate governance systems in the UK and Germany provide effective control mechanisms to 
resolve the agency problem. Hence there is no theoretical and empirical justification available 
to demonstrate that either one of the board models is superior to other (Jungmann, 2006, p. 426; 
Hopt, 2011).
A recent study (Goergen, 2007) on the effectiveness of different corporate governance 
systems around the world also highlights the scarcity of research on the stakeholder-based 
system of corporate governance. Criticising prior comparative corporate governance research, 
Goergen (2007, p. 7) argues that corporate governance mechanisms should not be investigated
20 Private benefits are those benefits which are received by large shareholders, but such benefits are not equally 
shared by other common stockholders, for instance, the approval of excessive perquisites for the directors 
representing large shareholders (Denis, 2001).
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in isolation because each corporate governance mechanism either ‘substitutes’ or 
‘complements’ the other. This shows that researchers need to adopt an integrated approach 
towards corporate governance, which takes into account the different aspects of internal 
corporate governance mechanisms (e.g., ownership structure, compliance, board attributes, 
etc.). The next section discusses the impact of ownership structure of firm performance.
2.6 The impact of ownership structure on firm performance
The previous section discussed the differences in the ownership structure of companies 
across the UK and Germany. This section discusses the empirical literature on blockholders’ 
ownership and the performance of firms. Table 2.2 summarises the studies discussed in this 
section. The UK companies have a dispersed ownership system and ownership is diffused 
among individuals, institutional investors and corporations (refer to Appendix A and Appendix 
E). On the other hand, German companies have a highly concentrated ownership structure and 
the majority of the German companies are owned by large shareholders, such as founding 
families, corporations and financial institutions (Thomsen et al., 2006).21 In fact, the whole idea 
of corporate governance is developed based on the separation of ownership and control in listed 
companies. Section 2.3 explains the theoretical framework of corporate governance research 
through the lens of agency theory and other supplementary theories. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that a dispersed ownership structure provides an opportunity for managers to 
expropriate a firm’s resources and thereby results in greater agency costs. On the other hand, 
managers in a concentrated ownership structure, with fewer large shareholders (blockholders), 
are less likely to expropriate a firm’s resources as they are closely monitored by the large
21 Appendix D provides further details about the percentage of shares owned by German corporations in the sample 
German companies.
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shareholders, who have greater financial incentives to monitor closely the managers. According 
to Thomsen et al. (2006), a blockholder is a shareholder who owns at least five per cent shares 
in the ordinary shares of a company. Empirical studies on ownership structure and firm 
performance are based on the theoretical proposition that a concentrated ownership system is a 
superior control mechanism as compared with a dispersed ownership system. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) argue that large corporations with dispersed shareholders have free-rider 
issues.22 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest that a concentrated ownership structure can partly 
mitigate the free-rider issue in large corporations. The nature and intensity of agency conflict 
also differ in a concentrated ownership system. For example, in a concentrated ownership 
system, a conflict of interest may not exist between shareholders and managers, although large 
shareholders may exploit the rights of minority shareholders, which could have negative 
implications for a firm’s financial performance (Franks and Mayer, 1997).
In the context of the USA, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examined the relationship 
between ownership structure and the financial performance of 400 large firms. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) argue that various corporate governance and control mechanisms exist to 
monitor a firm’s managers and corporate governance researchers need to take into account the 
impact of all different corporate governance mechanisms, such as the role of: (a) institutional 
shareholders; (b) insider shareholdings by the directors and officers of a company; (c) the 
presence of non-executive directors on the board; and (d) the impact of gearing. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996, p. 394) further argue that the use of one corporate governance mechanism may 
simultaneously depend on the use of other corporate governance mechanisms. In other words,
22 Small shareholders in a dispersed ownership structure have a low incentive to engage in active monitoring. In 
other words, small investors rely on the due diligence and monitoring of large shareholders.
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examining the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms in isolation could be 
misleading and may produce a ‘spurious correlation’ between corporate governance and the 
performance of firms. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) did not find any significant relationship 
between external blockholders’ ownership and the performance of firms.
Based on the assumptions of agency theory and using the theoretical proposition of 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), empirical studies have examined the impact of ownership structure 
on a firm’s operating and financial performance. However, empirical evidence on the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance is mixed. For example, the 
findings reported in prior literature have shown one of three results: (i) a positive relationship 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986); (ii) a negative relationship (Lehmann and Weigand, 2000); or (iii) 
no relationship (Short and Keasey, 1999). Empirical studies on the effectiveness of external 
shareholdings are carried out either in the context of a market-based system (Leech and Leahy, 
1991; Short and Keasey, 1999; O'Sullivan, 2000; Weir et al., 2002; O'Sullivan, 2009) or a 
relationship-based system (Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Lehmann and Weigand, 2000; Andres, 
2008), while only a few comparative studies have been carried out across these two corporate 
governance systems (e.g., Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Thomsen et al., 2006).
Using ownership concentration data for a sample of 587 companies from a market-based 
system and 276 companies from a relationship-based system for the period 1990-1998, 
Thomsen et al. (2006) examined the influence of external blockholders in the market- and 
control-based corporate governance systems. Thomsen et al. (2006) used an aggregate measure 
of ownership concentration, which is the fraction of ‘closely held shares’ held by : (i) owners 
who hold more than five per cent; (ii) officers, directors and families; (iii) corporations; and (iv)
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shares held in trust. For the UK and US firms, the findings show no significant relationship 
between blockholders’ ownership and the performance of firms. For companies in the 
relationship-based system, Thomsen et al. (2006), reported a negative relationship between 
blockholders’ ownership and firm performance and valuation. The • negative relationship 
between blockholders’ ownership and firm performance confirms the presence of a conflict of 
interest between minority shareholders and majority shareholders in a relationship-based system 
of corporate governance.
Leech and Leahy (1991) examined the relationship between ownership structure and the 
performance of firms for a sample of 473 large UK firms listed between 1983 and 1985. Using 
ownership concentration ratio and further classification of external blockholders based on their 
voting powers and control, Leech and Leahy (1991) found a significantly positive relationship 
between the level of external blockholdings and the performance of firms (as measured by the 
return on equity, return on sales and the market value of equity). Leech and Leahy (1991) argue 
that the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance also depends on which 
measure of ownership concentration has been used by the researchers. For example, some 
previous studies have used ownership concentration ratios as a simple representative measure of 
external blockholding (Thomsen et al., 2006), while other studies have classified external 
blockholders into institutional and non-institutional blockholders (Short and Keasey, 1999).
In the context of the UK, Short and Keasey (1999) examined the impact of ownership 
structure on the performance of firms for a sample of 225 UK listed firms for the period 1988— 
1992. The ownership structure variable measures the percentage of shares held by internal and 
external blockholders. The external blockholders measure represents those external
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shareholders who own at least five per cent of the ordinary shares of a company (both 
institutional and non-institutional blockholders). The accounting-based measure of firm 
performance included return on shareholders’ equity (RSE) and the market-based measure of 
firm performance was measured by the market to book value of equity. Short and Keasey 
(1999) find a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and the performance of 
firms. The findings also show a significantly positive impact of non-institutional shareholders’ 
ownership on the performance of UK firms. They argue that, as the equity ownership of 
managers increases, managers become entrenched (pursue personal interests) at a high level of 
managerial ownership and it negatively affects shareholders’ return. Short and Keasey (1999, p. 
99) find that when managerial ownership increases above 12 per cent, the entrenchment effects 
outweigh the alignment effect of managerial remuneration. Short and Keasey (1999) warn that 
the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance may suffer from 
endogeneity and the causality may run in the reverse direction. In other words, firms with better 
operating and financial performance may award more equity shares to their directors. In the 
context of the UK, Mura (2007) examined the impact of ownership structure and board 
composition on the performance of 1,100 non-financial firms listed in the UK. The findings 
show that institutional and non-institutional blockholders’ ownership has a significantly 
negative impact on the market valuation of firms.
Unlike traditional governance-performance studies, researchers have also examined the 
impact of ownership concentration on other corporate governance mechanisms. For example, 
O'Sullivan (2000) examined the impact of board composition and ownership concentration on 
the quality of auditing practices for a sample of 402 UK listed companies. The ownership
60
concentration measure represents the percentage of shares owned by executives and non­
executive directors and external blockholders, such as financial institutions and non-financial 
institutions. However, O’Sullivan (2000) did not report any significant relationship between 
external blockholdings and the quality of audit practices, as measured by the fees paid to the 
external auditing firms. In another similar study, O'Sullivan (2009) examined whether the 
influence of external blockholders restrict CEOs from holding multiple non-executive 
directorships in other listed companies. For a sample of 387 large UK companies and using an 
aggregate measure of ownership concentration (external blockholdings), O'Sullivan (2009) 
finds that external blockholders exert significant influence in monitoring a firm’s management 
and CEOs are less likely to hold additional non-executive directorships in firms with highly 
concentrated ownership structures.
For Germany, Gorton and Schmid (2000) examined the impact of external blockholders 
on the performance of 365 German firms for the period 1975-1986. The impact was separately 
examined for banks and non-bank blockholders. Gorton and Schmid (2000) argue that German 
banks exercise significant influence in the German corporate governance system. Similarly, 
blockholders are so influential that their presence minimises the need for external corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control (mergers and acquisitions). 
This could be one of the reasons for very low levels of takeover activities observed in a 
relationship-based corporate governance system as compared with a market-based corporate 
governance system (Gorton and Schmid, 2000). Gorton and Schmid (2000) find a positive 
relationship between equity stakes of financial institutions and the performance of firms. Gorton 
and Schmid (2000) argue that non-bank blockholders may behave differently when their equity
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stake is low and they are more likely to expropriate a firm’s resources (also known as the 
private benefits of control).
In a similar study, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) examined the relationship between 
ownership concentration and the performance of firms for a sample of 361 German firms for the 
period 1991-1996. The findings show that ownership concentration is significantly negatively 
related with the profitability of firms. A negative relationship was reported for firms that were 
owned by individuals (families) and other external shareholders. However, for those firms 
having financial institutions as their major shareholders, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) found a 
positive relationship between ownership concentration and the performance of firms. This 
shows that financial institutions play a crucial role in minimising the agency costs, particularly 
in the context of the German bank-based system of corporate governance.
Besides the significant influence exercised by financial institutions and non-financial 
institutions, individuals and families also own a majority of the shares in the German companies 
(Goergen, 2007; Goergen et al., 2008). Andres (2008) examined the relationship between the 
percentage of shares owned by founding families and the performance of 275 German firms 
listed between 1998 and 2004. The findings show that family-owned firms perform well as 
compared to companies with other external controlling shareholders and companies with 
dispersed ownership. Contrary to the findings reported by Lehmann and Weigand (2000), 
Andres (2008) finds that non-institutional blockholders successfully manage the conflict of 
interests between owners and managers, as well as between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders.
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Empirical studies have also examined how dispersed multiple blockholders23 affect the 
performance of firms. For instance, Konijn et al. (2011) examined the relationship between 
multiple blockholders and firm valuation for a sample of 744 firms listed in the USA between 
1996 and 2001. The findings show a negative relationship between blockholders’ dispersion 
and firm valuation. The findings also show that dispersed blockholders with a low equity stake 
may be unable to challenge effectively the powers of large blockholders who own a significant 
percentage of the equity of a company (Konijn et al., 2011, p. 1339).
Relatively few international comparative studies have been carried out to examine the 
impact of external shareholdings on the performance of firms. Gugler et al. (2008) compared 
the impact of ownership concentration for a sample of 1,560 firms from Anglo-Saxon countries 
(including the USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland) and 1,730 firms from 
Continental European countries (including Germany). The findings show that institutional 
shareholdings positively affect a firm’s performance in the USA, while, in Continental Europe 
and other Anglo-Saxon countries, the external ownership by financial institutions is negatively 
related with the performance of firms. Explaining the negative impact of financial institutions’ 
ownership, Gugler et al. (2008, p. 700) argue that financial institutions’ ownership may create 
agency problems in the following way:
‘Many banks have M&A departments and earn substantial fees advising clients about 
mergers. Such banks have an interest in seeing the firms they control undertake mergers, 
even when the mergers are not necessarily in the interest of the merging companies’ 
stockholders.’
23 Multiple blockholders include shares held by a number of different blockholders, namely: (i) outside 
blockholders; (ii) employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs); (iii) officers; (iv) directors; and (v) affiliated entities. 
A single blockholder with large equity stakes may behave differently as compared with multiple blockholders with 
low equity stakes in the ownership of a company (Konijn et al., 2011).
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Mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance raises questions about the methodology as well as the measures of ownership 
concentration that have been used in prior empirical studies. One reason for the mixed results 
could be that these prior studies have used different measures of ownership concentration, such 
as (a) ownership concentration ratios/aggregate percentage of external shareholdings (Thomsen 
et al., 2006); (b) the presence of a single blockholder with a significant shares ownership 
(Lehmann and Weigand, 2000); and (c) the presence of multiple blockholders (individuals, 
institutional investors, corporations) (O'Sullivan, 2000; Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Fidrmuc et 
al., 2006). A second reason for the inconclusive evidence in prior research (Leech and Leahy, 
1991; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Lehmann and Weigand, 2000; 
Andres, 2008; Konijn et al., 2011) could be the use of econometric techniques (such as the 
ordinary least squares regressions and the fixed-effects model), which do not fully control for 
the endogeneity problems. The methodology chapter further explains how the method used in 
this study controls for different kinds of endogeneity issues. Owing to this inconclusive 
relationship between external blockholdings and the performance of firms, this study will 
examine the relationship between external shareholdings and the performance of firms for a 
sample of UK and German firms. The next section discusses the implications of different legal 
systems for the performance of firms.
2.7 The impact of different legal systems on firm performance
A country’s legal system is an important corporate governance mechanism which affects 
a firm’s performance (Jensen, 1993). Legal systems around the world are classified into two 
major categories: (a) the common law system, as in England and Anglo-Saxon countries; and
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(b) the civil law system, as in France, Germany and Scandinavian countries (La Porta et al.,
1998). Corporate laws originating from these legal systems provide different kinds of protection 
to investors. For example, La Porta et al. (1998) examine the level of investor protection and the 
quality and enforcement of legal rules in 49 countries with different legal regimes. They find 
that common law countries provide the strongest protections for shareholders and creditors; 
French civil law countries give the weakest protections for investors; and German and 
Scandinavian civil law protection falls between common law and the French civil law system.
Aggarwal et al. (2010) argue that both internal corporate governance mechanisms and 
country-level corporate governance mechanisms, such as law, institutions and cultures, affect 
the overall governance of a firm. A brief history of corporate governance reforms in the UK and 
Germany is discussed in the following section to shed light on this.
2.8 The development of corporate governance codes in the UK and Germany
2.8.1 The UK Corporate Governance Code
In the late 1990s, a number of corporate scandals, such as the collapse of Polly Peck and 
the Maxwell Corporation, raised serious concerns about the protection of shareholders’ interests 
in the UK. As a result, both local and foreign investors were forced to leave the capital market. 
In response to investors’ dissatisfaction, regulators such as the Financial Reporting Council and 
the London Stock Exchange jointly established a Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance in May 1991 under the leadership of Sir Adrian Cadbury. The Cadbury 
Committee produced a code of best practice which was enforced by the London Stock 
Exchange as a listing requirement for companies reporting after June 1993. The 
recommendations of the Cadbury Report (1992) mainly addressed the issues relating to the
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company board of directors, auditors and its shareholders. In order to establish an appropriate 
level of control over company management, the Cadbury Report recommended that the roles of 
chief executive and chairman should not be fulfilled by one person. The Report also called for 
at least three non-executive directors to be appointed to the board who were required to be fully 
independent from the management (Cadbury, 1992). The Report required each listed company 
in the UK to establish three major board committees, including audit, remuneration and a 
nomination committee.
Following the Cadbury Report, the Greenbury Committee was formed in 1995 to look 
into the issue of excessive executive remuneration. The Greenbury Report (1995) recommended 
performance-based remuneration for directors with an appropriate disclosure of remuneration 
policies in the annual reports of listed companies. The Report also required companies to 
disclose directors’ remuneration on an individual basis. In order to ensure transparency in the 
remuneration system of UK listed companies, the Greenbury Committee proposed that the 
remuneration committee should be comprised of only independent non-executive directors.
The Cadbury Report and the Greenbury Report proposed to conduct a review of these 
Codes after a few years of their implementation. In order to review the recommendations 
proposed in earlier reports, the Hampel Committee was established in 1998, under the 
leadership of Sir Ronald Hampel. The Hampel Report (1998) consolidated the 
recommendations of the previous two committees into a Combined Code which was issued in 
June 1998 (Financial Reporting Council, 1998). The Combined Code addressed all concerns 
identified in earlier reports and became the basis of good corporate governance principles and 
practices in the UK. The Combined Code (provisions D.2.1 and D.2.2) required that directors
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should be responsible for undertaking an overview of the internal control systems in their 
organisations. In 1995, one of the major UK banks (Barings Bank) collapsed, as a result of its 
poor internal control system and risk management practices (Solomon, 2007, p. 58). This 
further attracted regulators’ attention and the Turnbull Committee was established to strengthen 
internal control and risk management practices in the UK listed companies. The Turnbull 
Report (1999) later recommended guidelines for effective internal control systems in UK listed 
companies. The Report required each listed company in the UK to disclose fully in its annual 
report a review of the internal control system and risk management strategies.
Regulators in the UK promptly responded with different corporate governance reforms 
after the collapse of Enron and WorldCom in the USA. For instance, the Higgs Report (2003) 
identified a need for a more effective role to be taken by non-executive directors in protecting 
the interests of shareholders. The Report also recommended changes to the Combined Code by 
increasing the proportion and role of non-executive directors from one third to one half of the 
board. The Report also restricted the executive directors from holding more than one non­
executive directorship in any of the FTSE 100 constituent firms. The Report also proposed that 
each listed company should appoint a senior non-executive director, who should be responsible 
for directly communicating with the shareholders, particularly the institutional shareholders. 
The Tyson Report (2003) provided guidelines on the recruitment and development of non­
executive directors. The Report found that greater board diversity in terms of non-executive 
directors’ backgrounds, education, and experience enhanced the effectiveness of the board. 
Following the collapse of Arthur Andersen (one of the world’s leading accounting firms), 
regulators and investors raised concerns about the roles and responsibilities of companies’
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external auditors. In response, the Financial Reporting Council in the UK established the Smith 
Committee to develop guidelines for audit committees. The Smith Report (2003) proposed 
strengthening the role of internal audit and audit committees so that the auditors could 
independently monitor the integrity of financial statements. The Report proposed that the audit 
committee should be responsible for recommending the appointment of external auditors. The 
Smith Report (2003) emphasised that all members of the audit committee should be independent 
non-executive directors, with at least one member having relevant experience in accounting and 
finance. The Report required listed companies to disclose fully the audit committee report in 
their annual reports.
In July 2003, the Financial Reporting Council revised the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (Financial Reporting Council, 2003). Since then the Combined Code has been 
revised in 2006 and 2008 respectively (Financial Reporting Council, 2006; Financial Reporting 
Council, 2008). The Combined Code has now been renamed as The UK Corporate Governance 
Code and compliance with the Code is now a listing requirement for FTSE 350 companies 
trading on the London Stock Exchange.
After the 2007 financial crisis, the UK government commissioned an independent 
review of the corporate governance practices (including board effectiveness, board 
remuneration, risk management and audit related matters) in the banking sector, under the 
chairmanship of David Walker. The Walker Review (2009) recommended the establishment and 
empowerment of firm-level risk management committees, to be chaired by independent non­
executive directors. The Review also emphasised that each listed company should be required to
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disclose fully its business model in the annual report. The Walker Review also called for a 
separate corporate governance code for UK institutional shareholders.
In response to the recommendations of the Walker Review, The UK Stewardship Code 
was issued in July 2010 (Financial Reporting Council, 2010b), which aimed actively to engage 
institutional investors in the governance process of their investee companies. The Code requires 
institutional investors in the UK to disclose on a ‘comply or explain’ basis that how they will 
discharge their stewardship responsibilities.24 A revised version of The UK Stewardship Code 
was issued in September 2012 (Financial Reporting Council, 2012a).
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) emphasises that each listed company 
should provide convincing explanations when they opt to explain any deviation from any 
provision of the Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2012b). The Code also recommends that 
every listed company should publish its policy on board diversity in its annual reports.
The latest version of The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) was published in 
September 2014 (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). The Code includes specific guidelines on 
risk management and internal control systems. For instance, provision C.2.1 of The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2014) requires that directors should disclose the risk assessment 
frameworks of their companies in the annual reports and they are also required to report how 
the potential risks faced by a company are mitigated or managed (Financial Reporting Council, 
2014). Provision C.2.2 of The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) further emphasises that 
directors have to report an assurance to the shareholders that the business will continue its
24 These responsibilities include monitoring and engaging investee companies in areas relating to: (a) corporate 
strategy; (b) performance; (c) risk; (d) capital structure; and (e) corporate governance, as well as corporate culture and 
remuneration (Financial Reporting Council, 2010b, p. 1).
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operations on a going-concem basis and will be able to meet its liabilities when they are due 
over the assessment period (Financial Reporting Council, 2014).
The Financial Reporting Council in the UK regularly engages in consultations with 
various stakeholders (companies, auditors and investor communities), aiming to improve 
corporate governance practices in the UK. Figure 2.1 below summarises corporate governance 
developments in the UK over the period 1992-2015.
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Figure 2.1 The development of Corporate Governance Codes in the UK
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2.8.2 The German Corporate Governance Code
Unlike the USA and the UK, where corporate laws and corporate governance codes 
included significant protection for investors, German regulators and policy makers continued to 
neglect the protection of shareholders until the late 1990s (Cromme, 2005). A large number of 
German companies was owned and controlled by a few financial institutions (Franks and 
Mayer, 2001). Until the 1990s, the German banks exercised significant influence in the German 
corporate governance system and German firms were highly dependent on commercial banks 
(Gorton and Schmid, 2000). Agarwal and Elston (2001) identify three reasons for this 
significant influence of German commercial banks, which include: (i) the provision of loan 
facilities to German firms; (ii) representation on a firm’s supervisory board; and (iii) exercise of 
proxy voting rights by German banks. However, this greater influence exercised by such 
financial institutions resulted in an inadequate focus on shareholder interests (Goncharov et al., 
2006, p. 432). In addition, German companies listed on foreign stock exchanges were also 
required to fulfil the listing requirements in such countries (Baums, 2003, p. 181). German 
companies, particularly in the iron and steel industry, faced significant economic problems in 
the late 1990s. Both local and foreign investors raised concerns over the inadequate monitoring 
role of the German supervisory boards (Du Plessis et al., 2012, p. 16). Furthermore, the 
development of the Cadbury Report (1992) in the UK could also be considered a driving force 
for various corporate governance reforms around the world. In response to growing local and 
international pressures calling for additional corporate governance reforms, the Baums 
Commission on Corporate Governance, Corporate Management and Reform of German law 
was established in May 2000, under the leadership of Professor Baums. The Baums 
Commission Report (2000) recommended that a separate commission should be set up to
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develop a German corporate governance code (Commission of the German Corporate 
Governance Code, 2000). On the recommendations of the Baums Commission, the Federal 
Ministry of Justice established the Cromme Commission in September 2001 under the 
chairmanship of Gerhard Cromme. As a result, the first German Corporate Governance Code 
was published in February 2002 and came into force in July 2002 (Commission of the German 
Corporate Governance Code, 2002). The Code has addressed all previous criticisms by clearly 
defining shareholder rights, requiring cooperation between management board and supervisory 
board and defining the role of financial statement auditors (Cromme, 2005).
In order to promote a corporate culture of self-regulation, the German Corporate 
Governance Code is not legally binding for listed companies (Commission of the German 
Corporate Governance Code, 2001). In other words, it is based on the principle of ‘comply or 
explain’. The general objective of the German Corporate Governance Code is to enhance local 
and foreign investors’ confidence by ensuring transparency and investor protection in the 
German corporate governance system (Commission of the German Corporate Governance 
Code, 2001).
The Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code is responsible for 
regularly reviewing German corporate governance. Since then, the Code has been amended 
each year with a first amendment in May 2003 and the last amendment in May 2012 
respectively (Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code, 2012a). Changes are 
incorporated in the provisions dealing with the appointment of management board and 
supervisory board members and their compensation. In 2009 the amended Code emphasised the 
improvement of diversity on the supervisory boards and management boards of German listed
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companies. Currently, there are many challenges for the Commission of the German Corporate 
Governance Code. First, the Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code has to 
improve the functions, efficiency and professionalism of the German supervisory boards and to 
make sure that the supervisory boards remain truly independent like their non-executive 
counterparts in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Du Plessis et al., 2012). Second, the German 
Corporate Governance Code includes a few controversial and unpopular provisions that have 
been constantly violated by the majority of listed companies (Bebenroth, 2005, cited in 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, p. 384). For example, the Code requires that directors’ 
remuneration should be disclosed on an individual basis (divided into fixed and variable 
components), while the Stock Exchange Admission Regulations in Germany require each 
company to disclose its board remuneration on an aggregate basis (Goergen et al., 2008, p. 
190). Regarding any major changes in the German corporate governance model, Du Plessis et 
al. (2012, p. 39) conclude that ‘one thing is sure; there is no sign of Germany moving away 
from a two-tier board system’.
The above discussion indicates that there are key differences across the UK and 
Germany, particularly in terms of code formation and developments. However, corporate 
governance reforms in both countries have been driven by a number of internal and external 
forces. For instance, Lutz et al. (2011, p. 315) argue that the UK corporate governance 
movement ‘largely reflects the demands of institutional investors for stricter standards. In 
contrast, members of the traditional German “stakeholder coalition” pushed for a code that was 
intended to be more of marketing than a regulatory instrument’. The next section reviews the 
empirical literature on compliance with the corporate governance codes and firm performance.
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2.9 Compliance with the corporate governance codes and firm performance
Irrespective of the governance systems in different locations, good corporate governance 
mechanisms are important in many ways. First, firms that practise good governance can access 
capital markets on better terms and borrow easily at a reduced market rate (La Porta et al., 
1998; Aggarwal et al., 2010). Second, there could be a ‘signalling effect’ to the capital market, 
which provides assurance to prospective investors that the firm is well governed (Chhaochharia 
and Laeven, 2009, p. 406). Moreover, a global investor opinion survey showed that 15 per cent 
of European institutional investors were more concerned about firm corporate governance than 
a firm’s financial issues (e.g., profit, growth potential). Similarly, 22 per cent of these investors 
were willing to pay an average premium of 19 per cent for well governed companies as opposed 
to poorly governed companies (Mckinsey and Company, 2002). Studies conducted in the 
context of the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis (Mitton, 2002) and the recent 2007 
financial crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009) also find a positive relationship between coiporate 
governance mechanisms and a firm’s performance during these extraordinary times. Bae et al. 
(2012) argue that firms with poor governance practices become exposed to the capital markets 
and increasing a firm’s risk exposure in a crisis period may not necessarily be appreciated by 
the capital markets. Therefore, corporate governance issues need more attention in a period of 
economic crisis.
Empirical research on corporate governance mechanisms and performance shows a 
positive relationship between good governance and firm operating and financial performance 
(Core et al., 1999), and higher firm valuation (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Gompers et al., 2003). Most 
of these studies examine firm-level corporate governance in a specific country and find that
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cross-firm differences in governance have a significant effect on firm performance and 
valuation.
Some previous studies (e.g., Murphy, 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Yermack, 
1996) have examined the impact of individual corporate governance mechanisms in isolation. 
These studies have separately analysed the impact of board size, board composition and 
executive compensation on firm performance. However, the financial performance of a firm 
may be affected by a broad range of corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, instead of 
looking at one single individual corporate governance mechanism (e.g., board size, board 
composition, executive compensation), researchers have frequently used a broad corporate 
governance index. A corporate governance index (or a compliance index) is a proxy for 
corporate governance that incorporates different firm-specific internal corporate governance 
provisions. Love (2011) has identified three key elements from which a corporate governance 
index is constructed, such as: (a) corporate bye-laws and charter provisions (articles of 
association); (b) corporate governance rankings provided by Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS) and Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA); and (c) surveys of firms. Table 2.2 
summarises the studies discussed in this section.
Using 24 corporate governance provisions, Gompers et al. (2003) are among the 
pioneers who constructed a non-compliance corporate governance index for a sample of 1,500 
US firms. For every firm that did not comply with a particular governance provision (such as 
shareholders’ rights), Gompers et al. (2003) added one point to the governance index. This 
implies that a higher degree of non-compliance indicates a weak corporate governance structure 
of a firm. Gompers et al. (2003) find that firms with a lower governance index (indicating good
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corporate governance) have higher equity returns and higher firm value. Thus the higher agency 
cost in poorly governed companies, as measured by a corporate governance index could be one 
of the reasons for low equity returns and earnings performance (Gompers et al., 2003).
Prior corporate governance studies in the UK have focused on the compliance behaviour 
of all listed companies in the UK (including domestic and foreign companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange). In a recent study, Rejchrt and Higgs (2014) examined the compliance 
behaviour of 45 non-domestic companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. The findings 
show that non-domestic companies exhibit low level of compliance compared with the domestic 
UK companies. In particular, 24 per cent of the non-domestic companies from high power- 
distance cultures did not separate the roles of a CEO and Chairman. The findings indicate that 
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Drobetz et al. (2004) investigate the impact of corporate governance on stock returns for 
a sample of 91 German listed companies. In order to construct a corporate governance index, 
they used 30 corporate governance provisions from The German Corporate Governance Code. 
These provisions are divided into five categories: (a) corporate governance commitments (firm- 
specific corporate governance guidelines); (b) shareholders’ rights; (c) transparency; (d) 
management and supervisory board matters; and (e) auditing. Consistent with Gompers et al.
(2003), Drobetz et al. (2004) have also reported a positive relationship between the quality of 
corporate governance and firm operating performance, stock returns and firm value. Following 
Drobetz et al. (2004), Goncharov et al. (2006) examine the impact of corporate governance 
compliance on the valuation of 80 large German firms. They find that a high degree of 
compliance with the corporate governance code is more highly valued by investors. They find, 
for instance, that well-governed companies25 are priced at an average premium of 10 per cent 
higher than poorly governed companies. This implies that corporate governance codes are 
relevant to value and that a degree of non-compliance is not rewarded by capital markets.
Beiner et al. (2006) also constructed a comprehensive corporate governance index based
on 38 internal corporate governance provisions from the Swiss Code o f Best Practice fo r
Corporate Governance (2002) (Swiss Business Federation, 2002). They added one point to the
governance index if a firm complied with any of the 38 provisions of the Code and zero
otherwise. Since a single corporate governance index may provide misleading results, Beiner et
al. (2006), therefore, also examined the impact of other corporate governance variables such as:
(a) board size; (b) outside directors; (c) shareholding by the largest shareholder; (d)
25 A company with a higher degree of compliance with the corporate governance code is known as a ‘well- 
governed company’ (Goncharov et al., 2006, p. 434).
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shareholdings by large outside block holders; and (e) leverage (gearing). They find a positive 
relationship between good corporate governance mechanisms and firm value. The findings of 
these studies show that capital markets play a disciplinary role in every corporate governance 
system.
Relatively few studies examine the impact of firm-level corporate governance in a cross- 
section of countries (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Bauer et al., 2004; Dumev and Kim, 2005; 
Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2010; Ammann et al., 2011). These studies 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in 14 emerging 
markets; the European Union; 24 developed and emerging countries; and 23 developing 
countries respectively.
Klapper and Love (2004) analyse the association between corporate governance and 
firm performance for 374 firms across 14 emerging market countries. They create a governance 
index of 57 firm-level governance attributes, using those produced by Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia (CLSA)26 in late 2000. Klapper and Love (2004) find that good governance is 
positively associated with market valuation and a firm’s operating performance (e.g., return on 
assets), and that this relationship holds true across several emerging markets. Klapper and Love 
(2004, p. 713) argue that firms listed on foreign stock exchanges are more likely to adopt strong 
corporate governance mechanisms because they are subject to additional disclosure 
requirements. These findings are consistent with the results reported by Gompers et al. (2003), 
which find that companies in the United States with weak governance structures demonstrate a
26 The CLSA corporate governance index uses a composite of 57 qualitative questions, covering seven broad 
categories: management discipline; transparency; independence; accountability; responsibility; fairness; and social 
awareness. A ‘yes’ answer to a particular question adds one point to the governance score.
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relatively lower performance. Klapper and Love (2004) argue that governance practices matter 
more in countries with weak legal protection for investors, and so firm-level corporate 
governance has a higher impact on valuation in these countries. In other words, these findings 
indicate that investors assign a higher valuation to well-governed companies and vice versa. 
Therefore, investors take into account firm-level governance provisions when they are making 
corporate investment decisions.
For the European Union, Bauer et al. (2004) study the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and stock returns, firm value and operating performance over the 
period 2000 and 2001. Bauer et al. (2004) used the Deminor Corporate Governance Ratings27 
for FTSE Eurotop 300 firms and classified these firms into two categories: good governance 
portfolio and bad governance portfolio. A higher score on the compliance index indicates an 
effective enforcement of the governance code and such firms are categorised as good 
governance companies and vice versa. Bauer et al. (2004) find that higher rating leads to higher 
stock returns and improves firm value. Contrary to Gompers et al. (2003), Bauer et al. (2004) 
find a negative relationship between governance standards and eamings-based performance 
ratios, for example, net profit margin and return on equity. Following the study by Bauer et al.
(2004), only a few studies have been carried out to investigate comparative corporate 
governance practices across Europe, because the Deminor Corporate Governance Ratings are 
unavailable except for a specific time period (2000-2001). Following the approach and data 
used by Bauer et al. (2004) and using an alternative measure of a firm’s operating performance 
(return on assets), Bauwhede (2009) re-examined the relationship between governance and
27 Deminor is a corporate governance rating agency and the ratings are available for FTSE Eurotop 300 firms over 
the period 2000-2001.
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performance for a sample of FTSE Eurotop 300 firms. Contrary to the negative relationship 
reported in the previous study, Bauwhede (2009) reported a positive relationship between 
compliance with the corporate governance codes and firm operating performance. He argues 
that the return on assets is a superior measure of a firm’s performance and the income measure 
(operating income) used in the computation of return on assets is less affected by extraordinary 
items such as income from asset disposals (Bauwhede, 2009, p. 498). This suggests that 
corporate governance researchers should use an appropriate measure of a firm’s operating 
performance (e.g., return on assets).
Recently, Essen et al. (2013) examined the impact of firm-level and country-level 
corporate governance regulations for a sample of 1,197 firms from 26 European countries. They 
found that the quality of the legal system and investor protection has a significantly positive 
impact on the performance of firms. Essen et al. (2013, p. 201) criticised the ‘universality of 
good governance prescriptions’ and they argued that the govemance-performance relationship 
is context-specific, subject to institutional and environmental circumstance.
Similar to Klapper and Love (2004), Dumev and Kim (2005) have also used the 
corporate governance score compiled by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) and Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P) disclosure data28 for a sample of 474 firms in 24 developed and emerging 
market countries. These scores are based on a range of firm-level governance characteristics 
which are: (a) disclosure; (b) board structure; (c) ownership structure; and (d) accountability. 
Durnev and Kim (2005) confirm a significant relationship between firm-level corporate
28 Standard and Poor’s (S&P) disclosure score is a sum of 91 provisions which are relevant to investors. The S&P 
disclosure score is a measure of transparency and a higher disclosure score indicates the highest quality of firm- 
level disclosure practices (Durnev and Kim, 2005, p. 1470).
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governance and firm value in a cross-section of countries. These results not only validate the 
findings reported by Klapper and Love (2004) for 14 emerging market countries, but also 
provide evidence of a need for external financing-motivated firms to practise better governance 
in weaker legal regimes.
Other streams of research (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2010) 
compare the governance of US firms with that of non-US firms. These studies have used ISS 
(Institutional Shareholder Services’) data on corporate governance attributes for a sample 
period of 2005 and 2003-2005, respectively. For instance, Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) 
find that capital markets reward those companies that improve their governance attributes 
beyond those required by law and corporate practice in their home countries, and that these 
improvements in corporate governance attributes are positively correlated with firm value. On 
the other hand, Aggarwal et al. (2010) find that the value (as measured by Tobin’s Q) of non- 
US firms decreases as their governance index value falls, as compared with the governance 
index of comparable US firms. Therefore, these results explain that ‘country-level investor 
protection is a crucial determinant in the intensity of investment in internal governance of a 
firm’ (Aggarwal et al., 2010, p. 3167).
The methods used in prior empirical corporate governance studies (as shown in Table 
2.2) have been criticised for their inability to control for different kinds of endogeneity issues. 
Endogeneity refers to a situation when the causality (effect of governance on performance) may 
run in the opposite direction (from performance to governance) (Schultz et al., 2010, p. 146). 
These studies have adopted one of the following methods: (i) a simple ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS) model (Gompers et al., 2003; Bauer et al., 2004); or (ii) fixed-effects or
random-effects models (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009).29 However, these methods fail to 
control for endogeneity problems and could provide a ‘spurious correlation’ between 
governance and performance (Schultz et al., 2010, p. 145). Schultz et al. (2010) investigated the 
relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and performance for a sample 
of 200 firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange between 2000 and 2007. Using a 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation technique,30 they found no causal 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. In the context of 
the USA, Wintoki et al. (2012) re-examined the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance for a sample of 6,000 firms between 1991 and 2003. 
Consistent with Schultz et al. (2010), they did not find any causal relationship between internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. These studies suggest that 
endogeneity issues could be resolved if researchers use a more sophisticated econometric 
model, such as a generalised method of moments (GMM), which controls for different kinds of 
endogeneity problems.
The findings of previous studies being reported in Table 2.2 are subject to a number of 
constraints as regards their usefulness. First, some of these studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 
2004; Dumev and Kim, 2005) have used subjective31 analysts’ corporate governance scores, 
which are compiled by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA). These ratings have been 
criticised because 30 per cent of their questions represent analysts’ opinions. Therefore, it is 
more likely that these rankings might include analysts’ personal bias. Second, the indices used
29 Section 3.5 presents an alternative approach to overcome the endogeneity problems and it critically discusses 
these methods.
30 Refer to Section 3.5 for a detailed discussion of GMM.
31According to Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia, around 70 per cent of questions are based on objective facts, while 
the remaining questions represent analysts’ opinions (Klapper and Love, 2004).
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in previous studies have only taken into account the level of compliance or non-compliance 
with limited provisions of a corporate governance code. This study uses a more comprehensive 
corporate governance index (‘comply or explain’ index), which takes into account the level of 
compliance as well as the quality of explanations reported for non-compliance with a corporate 
governance code. The next section focuses on the corporate governance disclosure literature 
and discusses the importance of the ‘explain’ element of the ‘comply or explain’ principle.
2.10 Corporate governance disclosure across different corporate governance systems
The. ‘comply or explain’ principle, which is the foundation of the UK corporate 
governance system, has been adopted in many countries around the world. The majority of EU 
countries, such as France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands have also implemented the 
‘comply or explain’ principle. The EU Commission Directive 2006/46/EC requires listed 
companies in member states to disclose annually in their corporate governance reports how they 
have applied the provisions of the national corporate governance codes (European Commission, 
2006, p. 2). The EU Commission Directive 2006/46/EC further requires listed companies to 
disclose if any voluntary corporate governance practices are implemented beyond those 
required by the national corporate governance codes European Commission (2006, p. 4). 
Similarly, in Australia, the code is based on an ‘if not, why not’ principle, while the South 
African King Report is based on an ‘apply or explain’ principle (Du Plessis et al., 2012, p. 32).
Indeed, ‘compliance’ and the ‘explanations for non-compliance’ with corporate 
governance codes are claimed to be the two most important pillars of an effective corporate 
governance system (Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 2011, p. 492). In the case of non-compliance, 
the ‘comply or explain’ principle provides the flexibility to justify any deviation from the
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recommendations of the code of best practice. For instance, the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2012b, p. 4) states that ‘deviation from a provision may be 
justified in particular circumstances if good governance can be achieved by other means’. The 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) further emphasises that:
‘In their responses to explanations, shareholders should pay due regard to companies’ 
individual circumstances and bear in mind, in particular, the size and complexity of the 
company and the nature of the risks and challenges it faces’.
Financial Reporting Council (2012b, p. 4)
In fact, the emergence of the ‘comply or explain’ approach has created a dilemma for 
investors to assess what constitutes an acceptable explanation and what does not. A recent 
discussion paper by the Financial Reporting Council (2012c) outlines three elements of a 
convincing explanation, which should include: (a) the context and historical background of any 
deviation; (b) a clear rationale for the action taken; and (c) a description of the mitigating action 
to address the deviations from the Code. The Code32 also recommends that companies should 
avoid using ‘boiler-plate’ statements33 in their corporate governance reports. In general, the 
explanations for non-compliance should, however, meet the expectations of shareholders 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2012c), so that they can obtain a true and fair view of the 
governance affairs of a company. In the context of the EU, where corporate governance codes 
are largely based on the principle of ‘comply or explain’, the European Company Law and 
Corporate Governance Action Plan (European Commission, 2012) has raised a similar concern 
about the quality of explanations reported in the compliance statements of listed companies in
32 Paragraph 6 of the Preface to the UK Corporate Governance Code 2012 (Financial Reporting Council, 2012b).
33 Statements providing ‘generic’ or standard phrases, such as, ‘in the best interest of the company’ ‘we believe
that’... ‘in our opinion’... ‘we consider that’ and soon.
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member states. The European Company Law and Corporate Governance Action Plan (2012, p. 
6) noted that: ‘companies either simply state that they had departed from a recommendation 
without any further explanation, or provide only a general or limited explanation’. The 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has warned that it would undertake another review in 2014 
and if  the quality of reported explanations should not improve, then the FRC would take the 
necessary steps to ensure compliance with the recommendations of the Code (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2013, p. 19). Recently, the EU Commission Directive 2014/208/EU issued 
further recommendations on the quality of corporate governance reporting (‘comply or 
explain’) and requires all national-level regulators in the member states to inform the 
Commission of their country-level arrangements by 13 April 2015 (European Commission, 
2014). The EU Commission Directive 2014/208/EU warned that non-compliant companies 
should avoid using ‘standard language’ and should report context-specific explanations and the 
explanations reported for non-compliance should be accurate, comprehensive and the 
information should be disclosed in such a away so that the investors can easily access it 
(European Commission, 2014, p. 1). These recent regulatory initiatives highlight loopholes in 
the existing ‘comply or explain’ approach to corporate governance.
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has recently published a corporate governance 
and stewardship monitoring report titled ‘Developments in Corporate Governance and 
Stewardship 2014’ and the new Chairman of the Financial Reporting Council, Sir Winfried 
Bischoff, has expressed concerns about the quality of reported explanations in the following 
way:
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‘There has been an increase in compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
While this remains encouraging I remind companies who have chosen not to comply 
that explanations should fully describe and explain their thinking’.
(Financial Reporting Council, 2015, p. 1) 
Empirical studies also cast doubt on the effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ system 
and call for a greater regulatory oversight and active engagement of shareholders in monitoring 
the quality of corporate governance disclosure (e.g., Andres and Theissen, 2008; Sergakis, 
2013; Keay, 2014). Andres and Theissen (2008) examined the determinants of the quality of 
corporate governance disclosure for a sample of German companies. They found that 
companies with high level of executive remuneration and companies with a concentrated 
ownership structure tend to violate the executive remuneration requirements of The German 
Corporate Governance Code. Andres and Theissen (2008, p. 289) argue that non-compliant 
companies take advantage of the ‘explain’ option granted by the ‘comply or explain’ system 
and providing too much flexibility to the corporate sector would be similar to ‘setting a fox to 
keep the geese’. The lack of shareholder engagement and the unwillingness of companies to 
improve the quality of their explanations are the two major challenges in the ‘comply explain’ 
regimes (Keay, 2014, p. 303). Keay (2014, p. 304) suggests stronger regulations in the form of 
‘soft sanctions’, e.g. informally communicating non-compliance and engaging regularly with 
the non-compliant companies’ boards along with the threat of potential actions, if  remedial 
actions are not taken. Sergakis (2013) proposes a ‘multi-player’ regulatory oversight of the 
‘comply or explain’ principle, which should define the monitoring roles for various corporate 
governance players, such as the national-level regulators, institutional investors and the 
auditors.
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In the past 23 years, since the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992) and other 
voluntary corporate governance codes around the world, corporate governance researchers have 
mainly focused on the level of a firm’s compliance with various codes in different national and 
international environments (refer to Section 2.8, Table 2.2). However, the empirical research on 
the level of compliance or non-compliance with the corporate governance codes, and its impact 
on a firm’s performance is largely inconclusive. For example, the findings reported in prior 
literature have shown one of three results: (i) a strongly positive relationship (e.g., Klapper and 
Love, 2004; Dumev and Kim, 2005); (ii) a negative relationship (Bauer et al., 2004); or (iii) no 
causal relationship (Wintoki et al., 2012) between corporate governance mechanisms and a 
firm’s performance. As a result of increasing pressures from the capital markets and the 
regulators (enforcing ‘comply or explain’ as a listing requirement) (MacNeil and Li, 2006), the 
level of compliance in the UK has significantly increased from 28 per cent in 2005 to 50 per 
cent over the period 2010-2012 (Grant Thornton, 2012, p. 8). This growing tendency towards 
compliance has now shifted the perspective of regulators and investors towards the quality of 
explanations reported for non-compliance with the recommended codes of best practice. This 
study attempts to examine the different types of explanations provided by firms when they do 
not comply with the requirements of the Code.
Theoretically, the explanations for non-compliance can be examined in the light of 
agency theory and empirical research on voluntary corporate disclosure. The ‘comply or 
explain’ mechanism is primarily based on the idea of voluntary corporate disclosure 
(Hooghiemstra, 2012, p. 6). Section 2.3 explains how corporate governance disclosure reduces 
the information asymmetries (differences in the available information) between managers and
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shareholders. The benefits of better corporate governance disclosure include access to the 
capital markets on better terms and conditions and borrowing at a relatively lower interest rate 
(Klapper and Love, 2004). This provides an opportunity for firms to comply or otherwise 
disclose the reasons for non-compliance in their annual reports. Full compliance with the 
corporate governance codes could also give an assurance to external investors (banks) that a 
firm is likely to meet the requirements of the lenders (debt agreements) as well (Klapper and 
Love, 2004).
Only a few studies have focused on the ‘explain’ element of the ‘comply or explain’ 
principle. Table 2.3 provides a summary of recent corporate governance disclosure literature. 
Hooghiemstra and Van Ees (2011) and Seidl et al. (2012) are among the pioneers who have 
developed a taxonomy of the explanations and justifications reported by non-compliant firms. 
For a sample of 257 listed firms in the UK and Germany over the period 2006, Seidl et al. 
(2012) have divided the reported explanations for non-compliance into three broader categories 
which include:
(1) Deficient justification -  where a firm discloses non-compliance without giving 
reasons for the non-compliance;
(2) Context-specific justification -  where a non-compliant firm provides arguments that 
a provision of the Code cannot be implemented owing to the following reasons: (a) 
company size; (b) company structure; (c) international context of the company; (d) 
industry-specific reasons; (e) company’s newness to code provision; or (f) other 
company-specific reasons; and
(3) Principled justification -  where a firm explains that a particular code provision is in 
conflict with social norms, values or laws and, therefore, such provision of a code 
cannot be implemented.
Seidl et al. (2012) find that 55.7 per cent of the sample firms in Germany and 41.3 per 
cent of firms in the UK provided deficient justification for their non-compliance with the
95
respective corporate governance codes. Similarly, 12.5 per cent of the sample firms in Germany 
and 6.5 per cent of the sample firms in the UK provided explanations that some of the code 
provisions could not be implemented as they were ineffective for their organisation. 
Hooghiemstra and Van Ees (2011) examine the quality of explanations reported by 126 firms in 
the Netherlands during 2005. The findings show that larger firms tend to avoid non-compliance 
as this could damage their corporate reputation. They further explain that compliant firms adopt 
largely similar provisions from a code, while non-compliant firms provide similar explanations 
to justify their position. Hooghiemstra and Van Ees (2011) conclude that reporting similar 
explanations for non-compliance could create doubts about the effectiveness of a principles- 
based approach to corporate governance. On the other hand, if a firm reports convincing 
explanations for non-compliance, it could provide positive signals to the capital markets that a 
firm has chosen superior alternative corporate governance mechanisms, and may also divert 
shareholders’ attention away from non-compliance with the corporate governance code 
(Okhmatovskiy and David, 2012).
The level of corporate governance disclosure also varies across different legal systems.
Bushman et al. (2004) examined country-level determinants of corporate governance disclosure
for a sample of 46 countries, using Centre for International Financial Analysis and Research
(CIFAR) disclosure data related to corporate governance.34 They reported that corporate
governance disclosure and transparency are linked with legal/judicial regimes -  with higher
corporate governance disclosure and transparency in common law countries and in countries
with an active judicial system. In another similar study, Bauwhede and Willekens (2008)
34 CIFAR assigns a score to each country based on the disclosure relating to the following categories: (a) range of 
shareholdings; (b) major shareholders; (c) list of board members and their affiliations; (d) directors’ and officers’ 
remuneration; and (e) directors’ and employees’ share ownership (Bushman et al., 2004, p. 245).
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examined the firm-level determinants of corporate governance disclosure for a sample of FTSE 
Eurotop 300 companies for the year 2000. Using the Deminor Corporate Governance Rating35 
as a proxy for corporate governance disclosure, they found that the level of corporate 
governance disclosure is high in the common law countries (United Kingdom and Ireland), and 
low in non-common law countries (France, Germany and Scandinavia). However, the study by 
Bushman et al. (2004) and that by Bauwhede and Willekens (2008), which uses Deminor 
ratings on corporate governance disclosure and CIFAR disclosure data, did not take into 
account the disclosure information on the explanations provided for non-compliance with the 
corporate governance codes.
In the context of the UK, Arcot and Bruno (2011) classified the explanations for non- 
compliance with eight provisions36 of The Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
(Financial Reporting Council, 1998), for a sample of FTSE 350 companies over the period 
1998-2004. They divided the explanations for non-compliance into six different types, which 
are:
(1) ‘Type O’ -  when there is no compliance statement in the corporate governance report 
or no explanation is reported in the compliance statement;
(2) ‘Type 1’ -  when the explanation for non-compliance is uninformative and it uses 
‘standard sentences’;
(3) ‘Type 2’ -  when the explanations reported for non-compliance are ambiguous;
35 Deminor is a corporate governance rating agency and the ratings are available for FTSE Eurotop 300 firms over 
the period 2000-2001. Deminor assigns a rating from 1 to 5 to each firm and a higher rating indicates a higher 
quality of corporate governance disclosure and vice versa. The Deminor corporate governance disclosure rating is 
developed using disclosure information on: (a) composition and function of the board and board committees; (b) 
board remuneration; (c) compliance with a national corporate governance code; (d) a company’s share capital and 
stock options; (e) environmental, political and charitable information (Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008, p. 113).
36 These provisions are regarding: (a) separation of chairman and CEO; (b) appointment of senior non-executive 
directors; (c) appointment of non-executive directors (NEDs); (d) independence of NEDs; (e) the term of service 
contracts; (f) establishment of nomination committee; (g) establishment of compensation committee; and (h) 
establishment of an audit committee.
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(4) ‘Type 3’ -  when the explanations reported for non-compliance are ‘too general’ and 
do not address a firm’s specific situations;
(5) ‘Type 4’ -  temporary deviation from a code’s provision with no further 
explanations;
(6) ‘Type 5’ -  ‘genuine’ and detailed firm-specific explanations (e.g., verifiable 
explanations).
Based on the above categories of explanations, Arcot and Bruno (2011) developed a 
corporate governance and disclosure index by assigning a weighting of zero to no explanation 
(Type 0), a weighting of one to uninformative explanations (Type 1), two or three to ambiguous 
or ‘too general’ explanations (Type 2 and 3), and a weighting score of four to verifiable and 
firm-specific explanations. The index assigns the lowest score to uninformative explanation (no 
explanation for non-compliance) and vice versa. In other words, the index captures the quality 
of corporate governance disclosure (as measured by the reported explanations for non- 
compliance). Arcot and Bruno (2011) found that firms which are fully compliant or, 
alternatively, which fully explain their deviations for non-compliance have a better operating 
performance (as measured by return on assets). These findings undermine a rules-based 
approach or a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to corporate governance because investors may 
tolerate non-compliance if the reasons for non-compliance are fully explained and justified, as 
recommended by a corporate governance code.
More recently, Shrives and Brennan (2014) examined the quality of explanations 
reported by FTSE 350 companies in two different time periods (2004-2005 and 2011-2012). 
Shrives and Brennan (2014) focused on the quality of explanations from different perspectives, 
such as (a) the location of the explanations; (b) the completeness of the reported explanations; 
(c) the comprehensiveness; and (d) verifiability of the reported explanations for non-compliance
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with the Code. Shrives and Brennan (2014) found that the quality of the reported explanations 
for non-compliance with the corporate governance code was variable. Shrives and Brennan 
(2014) criticise auditors for their inability to monitor effectively a firm’s compliance as well the 
quality of explanations reported for non-compliance with a corporate governance code. Using a 
plagiarism detection software, Tumitin’, Shrives and Brennan (2014) found instances where 
the explanations (words) reported by non-compliant firms in the UK were partly matched with 
the explanations reported by other firms operating in the UK and other countries.
Empirical research shows that the flexibility offered by the ‘comply or explain’ system 
provides an opportunity for firms to tailor their firm-specific governance arrangements in 
reducing agency costs (Luo and Salterio, 2014, p. 475). Using a sample of 655 Canadian firms, 
Luo and Salterio (2014) examined the impact of compliance as well as the quality of corporate 
governance disclosure on the performance of firms. Using 47 provisions from the Canadian 
code of best practices, Luo and Salterio (2014) applied a three-point scale (index) to measure 
compliance and the quality of corporate governance disclosure. For each provision, the index 
assigns zero for non-compliance or non-disclosure, ‘1’ for compliance, and ‘2’ for explanations 
reporting alternative governance arrangements. Luo and Salterio (2014) reported a significantly 
positive relationship between the quality of corporate governance disclosure (measured by the 
index) and the market value of firms (Tobin’s Q).
In a recent study, Inwinkl et al. (2014) analysed 244 stakeholders’37 responses from
European countries and they examined whether the ‘explain’ pillar of the ‘comply or explain’
principle should be improved, and what alternative explanations should be reported by non-
37 These stakeholders were: (a) business federations; (b) stock exchanges; (c) auditors; (d) accountants; (e) 
institutional investors; (f) citizens; (g) research institutions; and (h) public authorities.
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compliant firms. The finding shows that the majority of the stakeholders in the EU member 
countries were in favour of using effectively the explain option of the ‘comply or explain’ 
principle, and 84 per cent of the respondents suggested that companies should fully explain the 
reasons for non-compliance and any alternative corporate governance mechanisms adopted by 
non-compliant firms should be fully explained and justified in their annual reports.
In the context of the Netherlands, Hooghiemstra (2012) examines the determinants of 
corporate governance disclosure for a sample of 331 listed firms between 2005-2009. He 
divides explanations for non-compliance into three categories. The advantage of using a few 
categories is that it is then easier to deal with the differences between some of these categories 
where these may be very marginal (Hooghiemstra, 2012). These three categories are: (a) no 
explanations -  where a firm is non-compliant or it describes an alternative policy but it does not 
provide any explanation; (b) generic explanations -  where a firm provides explanations that use 
‘standard phrases’ and does not provide any firm-specific circumstances; and (c) firm-specific 
explanation -  one that fully justifies the reasons for deviation and is in line with the 
requirements of the Code. Consistent with Arcot and Bruno (2011), Hooghiemstra (2012) 
developed a corporate governance index, which assigns a lower score to uninformative 
explanations reported by non-compliant firms and vice versa. Hooghiemstra (2012) finds that 
certain firm characteristics (such as ownership structure and analyst following38) affect a firm’s 
choice about providing more informative firm-specific explanations. This shows that, despite 
the monitoring role of the capital markets, other external market pressures (such as analysts 
following) also affect the corporate governance disclosure behaviour of firms. However, neither
38 The number of analyst firms publishing their reports and opinions (buy, hold, and sell) about a company.
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of these studies (Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 2011; Seidl et al., 2012) provides a longitudinal 
pattern of corporate governance explanations, although Hooghiemstra (2012, p. 20) suggests 
that an overall trend in these explanations across different corporate governance systems would 
give a better understanding of whether, besides certain firm characteristics, these explanations 
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2.11 Rationale for this study and research questions
Summing up, a considerable amount of literature has examined the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm performance in an international context. These studies include 
sample firms from different corporate governance systems around the world (in particular, the 
USA, UK, Germany and Japan). However, the existing literature on the relationships between 
corporate governance and a firm’s performance is inconclusive. For example, the findings 
reported in prior literature have shown either a strong positive relationship (e.g., Klapper and 
Love, 2004; Dumev and Kim, 2005), or a negative relationship (Bauer et al., 2004) between 
corporate governance and a firm’s performance. On the other hand, some recent studies (e.g., 
Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012) did not find any causal relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance for a sample of 6,000 firms from the United 
States and 200 Australian firms respectively. This inconclusive evidence indicates that the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is still an unresolved issue, 
which needs further investigation.
Relatively few studies have compared the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
on firm performance across different corporate governance systems. This research attempts to 
fill the existing gap in the literature by investigating how internal corporate governance 
mechanisms have affected firm performance across different corporate governance systems.
This will be examined by comparing the relationships between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance in two major European economies, the UK and Germany. In 
addition, this research will also compare the types and quality of explanations reported for non- 
compliance with the corporate governance codes across these two corporate governance
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systems. Consistent with recent index-based studies (as reported in Tables 2.2 and 2.3), this 
research will develop a ‘comply or explain’ index that will capture the level of compliance as 
well as the quality of explanations reported for non-compliance with The UK Corporate 
Governance Code and The German Corporate Governance Code. As discussed in Section 2.9, 
regulators in the UK and EU have raised concerns about the quality of explanations reported by 
non-compliant firms in member states. The Financial Reporting Council has warned that, if the 
quality of explanations does not improve in 2014, then it would take necessary steps to ensure 
the implementation of the ‘comply or explain’ principle. Therefore, this study will also 
investigate the quality of explanations reported by non-compliant firms in the UK and 
Germany.
There are several reasons for looking into these two countries. First, the UK and 
Germany have significant differences in their corporate governance systems, particularly in 
terms of legal systems (La Porta et al., 1998), ownership structures (Franks and Mayer, 1997), 
board structures (Davies, 2000) and capital markets (Seidl et al., 2012) and the timing 
differences in the formation and development of corporate governance codes (Lutz et al., 2011).
Second, previous comparative research across the UK and Germany is entirely based on
the theoretical proposition that a concentrated ownership system39 is a superior control
mechanism as compared with a dispersed ownership system (Jungmann, 2006, p. 438). Recent
statistics on the UK share ownership structure indicate that individual share ownership in UK
listed companies has significantly decreased from 37.5 per cent in 1975 to 10.7 per cent in 2012
(refer to Appendix A). On the other hand, institutional shareholders’ ownership in UK
39 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large corporations with dispersed shareholders have free-rider issues. They 
suggest that a concentrated ownership structure can partly mitigate the free-rider issue in large corporations.
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corporations has considerably increased to 36.1 per cent in 2012 (Office for National Statistics, 
2013). However, ownership patterns have not yet converged in both countries and ownership 
structure remains dispersed in the UK as compared with a concentrated ownership structure in 
Germany. Therefore, a study across the UK and Germany could better explain and compare the 
underlying relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance.
Third, the UK and Germany are chosen for this study because they exhibit different 
board systems, with the UK having a 100 per cent unitary board system and Germany a 100 per 
cent two-tier board system (refer to Figure 2.2). The effectiveness of the one-tier board system 
in the UK and the two-tier board system in Germany has not attracted significant academic 
attention since these two board models were first compared by Davies (2000).
Figure 2.2 Prevalence of board structures in Europe
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Fourth, prior comparative studies across the UK and Germany have focused on the 
relationship between a single corporate governance mechanism and firm performance. For 
instance, Kaplan (1997) investigated the relationship between executive compensation and firm 
performance, while other studies (e.g., Franks and Mayer, 2001; Jungmann, 2006) have 
analysed the relationship between board turnover and firm performance. However, this 
comparative study examines the relationship between a wide range of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. These internal corporate governance 
mechanisms include: (a) board size; (b) the percentage of non-executive directors; (c) the 
number of board meetings; (d) gearing (the percentage of debt financing); (e) ownership 
structure; and (f) the ‘comply or explain’ index -  the index used in this study takes into account 
the level of compliance with corporate governance codes as well as the quality of explanations 
reported for non-compliance with the corporate governance codes;. Prior studies have either 
used commercially available corporate governance indices or the indices developed in those 
studies are largely based on the level of compliance or non-compliance with the corporate 
governance codes. The quality of reported explanations for non-compliance (corporate 
governance disclosure) has recently attracted attention from the UK and EU regulators. 
Previous comparative studies did not provide a longitudinal pattern of changes in the types and 
quality of reported explanations for non-compliance across different corporate governance 
systems.
Fifth, these two economies have developed different corporate governance mechanisms 
(for instance, different board structures, ownership structures, capital markets, legal systems 
and the enforcement of corporate governance codes, etc.) to resolve the agency problem.
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However, the UK corporate governance system and the German corporate governance system 
are principles-based systems of corporate governance and the corporate governance codes are 
based on a ‘comply or explain’ principle. So far, no comparative corporate governance study 
has focused on both aspects of a ‘comply or explain’ principle.
Last but not least, comparative corporate governance research across the UK and 
Germany has been under-researched and a cross-country comparative study could better explain 
the differences of and implications for national corporate governance regulations.
This thesis investigates how internal corporate governance mechanisms may have 
affected firm performance in the UK and Germany. The broader research theme on internal 
corporate governance mechanisms will be examined in the form of the following research 
questions.
1. How do the types, quality and pattern of explanations for non-compliance with the 
corporate governance codes vary across the UK and Germany?
2. How has a unitary board structure in the UK and a two-tier board structure in the 
Germany affected a firm’s operating and financial performance? Specifically, this can 
be investigated by the following sub-questions.
a. How has the ‘comply or explain’ index, which captures the level of a firm’s compliance 
and the quality of explanations for non-compliance, been associated with a firm’s 
operating and financial performance in the UK and Germany?
b. How has board size affected a firm’s operating and financial performance in the UK and 
Germany?
c. How has board composition affected a firm’s operating and financial performance in the 
UK and Germany?
d. How has the number of board meetings in the UK and Germany been associated with a 
firm’s operating and financial performance?
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e. How has external shareholdings (e.g., blockholder ownership) been associated with a 
firm’s operating and financial performance in the UK and Germany?
Figure 2.3 below presents a conceptual framework of this thesis and provides a link 
between corporate governance and firm performance in the two corporate governance systems. 
The control variables in Figure 2.3 are explained in the research methodology chapter (refer to 
Section 3.7).
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Chapter 3. Research Methodology
Section 3.9 Robustness tests
Section 3.10 Summary
Section 3.8 Dependent variables
Section 3.2 Research philosophy
Section 3.7 Control variables
Section 3.6 Independent variables
Section 3.4 Quantitative content analysis
Section 3.1 Introduction
Section 3.3 Data and variables
Section 3.5 Econometric model -  generalised method
of moments model
3.1 Introduction
The thesis addresses two broader research questions asked in the previous chapter about:
(a) the types and quality of explanations reported for non-compliance with the corporate 
governance codes; and (b) the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance. These research questions were developed by applying multiple 
theoretical perspectives (agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory and 
stakeholder theory).
The main objectives of this chapter are as follows. First, it sets out to explain the 
research design and to justify the reasons for choosing a specific research paradigm suitable for 
this research. Second, it aims to discuss the data and sample selection procedures and to provide 
a definition for each variable used in this research. Finally, the chapter seeks to explain and 
justify the two empirical methods (content analysis and econometric analysis) that are applied 
in analysing the data.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the research 
philosophy; Section 3.3 describes the sample selection procedures, sources of data and the 
composition of sample; Section 3.4 discusses a quantitative content analysis method, which has 
been selected to examine the types and quality of explanations reported by non-compliant firms 
in the UK and Germany; Section 3.5 presents the econometric model, which is used to analyse 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance; Section 3.6 
defines independent variables and explains the expected govemance-performance relationship
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by formulating testable hypotheses; Section 3.7 and Section 3.8 discuss control variables and 
dependent variables; and Section 3.10 summarises the chapter.
3.2 Research philosophy
A social science researcher is likely to adopt and justify a particular research philosophy 
which includes key assumptions about the way in which a researcher views the world. These 
assumptions include: (a) epistemological assumptions (the nature and scope of knowledge); (b) 
ontological assumptions (the nature of reality); and (c) methodological assumptions (the process 
of research). Saunders et al. (2012) outline three major philosophical views which are: (a) 
positivism; (b) interpretivism; and (c) realism. These three dominant paradigms are different 
from one another in terms of the assumptions they make about the nature and scope of 
knowledge (epistemological assumptions) and the nature of reality (ontological assumptions) 
and the research process (methodological assumptions). These assumptions affect the 
researcher’s approach towards formulating research question(s), the choice of a suitable 
research method and the way to interpret the research findings . For instance, Saunders et al. 
(2012, p. 128) argue:
‘a researcher who is concerned with facts, such as the resources needed in a 
manufacturing process, is likely to have a very different view on the way research 
should be conducted from a researcher concerned with the feelings and attitudes of 
the workers towards their managers in that same manufacturing process’.
The principle of positivism relates to ‘working with an observable social reality that the 
end product of such research can be law-like generalisations similar to those produced by 
natural scientists’ (Remenyi et al., 1998 cited in Saunders et al., 2012, p. 110). Positivist 
researchers argue that the ‘reality’ is represented by ‘objects’ and the data collected are free
114
from bias because the researcher has less influence over the data collected. Like natural 
scientists, positivist researchers collect data and test, often applying quantitative techniques and 
one or more theories which lead the researchers to develop one or more hypotheses to construct 
a relationship between observable facts (variables) (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 103).
On the other hand, researchers in the interpretative paradigm advocate that ‘reality’ is 
‘subjective’ and argue that understanding human behaviour as a social construct rather than 
‘objects’ will give a better understanding of the world (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 106). 
Researchers in this paradigm usually apply qualitative approaches to understand the complex 
environment of different social institutions and social actors. The findings reported under this 
approach may not be generalised owing to significant differences across individual social actors 
and social institutions (businesses) (Saunders et al., 2012).
Advocates of the realist approach combine some unique aspects of positivism and 
interpretivism. For instance, direct realists argue that reality is objective and is external to the 
researcher. Critical realists, however, argue that ‘what we experience are sensations, the images 
of the things in the real world, not the things directly’ (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 136). Like 
positivism, realism acknowledges that the social ‘reality’ is objective and external to the 
researcher, but this approach also takes into account the importance of ‘subjectivity’ and the 
‘social actors involved in the knowledge derivation process’ (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 136).
Traditionally, adopting an appropriate research philosophy is often debated in the 
context of a choice of either a positivist or interpretivist approach or a choice between 
quantitative or qualitative methods (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 129). As discussed in the literature
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review section, prior corporate governance studies have only used a positivist (quantitative) 
approach in analysing the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
Therefore, adopting a positivist approach for this research is not only consistent with the 
literature but it will also be helpful in comparing the results of this research with those reported 
in previous corporate governance studies. Researchers in the positivist paradigm usually use 
quantitative research methods in analysing the relationship between observable firm-specific 
governance mechanisms (such as board size -  measured by the number of directors; board 
structure -  measured by the ratio of independent non-executive directors to total number of 
directors, etc.) and firm performance as measured by financial ratios, such as return on assets 
and Tobin’s Q. As explained earlier, an important aspect of the positivist paradigm is to use one 
or more theories and to develop one or more hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested by 
applying appropriate econometric techniques. Using multiple theoretical perspectives, the 
expected govemance-performance relationship has been presented in the form of different 
hypotheses (refer to Section 3.6). For this research, the governance and financial performance 
variables are measured quantitatively. Hence, keeping in view the large sample (120 firms) and 
the longitudinal nature of the data (2007-2011), a positivist approach and quantitative methods 
are considered an appropriate choice to answer underlying research question about the 
relationship between governance and firm performance. Therefore, this research adopts a 
‘positivist’ approach in analysing the relationship between internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance. Section 3.5 further explains the econometric model used in 
this research.
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A content analysis approach will be adopted to answer the research question presented 
in the previous chapter about -  how the types and quality of explanations for non-compliance 
with the corporate governance codes vary across the UK and Germany. Accounting researchers 
generally use two types of content analysis: (a) a mechanistic or quantitative approach; and (b) 
an interpretive or qualitative approach (Beck et al., 2010, p. 208). These two different 
approaches fit into the positivist and interpretivist research paradigms respectively.
Content analysis is defined as ‘the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of 
message characteristics’ (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 1). Merkl-Davies et al. (2012) argue that a 
content analysis approach is widely used in analysing corporate documents, such as annual 
reports, chief executive officers’ (CEO) letters, corporate social responsibility statements, 
corporate websites and press releases, etc. In the context of this study, ‘content’ refers to the 
explanations reported for non-compliance with The UK Corporate Governance Code and The 
German Corporate Governance Code.
Merkl-Davies et al. (2012, p. 9) define a quantitative content analysis method as follows:
‘Quantitative form-oriented content analysis entails converting proxies for 
organizational disclosure behaviour into numerical scores or indices (which can be 
subsequently related to organizational variables, such as organizational performance or 
firm size by means of statistical association tests in order to explain the determinants 
of disclosure behaviour’.
Beck et al. (2010, p. 208) argue that a ‘mechanistic’ or quantitative content analysis 
approach captures the ‘disclosure volume or frequency’ and this method is suitable for 
understanding the disclosure behaviour of a firm. On the other hand, an interpretive or 
qualitative content analysis approach, which has been rarely used in the finance literature, 
largely ‘focuses on underlying themes in the text under investigation’ (Smith and Taffler, 2000,
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cited in Beck et al., 2010, p. 208). Section 3.4 further describes how the quantitative content 
analysis approach would be implemented in analysing the text in the corporate governance 
reports of the UK and German companies.
In categorising the frequency of different types of explanations given for non- 
compliance with The UK Corporate Governance Code and The German Corporate Governance 
Code, this research follows a quantitative content analysis approach, as used by Hooghiemstra 
and Van Ees (2011) and Seidl et al. (2012). A positivist approach or a quantitative content 
analysis approach is more suitable in a number of ways. First, an interpretive or qualitative 
content analysis approach is designed for a small sample and it may not be possible to carry out 
a qualitative content analysis for a large sample of 600 corporate governance reports, which will 
be used in this study. Second, existing corporate governance studies (Arcot and Bruno, 2011; 
Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 2011; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Seidl et al., 2012) have also used a 
quantitative content analysis approach to determine the quality of corporate governance 
disclosure. Therefore, the underlying research question can be better answered by applying a 
quantitative content analysis approach instead of a qualitative content analysis approach. Using 
a quantitative content analysis will make it easier to compare the results of this study with 
recent studies (e.g., Arcot and Bruno, 2011; Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 2011; Hooghiemstra, 
2012; Seidl et al., 2012). Third, the quantitative content analysis assigns a numerical score to 
each category of explanation identified in the corporate governance statements. The numerical 
score will also be used in developing an index (‘comply or explain’ index)40 for the econometric 
analysis. The ‘comply or explain’ index captures the level of compliance as well as the quality
40 Refer to Section 3.6.1 for more details about the ‘comply or explain’ index.
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of explanations reported for non-compliance. Hence, a ‘comply or explain’ index can only be 
developed if a quantitative content analysis has been carried out. Fourth, quantitative content 
analysis is an objective and robust method because the inter-coders’ reliability test41 determines 
the validity and reliability of this method and therefore the results can also be generalised 
(Neuendorf, 2002). Finally, Merkl-Davies et al. (2012) argue that a quantitative content analysis 
technique (or positivist evaluation criteria) possesses all the characteristics of a valid research 
method, such as reliability, generalizability and internal and external validity. The next section 
explains the data and sample selection procedures.
3.3 Data and variables
3.3.1 Sample selection and data collection
The sample of firms used in investigating the relationship between corporate governance 
and a firm’s performance and the quality of explanations for non-compliance is drawn from 
companies listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and London Stock Exchange. In line with a 
recent comparative study on the UK and Germany (Seidl et al., 2012), this research also 
includes German firms from different stock market indices, ranging from the medium-sized 
companies that comprise MDAX 50, to the largest companies in the DAX 30, for the period 
ending 2007-2011. Similarly, in the UK, the same number of firms has been selected from the 
London Stock Exchange on the basis of their market capitalisation with their corresponding 
German peers in the same industry. This reduces any sample selection bias arising from 
‘country specificities’ because the UK and Germany have contrasting capital market structures 
(Seidl et al., 2012, p. 8). The unavailability of corporate governance data for small size German
41 The inter-coders’ reliability test determines whether a correct coding approach has been adopted or not (for more 
details about this test, refer to Section 3.4).
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companies (SDAX 50) restricts the initial sample to 80 companies in the UK and Germany 
respectively. Table 3.1 explains the sample selection process used for the econometric analysis 
and the content analysis.
For both econometric analysis and the content analysis, the financial period 2007-2011 
is selected because full compliance statements for all sample German companies were available 
from year 2007 onward. Second, the end date of 2011 was selected because it is the most recent 
year for which corporate governance and financial data were available for the sample firms at 
the time of doing this research.
A total sample size of 120 firms from both the UK and Germany is relatively larger 
than that used in prior comparative studies on the UK and Germany. For instance, a recent study 
(Jungmann, 2006) on the effectiveness of a unitary board structure versus a two-tier board 
structure only used 25 firms from UK and Germany respectively. The selected sample size also 
represents key industrial sectors from both countries. Table 3.2 shows the industrial sectors of 
the 120 sample firms for which the corporate governance and financial data are available on 
DataStream for the period 2007-2011. The largest portion of the sample of companies in both 
countries belongs to the industrial goods and chemical and pharmaceutical industries.
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Table 3.1 Sample selection
Germany
Firms listed on DAX 3042 and MDAX 50 over the period 2007-2011 80
Less: Insurance, utilities and financial firms43 m
Initial Sample 71
Less: Firms with compliance statements in German44 (2)
Less: Firms with compliance statements not available for five years or less
than five years (9)
Final sample 60
UK
60 non-financial firms drawn from FTSE All Share Index 60
Table 3.2 Sample characteristics
Industrial composition Germany % UK %
Automobiles & Parts 5 8.3 1 1.7
Basic Resources 3 5 9 15
Chemicals 9 15 6 10
Construction & Materials 1 1.7 1 1.7
Food & Beverage 1 1.7 3 5
Health Care & Pharmaceutical 6 10 12 20
Industrial Goods & Services 17 28.3 13 21.6
Media 2 3.3 1 1.7
Oil & Gas 0 0 3 5
Personal & Household Goods 6 10 4 6.6
Real Estate 1 1.7 2 3.3
Retail 3 5 1 1.7
Technology 3 5 1 1.7
T elecommunications 1 1.7 1 1.7
Travel & Leisure 2 3.3 2 3.3
Total 60 100% 60 100%
Source: Compiled from DataStream.
42 DAX stands for Deutscher Aktien Index (German Stock Index).
43 In line with the literature, these firms are excluded because of their different regulatory and governance structure 
(Hooghiemstra, 2012).
44 These companies are (a) Wincor Nixdorf AG; and (b) Hochtief AG (AG stands for Aktiengesellschaft, which 
indicates German stock corporation). The 2009 and 2010 compliance statement of Douglas Holding AG is, 
however, conveniently translated from the German language using the Google translator service. The reports of 
these two companies are read-only documents and hence they do not allow the option of being copied.
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In order to make the analysis comparable across these two countries, non-financial firms 
in the UK were selected based on the industrial classification of their corresponding German 
counterparts. Only 60 companies are selected from each country because there are only 60 non- 
financial companies listed on DAX 30 and MDAX 50 in Germany. Therefore, this also restricts 
the corresponding sample to 60 companies in the UK. A list of German and UK companies has 
been shown in Appendix B and Appendix C.
Corporate governance data in DataStream is only available for DAX 30 and MDAX 50 
companies. Owing to the lack of availability of governance data for small-sized German 
companies, the scope of the sample is limited to only large companies. The larger companies 
are selected because ‘larger firms especially will care more about their corporate reputation as 
they will be more visible to media attention and face more scrutiny from the investor 
community’ (Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 2011, p. 483). Second, larger firms have ‘severe’ 
agency problems as compared with small firms (Beiner et al., 2006, p. 253).
Two types of data are required to examine the relationship between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and a firm’s performance. Corporate governance data (board size, 
board structure, number of board meetings, gearing, firm-specific risk (beta), foreign listings) 
and financial data (firm size,, return on assets, Tobin’s Q) for selected UK and German 
companies are taken from DataStream. Blockholders’ ownership data were derived from 
Thomson One database. Thomson One reports the identity of all shareholders, including their 
names, the number of ordinary shares owned, the value of investment, the location of investors 
and the percentage of shareholdings. The database further classifies owners into different 
categories, such as individuals/families, corporations, holding companies, pension funds, hedge
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funds, hedge endowment funds, finance companies, investment advisers, banks and trusts, 
insurance companies and financial institutions. The UK’s regulation requires each company to 
disclose the identity of all shareholders who own more than three per cent of the total equity of 
a company (O'Sullivan, 2000), while in Germany, this threshold for ownership disclosure is 
five per cent (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Owing to different disclosure requirements and limits in 
different countries, cross-country comparative studies on market-based and relationship-based 
systems (Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Thomsen et al., 2006) have used a common threshold of five per 
cent for blockholders’ ownership. Consistent with prior comparative studies (Fidrmuc et al., 
2006; Thomsen et al., 2006), this study also uses a minimum threshold of five per cent for 
external blockholders. This will not only make the results comparable across these two 
countries, it will also help in comparing the results of this study with those reported in prior 
comparative studies. Data for the content analysis of corporate governance reports were 
collected from the annual reports of the 60 largest UK and 60 largest German non-financial 
companies over the period 2007-2011. The annual reports of UK companies were downloaded 
from Hemscott Company Guru Academic (now Momingstar Company Intelligence). For 
German companies, the compliance statements (declaration of conformity) were downloaded 
from the website of the Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code (Commission 
of the German Corporate Governance Code, 2012b).
Data for the selected sample of 120 companies were collected for five years. 120 firms’ 
corporate governance reports for five years (2007-2011) result in 600 corporate governance 
reports. Before doing the regression analysis for all corporate governance variables and the 
financial performance variables, some data were manually collected for missing observations
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for various corporate governance variables45 from the annual reports of UK and German 
companies. This provides a balanced panel data set for the econometric analysis. Panel data 
combine the richness of both longitudinal and cross-sectional data, provide more informative 
data and more precise estimates and reduce the problem of collinearity among variables 
(Gujarati, 2003, p. 637). Furthermore, panel data offer an advantage over time series and cross 
sectional data, allowing the application of complex econometric models to detect and measure 
the dynamic relation between independent variables (e.g., governance mechanisms) and 
dependent variables (e.g., firm performance) (Gujarati, 2003, p. 638). The next section 
discusses the content analysis procedures.
3.4 Quantitative content analysis
Along with the econometric analysis, which will be explained in Section 3.5, this 
research also uses content analysis to understand the types of explanations given for non- 
compliance with The UK Corporate Governance Code and The German Corporate 
Governance Code. The underlying research philosophy and a rationale for choosing the 
quantitative content analysis approach have already been discussed in Section 3.2. Bos and 
Tamai (1999, p. 20) argue that quantitative content analysis is not merely a ‘word count’ 
exercise but in fact, if applied in the right context and if appropriate steps are used, then 
researchers can make valid inferences about the underlying text in investigation. Bos and 
Tarnai (1999) suggest a five-step process to be used when carrying out content analysis. 
These steps are: (a) outlining the research question; (b) developing appropriate categories
45 These governance variables include: (a) board size data for ten UK and eight German companies; and (b) data 
about the ratio of independent non-executive directors to total board members for seven UK and five German 
companies.
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to be used in classifying the text; (c) determining the validity and reliability of these 
categories by conducting a pre-test of the instrument; (d) collecting the data for the whole 
sample and coding the text; and (e) analysis and interpretation of the results.
Following Bos and Tamai (1999), Figure 3.1 explains the content analysis 
procedures that are used in this study. Beginning with the first step, the research seeks to 
investigate the types and quality of explanations reported for non-compliance with The UK 
Corporate Governance Code and The German Corporate Governance Code. The second 
step requires identifying non-compliance and the explanations for non-compliance with The 
UK Corporate Governance Code and The German Corporate Governance Code. A number 
of reported explanations for non-compliance is identified in the corporate governance 
statements (or declaration of conformity in the case of Germany) by looking for various 
phrases, such as ‘do not comply with....’ ‘...deviates from... ’ ‘...except... ’ ‘...save for... ’ 
and so on. The 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 versions of the German Corporate Governance 
Code and the 2006, 2008 and 2010 versions of the UK Corporate Governance Code are 
applicable during the reporting period 2007-2011. The UK Corporate Governance Code 
and The German Corporate Governance Code have already been discussed in Section 2.7. 
Prior index-based corporate governance studies (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Drobetz et al., 
2004; Beiner et al., 2006) have focused on developing compliance or non-compliance 
indices, based on a certain number of provisions from a corporate governance code. 
However, the content analysis approach only focuses on the explanations for non- 
compliance; therefore any explanation reported in response to non-compliance with any 
provision of The UK Corporate Governance Code and The German Corporate Governance
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Code has been taken into consideration. Further, the reported explanations are listed down 
for each company and then they are classified into different categories, ranging from 
uninformative explanations (such as no explanation for non-compliance) to detailed and 
firm-specific explanations (such as explanations regarding a company size, or board 
structure). For this study, the explanations for non-compliance are divided into ten 
categories because some of the categories already identified in the literature either overlap 
or there are only marginal differences between them (for example, Arcot and Bruno, 2011; 
Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 2011; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Seidl et al., 2012). In addition, two 
new categories, ‘partial non-compliance’ and ‘assurance of future compliance’, emerged 
after analysing the compliance statements, which makes the number of categories and the 
categorisation scheme different from previous studies (refer to Table 3.3 for a definition of 
each category of explanation).
Once the categories are identified, the next step is to test the reliability of the coding 
scheme. In a mechanistic (quantitative) content analysis, Cohen’s kappa test of inter-coders’ 
reliability is used to determine whether the coding process yields similar results if  the same 
content (text) were to be coded by independent (external) coders. A simple per cent 
agreement between two coders can be misleading as it ignores the chance agreement 
between two coders. Cohen’s kappa coefficient is more robust because its calculation takes 
into account the chance agreement between different coders (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 151). 
Examining the explanations for non-compliance and applying a content analysis approach, 
recent corporate governance studies (e.g., Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 2011; Hooghiemstra, 
2012) have also used a Cohen’s kappa test to measure the reliability of the coding scheme.
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For this study, two coders independently coded the compliance statements for ten firms, 
using the categorisation scheme given in Table 3.3. One coder was doing a PhD in finance 
and the other coder was an MSc graduate in accounting and finance. The coding process was 
explained to each coder and a definition and example of each category of explanation was 
also given to them. The results reported by each coder were compared and for each category 
of explanation the agreement or disagreement between the coders was recorded in a tabular 
form. The coding process yielded reliable results and the Cohen’s kappa is 71 per cent, 
which shows excellent agreement between coders. If a Cohen’s kappa test of agreement is 
less than 60 per cent, it would mean that there is a general problem in understanding and 
implementing the coding scheme and therefore categories should be reviewed before starting 
the actual content analysis (Neuendorf, 2002). In this case, the Cohen’s kappa inter-coders’ 
reliability test (pre-test) is above the minimum threshold of 60 per cent, which suggests that 
the researcher can proceed with the actual content analysis. The corporate governance 
reports were downloaded for the sample of 120 firms over the period of five years (2007-
2011), and the actual content analysis was carried out for a sample of 600 corporate 
governance reports. The results are reported in Chapter 4. Table 3.3 defines each category of 
explanation used in classifying the reported explanations for non-compliance with the 
corporate governance codes. The method used in classifying the explanations for non- 
compliance is consistent with the recent literature (e.g., Arcot and Bruno, 2011; 
Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 2011; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Seidl et al., 2012). Further 
examples for each category of explanation can be seen in the following chapter (Table 4.2).
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Figure 3.1 The content analysis procedures
Research question 1 (refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.10)
How do the types, quality and pattern of explanations for non-compliance with the 
corporate governance codes vary across the UK and Germany?
Establishment of categories /
Previously used categories are adopted with some of the new categories that 
emerged during the content analysis. In total, ten categories are used for coding the 
explanations for non-compliance. Section 3.4 discusses the justifications for 
choosing ten categories.
Pre-test
Inter-coders’ reliability test -  Cohen’s kappa coefficient is used for a pilot sample 
of ten corporate governance reports. This test is used to determine whether the 
coding scheme is correct or whether it needs to be reviewed. A Cohen’s kappa 
below 60 per cent indicates a very low inter-coders’ agreement and suggests that a 
modification is needed in the existing categories (Neuendorf, 2002), while a 
Cohen’s kappa above the threshold of 60 per cent validates the reliability of the 
instrument (content analysis method).
Data collection and evaluation
120 firms’ corporate governance reports for five years (2007-2011) result in 600 
corporate governance reports. Each explanation for non-compliance fits into one of 
the ten categories used for the purpose of this research. In line with the previous 
corporate governance literature (e.g., Arcot and Bruno, 2011; Hooghiemstra and 
Van Ees, 2011; Hooghiemstra, 2012; Seidl et al., 2012), the frequency of each 
category of explanation is used as a proxy for a good or poor corporate governance 
disclosure.
Interpretation of the results
The longitudinal pattern of the quality of corporate governance disclosure is 
compared by taking into account the frequency of different categories of 
explanations reported for non-compliance with The UK Corporate Governance 
Code and The German Corporate Governance Code. The findings are then 
compared with previous studies, which have used the same or closely similar 
categories in coding the explanations for non-compliance. It is essential that a 
qualitative interpretation should supplement the quantitative analysis of the 
underlying text in investigation (Bos and Tamai, 1999).
Source: Figure 3.1 is developed based on the five-step process proposed by Bos and Tamai (1999, p. 667).
Table 3.3 Definition of various categories used in coding the explanations for non-compliance 
Category of explanation Definition
1. Partial non-compliance
2. No explanations for non- 
compliance
3. Description of alternative 
practices
When a firm is non-compliant over a specific period of time 
during the reporting period or it fails to implement all 
aspects of a specific Code provision.
When a firm reports no explanation for non-compliance.
When a firm is non-compliant with a particular provision of 
the Code and it offers alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms.
4. Generic or standard 
explanations
5. Future assurance of 
compliance
6. Explanations regarding 
company size, board size or 
company structure
7. Explanations regarding a 
company’s foreign listings or 
international operations
8. Company, industry or 
market related specific 
explanations
9. Code provision conflicts 
with laws
10. Firm-specific issues with 
Code implementation or less 
effectiveness of the Code 
provision________________
When a firm justifies non-compliance by using standard 
phrases, such as ‘in the best interest of the company’. . .‘in 
our opinion’... ‘we believe that’... .and so on.
When a firm intends to implement a Code’s provision in the 
following year or in the near future.
When a firm is non-compliant and provides explanations that 
it could not implement a provision of the Code owing to its 
small board size, company size or the structure of the 
company.
When a firm is non-compliant and it justifies non- 
compliance with reference to its foreign operations or 
listings in other stock exchanges.
When a firm justifies non-compliance and refers to its 
specific situation or to the prevailing practices in the market 
or industry in which it operates.
When a provision of the Code is in conflict with any other 
prevailing laws in the country and a firm refers to such 
conflicting provision(s) when justifying its non-compliance.
When a firm has operational issues in terms of Code 
implementation or it believes that a provision of the Code 
would be less effective for the organisation.
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The next section discusses the econometric model, which would be applied to examine 
the second research question -  the relationship between internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance (refer to Chapter 2, Section 2.10).
3.5 Econometric model -  Generalised method of moments model (GMM)
Recent research (e.g., Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012) has raised serious 
concerns about the econometric techniques applied in prior corporate governance studies. For 
instance, most corporate governance researchers have either used an ordinary least squares 
regression (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004) or a fixed-effects model (e.g., 
Yermack, 1996; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Ammann et al., 2011) to estimate the 
relationship between governance and performance. The findings reported in these studies 
should be ‘interpreted with caution’ because the econometric models used in these studies fail 
to control for different kinds of endogeneity -  a situation when the causality may run from 
performance to governance (Schultz et al., 2010 , p. 146). Wintoki et al. (2012) identify three 
sources of endogeneity and they argue that the existence of even one source of endogeneity in 
the data will generate biased results.
These three sources of potential endogeneity are:
(1) Unobserved heterogeneity;
(2) Simultaneity or reverse causation; and
(3) Dynamic endogeneity.
Unobserved heterogeneity arises when the relationship between an independent variable 
(governance) and dependent variable (performance) is affected by an unobservable factor (for
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instance, firm-specific characteristics), which may be unknown to the researcher. Simultaneity 
or reverse causation arises when two variables (governance and performance) affect each other 
simultaneously. For instance, it has been reported in prior studies that compliance with 
corporate governance code enhances a firm’s performance and valuation, but it is possible that 
firms with higher market valuation may choose strong corporate governance mechanisms and, 
further, that a need for external financing may also motivate firms to implement better 
governance practices (Dumev and Kim, 2005).
Dynamic endogeneity arises when a firm’s past/current performance affects the 
current/future governance structure of a firm (Wintoki et al., 2012, p. 582). For example, poor 
corporate performance may cause changes in the governance structure (removal of one or more 
directors from the board by shareholders) of a firm. Schultz et al. (2010) and Wintoki et al. 
(2012) suggest that by using a dynamic generalised method of moments model (GMM), 
researchers can control for these kinds of endogeneity and thus the GMM model provides 
significant advantage over the ordinary least squares regression and fixed-effect models. For 
instance, the ordinary least squares model and fixed-effects model ignore unobserved 
heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity respectively and applying these techniques will provide 
biased estimates about the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
(Wintoki et al., 2012, p. 582). However, fixed-effects estimation technique can potentially 
control for unobservable heterogeneity under the assumption of strict exogeneity, which means 
that a firm’s current governance mechanisms (independent variables) are not affected by any 
changes in a firm past, present or future financial performance (dependent variables) (Schultz et 
al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012). However, as discussed before, in reality, this assumption of
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strict exogeneity is violated because a firm’s past/current performance may affect the 
current/future governance structure of a firm. Furthermore, both fixed-effects and random- 
effects are static panel data models, which means that they do not allow for the lag of the 
dependent variables (firm financial performance) to be included as an explanatory variable in 
the econometric model (Wooldridge, 2012). An ordinary least squares regression model fails to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity and the fixed-effects or random-effects models could 
potentially overcome this problem. The govemance-performance relationship is dynamic, and 
so, traditional fixed-effects and random-effects panel data static models would provide 
inconsistent and biased results (Wooldridge, 2012).
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed the generalised 
method of moments (hereafter GMM) model which can be used for dynamic panel data. The 
GMM model provides consistent results in the presence of endogeniety, such as unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2012, p. 588). A GMM 
model takes into account the dynamic nature of the governance and performance relationship, 
by including the lagged effect of the dependent variables (firm’s past financial performance) as 
an instrument (exploratory variable) to control for the endogeneity being caused by simultaneity 
(Wintoki et al., 2012). Traditionally, corporate governance researchers (Schultz et al., 2010; 
Wintoki et al., 2012) have used two lags of the dependent variables and they argue that two lags 
is sufficient to capture the persistence of profitability. The GMM model removes endogeneity 
(fixed effects) by internally transforming the data -  a variable’s past value is deducted from its 
present value (Roodman, 2009, p. 86). In this way, the number of observations is reduced but 
this process (internal transformation) enhances the efficiency of the GMM model (Wooldridge,
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2012). Furthermore, two kinds of transformation methods, known as first-difference 
transformation (one-step GMM) and second-order transformation (two-step GMM), can also be 
used as GMM estimators. However, first-difference transformation (one-step GMM) has some 
limitations. For instance, if a variable’s recent value is missing then the first-difference 
transformation (where a variable’s past value is deducted from its current value) could result in 
the loss of too many observations (Roodman, 2009, p. 104). In order to avoid potential data loss 
owing to the internal transformation problem with the first-step GMM, Arellano and Bover 
(1995) recommend the use of a second order transformation (two-step GMM). Second-order 
transformation (two-step GMM) applies ‘forward orthogonal deviations’, which means that 
instead of subtracting the previous observations of a variable from its current value, the two- 
step GMM subtracts the average of all future available observations of a particular variable 
(Roodman, 2009, p. 104). Using a two-step GMM model, researchers can prevent unnecessary 
data loss. Therefore, in the case of a balanced panel dataset, a two-step GMM model provides 
more efficient and consistent estimates for the coefficients (Arellano and Bover 1995, cited in 
Roodman, 2009, p. 105).
This study uses a two-step system GMM model to provide an unbiased estimate of the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. In the past 23 years, 
corporate governance research has witnessed substantial methodological developments. For 
instance, the ordinary least squares regression model has been widely applied in corporate 
governance research, particularly after the publication of the first index-based corporate 
governance study by Gompers et al. (2003) about the relationship between governance 
mechanisms and firm performance. In order to overcome any potential endogeneity problems
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associated with the ordinary least squares estimation method, researchers (such as, 
Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Guest, 2009) then suggested using fixed-effects or random- 
effects models. However, recent research (e.g., Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012; Pathan 
and Faff, 2013) shows that more sophisticated models, such as a GMM, controls for different 
kinds of endogeneity issues, including: (a) unobserved heterogeneity; (b) simultaneity; and (c) 
dynamic endogeneity, as already discussed. A GMM model is suitable for panel data with a 
large number of observations (large N) and few time periods (small T) (Roodman, 2009, p. 86). 
This study also uses strongly balanced panel data for 120 firms with 600 observations (large N) 
and for five years (2007-2011, small 7).
Following Schultz et al. (2010) and Wintoki et al. (2012), the general dynamic 
generalised method of moments model (GMM) that will be used in this research is as follows:
Pit = dPu-1 + GPu + Xnu + Vh + 8 h (1)
Where:
• /^stands for firm performance (operating and financial performance) across N  
observations and /  firms over the time period;
• Pit_x is a one period lag operator (previous year operating and financial 
performance);
• Gpu represents corporate governance variables (‘comply or explain’ index, board
size, board structure, number of board meetings, gearing, institutional 
blockholders, non-institutional blockholders) across N  observations and /  firms 
over the time period;
• Xnit represents control variables over the time period;
• / / i s  firm-specific fixed effects; and
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• £ it represents the error term across N  observations and I  firms.
In other words, the left-hand side of the equation represents operating and financial 
performance variables (ROA, Tobin’s Q) and the right-hand side represents independent 
variables (internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as board size, board structure, 
number of board meetings and gearing) and control variables, such as firm size, foreign listing, 
firm-specific risk and industry dummies.
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest two post-estimation tests: (a) the Sargan test;46 and
(b) the Arellano-Bond test for auto-correlation.47 These two post-estimations tests are further 
explained in Chapter 5. The next section explains the independent variables used in the 
econometric model.
3.6 Independent variables
3.6.1 The ‘comply or explain’ index
The methodology used in developing a ‘comply or explain’ index is in line with the 
well-known methodology used in the accounting and finance literature (e.g., Gompers et al., 
2003; Bauer et al., 2004; Klapper and Love, 2004; Beiner et al., 2006; Bauwhede and 
Willekens, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2010; Hooghiemstra, 2012). These studies have largely 
focused on the level of compliance with corporate governance codes by either developing their 
own corporate governance index for each firm (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Hooghiemstra, 2012) or
46 The Sargan test is used to determine whether the econometric model is valid or not, and whether the instruments 
are correctly specified or not. In other words, if the null hypothesis is rejected, the researcher needs to reconsider 
the model or the instruments used in the estimation process.
47 In order to examine the validity of a strong exogeneity assumption, the Arellano-Bond test for no auto­
correlation (or no serial correlation) is used under the null hypothesis that the error terms of two different time 
periods are uncorrelated. In other words, it means that the lagged variables are not correlated with the error term in 
the govemance-performance equation.
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by using commercially available corporate governance indices, such as: (a) the Investor 
Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) data on corporate governance (Gompers et al., 2003);
(b) the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) governance index (Klapper and Love, 2004);
(c) the Deminor corporate governance rating for EU firms (Bauer et al., 2004; Bauwhede and 
Willekens, 2008); and (d) the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data on corporate 
governance (Aggarwal et al., 2010).
The ‘comply or explain’ index used in this study is a fine-tuning of the compliance 
indices used in prior studies (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Bauer et al., 2004; Klapper and Love, 
2004; Beiner et al., 2006; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2010; 
Hooghiemstra, 2012). The index used in this study not only captures the level of compliance 
with corporate governance codes as used in previous studies but also focuses on the quality of 
explanations given for non-compliance with the corporate governance codes. The ‘comply or 
explain’ index is a proxy for good corporate governance practices and it is developed by 
assigning a score of 1 to 5 to each firm. For instance, a higher score on the ‘comply or explain’ 
index indicates that a firm is either fully compliant or fully explains and justifies the reasons for 
non-compliance with the recommended code of best practices (a sign of good governance). 
There are two reasons for assigning a higher score of 5 to a fully compliant firm or to a high 
quality detailed explanation in the ‘comply or explain’ index. First, the Financial Reporting 
Council in the UK acknowledges the fact that non-compliance may be justified in specific 
situations, if a firm can achieve good governance by offering different governance mechanisms 
in response to those prescribed by the Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2012b, p. 4). Second, 
Arcot and Bruno (2011, p. 12) also noted that: ‘there should be no difference between a
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compliant company and a non-compliant company that deviates from standards for good and 
valid reasons that are fully disclosed’. In fact, if any index-based study ignores any aspect of the 
‘comply or explain’ principle, then it would fail to establish a valid inference about the 
effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ principle. Similarly, a lower score on the ‘comply or 
explain’ index shows that a firm is non-compliant and either reports no explanations for non- 
compliance or provides generic or standard explanations, which in both cases could be 
considered a sign of poor corporate governance disclosure (Arcot and Bruno, 2011; 
Hooghiemstra, 2012).
Following Hooghiemstra (2012), the procedures used to develop a ‘comply or explain’ 
index are as follows. The index assigns a highest score of 5 to a fully compliant firm with all 
provisions of the Code. In the case of non-compliance, the index also takes into account the 
explanations for non-compliance; therefore a score from 1 to 5 would be assigned to each 
category of explanation reported for non-compliance, with the score assigned being based on 
the relative informativeness of each category of explanation. In developing a ‘comply or 
explain’ index, a lower score of 1 is assigned when a firm reports ‘no explanation’ for non- 
compliance; a score of 2 when a firm provides ‘generic’ or ‘standard explanations’ or assurance 
of future compliance; a score of 3 for explanation offering alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms; a score of 4 to partial non-compliance over a temporary period of time; and a 
score of 5 to high quality detailed and firm-specific explanation. Some of these categories are 
uninformative (such as no explanations for non-compliance), while certain categories of 
explanations are highly informative, such as firm-specific explanations and explanations 
regarding a company’s size and structure. Table 3.4 describes the categories used in the
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‘comply or explain’ index, with a corresponding score assigned to each category, based on the 
order of its relative informativeness.
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Table 3.4 Definition of various categories used in the ‘comply or explain* index
Categories of explanations Description Score
a. No explanations for non- 
compliance
When a firm provides no explanation for non- 
compliance.
1
b. Generic or standard 
explanations
When a firm explains non-compliance by using 
standard phrases, such as ‘in the best interest of the 
company’.... ‘in our opinion’.... ‘we believe that’.... 
and so on.
2
c. Future assurance of 
compliance
When a firm reports that it will implement a Code 
provision in the following year or in the near future.
2
d. Description of alternative 
practices
When a firm is non-compliant with a particular Code 
provision but offers alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms adopted by the firm.
3
e. Partial non-compliance When a firm is non-compliant over a specific period 
of time during the reporting period or it fails to 
implement all aspects of a specific Code provision.
4
f. Firm-specific or context 
specific detailed explanations
When a firm provides detailed explanations about its 
specific context, such as: (a) company size; (b) board 
size; (c) company structure; (d) company foreign 
listings or its international operations; (e) industry or 
market related specific explanations; (f) 
implementation issues or ineffectiveness of Code 
provision; and (g) Code conflicts with laws.
5
g. Total number of 
explanations reported by a 
firm
The total number of explanations reported by a firm, 
in response to non-compliance with different 
provisions of the Code.
Based on the criteria in Table 3.4 and consistent with Hooghiemstra (2012), a ‘comply
or explain’ index is developed for each firm in the sample using the following formula:
‘Comply or explain’ index = l(no explanations) + 2(generic or standard explanations 
+ assurance of future compliance) + 3 (description of alternative practice) + 4(partial non- 
compliance) + 5(firm-specific detailed explanations)/Total number of explanations reported by 
a firm.
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Here, a score of 1 to 5 is the weighting given to the number of explanations in each 
category, based on the relative informativeness of each category. A higher score on the index 
shows the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms (in terms of compliance) as well 
as the quality of corporate governance disclosure (quality of reported explanations). For 
instance, if a firm (e.g., company A) is non-compliant with three provisions of the corporate 
governance code and it provides ‘no explanation’ for each deviation, the ‘comply or explain’ 
index will be:
‘Comply or explain’ index = 1(3) + 2(0) + 3(0) + .4(0) + 5(0)/3 = 1
Where, a score of 1 to 5 in the numerator is the weighting given to each category; the 
number of explanations in ‘no explanations’ category is 3; zero indicates the absence of a 
particular category of explanation; and 3 in the denominator represents the total number of 
explanations reported by a firm.
Similarly, if a firm (e.g., company B) is non-compliant with three provisions but 
justifies its position by providing firm-specific detailed explanation, the ‘comply or explain’ 
index will be:
‘Comply or explain’ index = 1(0) + 2(0) + 3(0) + 4(0) + 5(3)/3 = 5
In the above two examples, the two hypothetical companies are non-compliant with 
three provisions of the Code. However, based on the different types of explanations that they 
provide, the ‘comply or explain’ index is 1 for company A and 5 for company B. This shows 
that the quality of corporate governance disclosure (explanations) of company B is better than
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that of company A. A firm that is fully compliant with all provisions of a Code receives a 
highest score of 5 on the ‘comply or explain’ index.
In the context of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and in line with the 
empirical research on corporate governance and firm performance (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; 
Klapper and Love, 2004; Dumev and Kim, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Aggarwal et al., 2010; 
Hooghiemstra, 2012), it is argued that full compliance with the corporate governance codes or 
better corporate governance disclosure (as measured by the quality of reported explanations for 
non-compliance) has a positive impact on a firm’s financial performance. In this regard, the 
following hypothesis is developed.
HI: Full compliance with the corporate governance codes or better corporate 
governance disclosure (as measured by the quality of explanations for non-compliance) is 
positively related with a firm’s operating and financial performance in the UK and 
Germany.
3.6.2 Board size
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical link between various internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, including the board size and a firm’s performance. Jensen (1993) suggests that an 
appropriate board size comprises eight to ten directors. This is because larger boards are 
ineffective in terms of slow decision making and higher monitoring costs (Jensen, 1993). On the 
other hand, a larger board provides a link between the organisation and its external resources 
(e.g., Zahra and Pearce, 1989).
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The UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2012b) does not 
explicitly recommend any specific board size for listed companies in the UK. For instance, 
Section A of The UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2012b) 
recommends that ‘every company should be headed by an effective board which is collectively 
responsible for the long-term success of the company’ (Financial Reporting Council, 2012b, p. 
6). This shows that companies have been given the option to expand or reduce their board size, 
keeping in view the cost and benefits of a larger and smaller board, and also keeping in 
consideration the complex nature of their operations. On the other hand, German law only 
specifies the percentage of employees to be represented on the German supervisory boards and 
also remains silent about the appropriate size of corporate boards in Germany. For instance, the 
German Codetermination A c f % requires at least one third to one half of employees to be 
represented on the supervisory boards of companies having more than 500 or 2,000 employees 
respectively (Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code, 2012c, p. 1).
The average board size of UK firms is usually small, varying from 7 to 17 directors 
(Guest, 2009, p. 32). On the other hand, the German boards are relatively larger, with an 
average board size of 15 directors (De Andres et al., 2005). Empirical research on the 
relationship between board size and firm performance is inconclusive. For instance, the results 
reported in earlier studies have shown one of the two findings: (i) a significantly positive 
relationship (e.g., Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Beiner et al., 2006); or (ii) a significantly negative 
relationship (e.g., Yermack, 1996; De Andres et al., 2005; Guest, 2009).
48 Under the German Codetermination Act 1976, ‘codetermination’ refers to employees representation on the 
supervisory boards of German listed companies (Du Plessis et al., 2012, p. 151).
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From an agency theory perspective, it is argued that larger boards are ineffective in 
terms of slow decision making and higher monitoring costs. When board size increases beyond 
ten directors, it creates additional costs for the organisation in the form of slow decision making 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Psychologists also recommend that a smaller board between eight 
and ten directors could be ideal in terms of timely decision making, while larger boards may be 
subject to boardroom politics (Tricker, 2012). In a period of economic crisis, the costs of larger 
boards may negatively affect a firm performance. This argument is also supported by the 
existing literature on corporate governance (e.g., Pathan and Faff, 2013). Therefore, in line with 
the assumptions of agency theory, the following hypothesis is developed:
H2: Board size is negatively associated with firm operating and financial 
performance in the UK and Germany.
3.6.3 Board structure
Board structure is defined as the ratio of independent non-executive directors to total 
board members. The previous chapter discussed the theoretical link between independent non­
executive directors and firm financial performance. For instance, agency theory suggests that 
boards with more independent non-executive directors enhance the monitoring efficiency of a 
firm and that this subsequently reduces the agency costs (Fama, 1980). Keeping in view their 
monitoring role, the appointment of independent non-executive directors on board has been 
widely acknowledged in different corporate governance codes around the world. For instance, 
the Cadbury Report (1992) called for at least three independent non-executive directors. 
Recently, the required percentage of non-executive directors has been significantly increased 
and The UK Corporate Governance Code of 2012 requires that, at least half of the board of
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FTSE 350 companies should be comprised of independent non-executive directors (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2012b). In German firms, at least half of the members of the supervisory 
boards are selected from among the employees and the remaining members are appointed by the 
shareholders. The supervisory board, which comprises non-executive directors, is exclusively 
responsible for monitoring and advising the management board (Davies, 2000). Therefore, it 
can be argued that a mix of shareholders and employees represented on the supervisory board 
enhances the monitoring function of the supervisory board.
In the UK, the monitoring function of non-executive directors include: (a) examining the 
integrity of financial information; (b) determining executive remuneration; (c) risk 
management; (d) appointing, and where necessary, removing executive directors; and (e) a 
succession planning for the board (Financial Reporting Council, 2012b, p. 10). In addition, the 
Code also requires that non-executive directors should constructively challenge, and also help 
in, the development of corporate strategy. Effective monitoring in these areas is only possible if 
non-executive directors carefully perform their duties in such a way as recommended by the 
Code, and allocate sufficient time and levels of commitment to their companies. Section B.3.3 
of The UK Corporate Governance Code of 2012 imposes regulatory restrictions on non­
executive directors in that they cannot hold more than one non-executive directorship in any of 
the FTSE 100 constituent firms. Such wider engagement may affect the monitoring role of the 
non-executive directors. In Germany, Section 5.4.5 of the German Corporate Governance Code 
of 2012 stipulates that ‘members of the management board of a listed company shall not accept 
more than a total of three supervisory board mandates in non-group listed companies or in
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supervisory bodies of non-group companies which make similar requirements’ (Commission of 
the German Corporate Governance Code, 2012c , p. 12)
Empirical evidence shows mixed results about the relationship between non-executive 
directors and firm performance. One strand of the empirical literature finds that boards with 
more non-executive directors deliver better financial performance. For instance, Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) find that a greater proportion of independent non-executive directors is positively 
correlated with a firm’s performance. Some studies have reported a negative relationship 
between non-executive directors and firm financial performance (e.g., Guest, 2009). Guest
(2009) argues that adding more non-executive directors does not bring additional expertise to 
the board and that this may not only increase the existing size of the board but may also result 
in some unnecessary costs to the firm. On the other hand, some studies find no relationship 
between non-executive directors and firm performance. For instance, De Andres et al. (2005) 
did not find any significant relationship between the representation of non-executive directors 
and firm performance for a sample of 450 firms from the Anglo-Saxon and Continental 
European corporate governance systems. Moreover, in a recent study, Wintoki et al. (2012) 
used board structure data for 6,000 US firms over the period 1991-2003 and found no 
relationship between the presence of non-executive directors on the board and firm 
performance. They argue that prior corporate governance studies did not take into account the 
endogeneity factor, as methods used in prior research failed to control for different kinds of 
endogeneity issues.
From an agency theory perspective, it is expected that the proportion of non-executive 
directors is positively associated with the performance of firms. The UK Corporate Governance
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Code and The German Corporate Governance Code emphasise a greater role for non-executive 
directors. Keeping in view the recommendations of the corporate governance codes in the UK 
and Germany, and based on the assumptions of agency theory, the following hypothesis is 
developed:
H3: The proportion of independent non-executive directors is positively associated 
with firm operating and financial performance for UK and German firms.
3.6.4 Number of board meetings
Board activity is a key element of an effective corporate board. As discussed in the 
literature review section, board activities (measured by the total number of board meetings 
during a year) may enhance a firm’s performance. From a resource dependence theory 
perspective, the time spent by the board could be considered as a resource to the organisation 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992), while agency theory emphasises that increasing board activities 
could enhance the monitoring and control function of the board of directors. According to 
Section B.3 of The UK Corporate Governance Code of 2012, the directors should allocate 
sufficient time to their own companies and they should not be allowed to hold multiple non­
executive directorship in any of the FTSE companies (Financial Reporting Council, 2012b). The 
German Corporate Governance Code of 2012 also requires supervisory board members to 
allocate sufficient time to their companies to discharge their responsibilities effectively 
(Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code, 2012c, p. 12).
Empirical evidence on the relationship between the number of board meetings and firm 
performance is inconclusive. Vafeas (1999) finds that the frequency of board meetings has a 
positive effect on a firm’s operating performance. In the context of the 2007 financial crisis,
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Brick and Chidambaran (2010) have also reported a positive relationship between board 
meetings and firm performance. They argue that external market pressures from investors and 
regulators may significantly influence a firm’s management so as to increase its board activities, 
which have had a positive impact on a firm’s performance.
Overall, the above arguments suggest that increasing the number of board activities 
could be beneficial for the organisation from the perspective of an agency theory and a resource 
dependence theory. Prior research (Vafeas, 1999; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010) has also 
documented a positive relationship between the frequency of board meetings and firm 
performance. Consistent with prior research (Vafeas, 1999; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010) and 
keeping in view the recommendations of The UK Corporate Governance Code and The 
German Corporate Governance Code, it is expected that there will be a positive relationship 
between the number of board meetings and firm performance.
Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed:
H4: The number of board meetings variable is positively associated with firm
operating and financial performance for UK and German firms.
3.6.5 Gearing
Jensen (1986, p. 323) suggests that debt financing (gearing) can increase the level of 
monitoring over self-serving managers and that it can be used as an alternative corporate 
governance mechanism. Jensen argues that managers are likely to invest free cash flow in low-
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return projects instead of paying it to the owners. This creates a conflict of interests49 between 
owners and managers, particularly when a firm is generating substantial free cash flows 
(Jensen, 1986). However, debt financing can restrain managers from diverting free cash flow to 
low-retum projects because the firm has the primary liability to pay the interest and principal 
obligations on the credit. Therefore, the use of debt increases the value of the firm because debt 
financing provides signals that the managers are willing and able to distribute free cash flow 
and to be monitored by the creditors (Beiner et al., 2006, p. 256). Another argument can be 
made from a capital structure perspective that interest payments are tax deductible and therefore 
the value of a geared firm is higher than the value of an ungeared firm. In the context of 
Germany, where banks play a significant role in the German corporate governance structure, 
Agarwal and Elston (2001, p. 226) argue that:
‘Bank-influenced firms should enjoy increased access to capital through easier access 
to bank debt or preferential terms on loans. In addition, bank involvement with a firm 
serves as a signal to outside investors and causes a certification effect, which makes it 
easier for firms to attract additional equity’.
The presence of debt financing could create a conflict of interests between shareholders 
and creditors, which may increase the agency costs to the firm. According to Agarwal and 
Elston (2001), when a firm faces financial constraints, banks may ask for the issue of additional 
equity shares to repay the loan or may influence the use of equity capital rather than debt 
financing for more risky projects and vice versa. A conflict of interests also arises when a bank 
attempts to share firm-specific or industry-related private information with the firm’s 
competitors to maximise its own benefits. This may happen when banks provide financing 
facilities to different firms in the same industry (Agarwal and Elston, 2001).
49 Also known as ‘the agency costs of free cash flow’ in the finance literature.
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Empirical evidence on the relationship between debt financing and firm performance is 
inconclusive. Some studies have reported a negative relationship between debt financing and 
firm performance (e.g., Agarwal and Elston, 2001; Bauwhede, 2009; Francis et al., 2012). 
These studies confirm the presence of a conflict of interests between shareholders and creditors 
in highly geared companies. For this study, gearing is defined as a ratio of a firm’s total debt to 
the book value of its total assets.
On the other hand, using a sample of 280 German firms, Gorton and Schmid (2000) find 
a positive relationship between debt financing and firm operating and financial performance. 
Explaining the causes of this positive relationship, they argue that German banks provide 
substantial financial support to German firms and their representations on the supervisory 
boards of German listed companies also increase their incentive for additional monitoring and 
control. Other studies (Beiner et al., 2006; Goncharov et al., 2006) also report a positive 
relationship between debt financing and firm performance. These studies show that debt holders 
require additional internal control mechanisms (through debt agreements) beyond those 
implemented by the firm. In the context of the UK, McKnight and Weir (2009) have also 
reported positive relationship between debt financing and the performance of firms.
After the 2007 financial crisis, banks and financial institutions have tightened their 
lending policies, asking for strict terms and conditions (Bae et al., 2012). Based on the free cash 
flow hypothesis, suggesting a stronger monitoring role of gearing (Jensen, 1986) and consistent 
with prior empirical research (Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Beiner et al., 2006; Goncharov et al., 
2006), it is expected that there will be a positive relationship between gearing and firm 
performance.
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H5: There is a positive relationship between gearing (as measured by the ratio of a 
firm’s total debt to the book value of its total assets) and firm operating and 
financial performance for UK and German firms.
3.6.6 Ownership structure (blockholders’ ownership)
Section 2.6 provides a review of prior empirical studies on the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance. In the context of this thesis, ownership structure 
refers to external shareholders who own at least five per cent or more shares of the equity of a 
company. The five per cent threshold for external blockholders is consistent with prior 
empirical studies (Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Thomsen et al., 2006) and Section 3.3 justifies the 
reasons for choosing a minimum of five per cent threshold.
Sections 2.3, 2.5 and 2.6 discuss the theoretical arguments for and against the 
monitoring role of external blockholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large 
corporations with dispersed shareholders have free-rider issues. They suggest that a 
concentrated ownership structure can partly mitigate the free-rider issues in large corporations, 
as blockholders have a financial incentive to closely monitor a firm’s managers. However, large 
shareholders in a concentrated ownership system used to availing of ‘private benefits of control’ 
that may not necessarily benefit all shareholders’ (Franks and Mayer, 1997; Denis and 
McConnell, 2003).50 Such expropriations of minority shareholders’ rights create a conflict of 
interest between large shareholders and minority shareholders and may negatively affect the 
performance of firms. Empirical studies that report a negative relationship between external
50. Private benefits are those benefits which are received by large shareholders, but such benefits are not equally 
shared by other common stockholders, for instance, the approval of excessive perquisites for the directors 
representing large blockholders (Denis, 2001).
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blockholders and the performance of firms confirm a conflict of interest between minority 
shareholders and majority shareholders. Thomsen et al. (2006) reported a negative relationship 
between blockholders’ ownership and firm performance and valuation for firms operating in a 
relationship-based system of corporate governance.
The governance literature shows mixed evidence about the impact of institutional and 
non-institutional blockholders’ ownership on the performance of firms. For instance, some 
studies find that institutional blockholders’ ownership has a positive impact on the performance 
of firms (Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Lehmann and Weigand, 2000), while other studies report a 
positive relationship between non-institutional blockholders’ ownership and the performance of 
firms (Andres, 2008).
Empirical evidence also shows that similar to dispersed shareholdings, blockholders’ 
dispersion also reduces the ability of larger shareholders to control a firm’s management 
(Konijn et al., 2011). The findings imply that small and dispersed blockholders may be unable 
to challenge effectively the powers of large blockholders (Konijn et al., 2011, p. 1339).
Studies on the effectiveness of ownership concentration are specifically carried out in 
the context of the major corpofate governance system, such as the UK (e.g., Leech and Leahy, 
1991; Short and Keasey, 1999; O'Sullivan, 2009), the USA (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) 
and Germany (e.g., Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Lehmann and Weigand, 2000; Andres, 2008). 
Empirical studies have also examined the impact of external blockholders in two contrasting 
corporate governance systems (Anglo-Saxon vs. relationship-based systems) (Franks and 
Mayer, 1997; Thomsen et al., 2006; Gugler et al., 2008). The majority of the previous studies
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has reported a positive relationship between external blockholdings and the performance of 
firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Leech and Leahy, 1991; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Gorton 
and Schmid, 2000; Andres, 2008).
Following the theoretical proposition of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and consistent with 
prior empirical work carried out in the UK, Germany and other countries (Gorton and Schmid, 
2000; Andres, 2008; O'Sullivan, 2009), this study expects a positive relationship between the 
percentage of shares owned by external blockholders and the performance of firms. Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is developed:
H6: There is a positive relationship between the percentage of shares owned by 
external blockholders (institutional shareholders, non-institutional shareholders) and firm 
operating and financial performance for UK and German firms.
3.7 Control variables
Control variables are observable firm-specific and industry-specific characteristics that 
could have a significant influence on a firm’s performance. The control variables used in this 
study are: (a) firm size; (b) firm-specific risk; (c) foreign listing; and (d) industry dummies.
3.7.1 Firm size
Larger firms have ‘severe’ agency issues and it is difficult to monitor them as compared 
with smaller firms (Beiner et al., 2006, p. 253). Similarly, different corporate governance 
arrangements are also affected by a firm’s size (Wintoki et al., 2012). For instance, it is 
common that larger firms have larger boards, which increases the monitoring costs and affect a 
firm’s value. Various studies (e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005; Schultz et al., 2010) have reported a
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negative relationship between firm size and Tobin’s Q and return on assets (hereafter ROA). 
For the purpose of this research, the natural logarithm of the book value of a firm’s assets at the 
end of a financial period will be used as a proxy for a firm’s size (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 
2009; Aggarwal et al., 2010). Therefore, it is expected that there will be a negative relationship 
between firm size and firm operating performance (ROA) and financial performance (Tobin’s
Q).
3.7.2 Foreign listing
As argued in the literature review section, legal systems around the world provide 
different kinds of protection to investors (La Porta et al., 1998). Therefore, a firm listed in a 
country with strong legal protection (such as common law countries) will have to ensure more 
investor protection than a firm listed in a country with a weak legal protection for investors. 
Prior research (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004) has also reported a significantly positive 
relationship between a foreign listing and a firm’s financial performance. Similarly, in the 
context of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, Mitton (2002) also found that foreign-listed 
firms have a higher quality of disclosure and higher stock returns. Therefore, it is expected that 
there will be a positive relationship between foreign listing (proxied by a dummy variable that 
will take a value of one if a firm is cross-listed or zero otherwise) and a firm’s performance.
3.7.3 Firm-specific risk
Variation in firm-specific risk can cause variation in the governance structure of a 
company because ‘it is a potential indicator of the level of information asymmetry that exists 
between management and shareholders’ (Schultz et al., 2010, p. 154). In the context of the 
recent financial crisis, Beltratti and Stulz (2011, p. 7) argue that managers in a well-governed
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company are likely to avoid risks that may negatively affect shareholders’ value. Schultz et al.
(2010) have found a negative relationship between firm-specific risk (measured by beta) and 
firm performance (as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q). Using a sample of 288 companies 
Bromiley (1991) finds a negative relationship between corporate risk taking and the 
performance of firms. Bromiley (1991) argues that poor financial performance increases a 
firm’s risk exposure, which results in further poor performance. In line with prior research 
(Beiner et al., 2006; Schultz et al., 2010), this study will use firm-specific beta as a proxy for 
firm-specific risk. Therefore, it is expected that there will be a negative relationship between 
firm-specific risk (beta) and firm performance. Data on firm-specific betas will be taken from 
DataStream, which is calculated by a least squares regression between adjusted share prices and 
the corresponding DataStream market index (Beiner et al., 2006).
3.7.4 Industry dummies
Firm-specific or internal corporate governance mechanisms vary across different 
industries (Klapper and Love, 2004, p. 704). Consistent with prior studies (Klapper and Love, 
2004; Beiner et al., 2006), industry dummies will be included to control for the 15 major 
industries as shown in Table 3.2. Another reason for including industry dummy variables is to 
capture potential ‘unobserved heterogeneity’ at the industry level and its impact on a firm’s 
performance across the UK and Germany (Klapper and Love, 2004, p. 714).
3.7.5 Research and development expenditure
Research and development expenditure (hereafter R&D) has been included as a control 
for three reasons. First, the majority of the companies in the UK and German sample are from 
those industries which require significant R&D investment, such as chemical, health and
154
pharmaceutical, oil and gas, technology and telecommunications sectors. Second, the sample 
firms include larger firms and larger firms will invest more in R&D expenditure (Beiner et al., 
2006). The inclusion of R&D expenditure will therefore capture a firm’s growth opportunities. 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between R&D expenditure and firm performance is 
inconclusive. For instance, Aggarwal et al. (2010) argue that investment in R&D creates a 
positive impact on shareholders’ wealth. Aggarwal et al. (2010) find that firms with higher 
R&D expenditure have higher corporate governance ratings as measured by a corporate 
governance index. Following prior empirical research (e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005; Guest, 
2009; Aggarwal et al., 2010; Ammann et al., 2011), this study includes R&D expenditure as a 
control variable, as measured by research and development expenditure divided by sales. It is 
expected that R&D expenditure will be positively associated with a firm’s operating and 
financial performance.
3.8 Dependent variables: firm performance
Two dependent variables included in this study are: (a) a firm’s operating performance 
(return on assets); and (b) financial performance (Tobin’s Q). The accounting-based measure of 
performance (ROA) is selected because it is a superior measure of a firm’s operating 
performance as compared with the return on equity (ROE). For instance, the income measure 
(operating income) used in the computation of ROA is less affected by extraordinary items such 
as income from asset disposals (Bauwhede, 2009, p. 498). Second, the selection of this specific 
measure of accounting performance is also in line with prior studies (e.g., Yermack, 1996; 
Klapper and Love, 2004; Beiner et al., 2006). For the purpose of this study, ROA is defined as 
operating income divided by total assets at the end of a financial year (Yermack, 1996). As
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suggested in the literature, a higher ROA indicates the effectiveness of firm-level corporate 
governance mechanisms and vice versa (Bauwhede, 2009, p. 497). A second measure of 
performance used in this study is Tobin’s Q, which has been widely used in the corporate 
governance literature as a proxy for a firm’s market valuation (e.g,. Yermack, 1996; Gompers et 
al., 2003; Bauer et al., 2004; Klapper and Love, 2004; Beiner et al., 2006; Chhaochharia and 
Laeven, 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2010; Ammann et al., 2011). A higher Tobin’s Q ratio shows the 
ability of a firm’s management to generate higher value for shareholders. Following Aggarwal 
et al. (2010), Tobin’s Q will be calculated as:
(Total assets + Market value of equity -  Total common equity -  Deferred taxes)
Total assets
Table 3.5 below provides a brief summary of these variables, and provides a definition 
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This chapter has presented the research methodology, the sources of data and the sample 
selection procedures. Corporate governance and financial data will be collected from 
DataStream. The sample represents 120 firms from the UK and Germany over the period 2007- 
2011. Section 3.2 provided the philosophical assumptions and justifications behind the chosen 
research paradigm (e.g., positivist approach). A positivist research approach is adopted for this 
study, which aims to address the two research questions objectively and using quantitative 
approaches to test one or more theories. A quantitative content analysis approach is used to 
address the first research question, which examines the types, quality and pattern of 
explanations reported for non-compliance with The UK Corporate Governance Code and 
German Corporate Governance Code. The content analysis procedures have been explained in 
Section 3.4. Section 3.5 explained the econometric model, which is applied to address the 
second research question, which investigates the impact of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance. Following Schultz et al. (2010) and Wintoki et al. (2012), 
this study will employ a generalised method of moments (GMM) model, which controls for 
different kinds of endogeneity problems. Section 3.6 presented the expected relationship 
between independent variables, control variables and the dependent variables.
The next chapter reports the findings from the content analysis of the UK and German 
corporate governance reports.
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Chapter 4. Content analysis of the UK and German corporate governance
reports
Section 4.1 Introduction






This chapter presents the empirical results and it analyses the explanations reported for 
non-compliance with The UK Corporate Governance Code and The German Corporate 
Governance Code. The chapter examines the first research question presented in the literature 
review section -  how do the types, quality and pattern of explanations for non-compliance with 
the corporate governance codes vary across the UK and Germany?
In order to answer the above research question, this chapter fulfils three main objectives. 
First, it examines and compares the level of compliance across the UK and German firms 
examined in this study. Second, the chapter classifies the reported explanations for non­
complying firms into different categories and then provides a comparison between these two 
countries. Finally, the chapter also provides examples of individual firm-specific explanations 
that have been extracted from the corporate governance reports of the UK and German 
companies.
The sample consists of 120 non-financial firms selected from the UK and Germany for 
the period 2007-2011. As explained in the methodology chapter, a mechanistic (quantitative) 
content analysis approach is used for classifying and comparing the different categories of 
explanations reported by non-compliant firms in the UK and Germany.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reports the descriptive 
statistics for the sample firms; Section 4.3 presents the findings by reporting the different 
categories of explanations taken from the corporate governance reports of UK and German 
firms; and Section 4.4 summarises the chapter.
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4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.1 below presents descriptive statistics, such as foreign listings, five years’ 
average market capitalisation, average book value of total assets, average number of employees 
and the average number of equity shares issued, taken from DataStream at the end of a 
company financial year for the sample firms. Table 4.1 shows that the percentage of German 
and UK firms cross-listed in the United States are 25 per cent (15/60) and 23 per cent (14/60), 
respectively. However, the number of sample UK firms listed in Germany is 93.3 per cent 
(56/60),51 which is significantly higher than 3.3 per cent (2/60) of the German firms listed on 
the London Stock Exchange, and because of these reasons the average market capitalisation for 
sample UK companies is relatively higher than that for German companies. Another reason 
could be that cross listed firms are likely to raise additional capital from overseas stock markets 
(Klapper and Love, 2004). Given this higher percentage of cross-listing across the UK and 
Germany, the final sample has been selected based on a company’s primary listings in any of 
these two countries. In other words, any of the UK or German firms, which has been cross­
listed in Germany or UK, has been excluded from the final sample selection in its secondary 
market.
51 A good example of foreign listing is Anglo American pic, which has primary listings on the London Stock 
Exchange and is also listed in Germany, Switzerland, South Africa, Bostwana and Namibia.





New York Stock Exchange listing 14 (23%) 15(25%)
Cross-listing on the London Stock 
Exchange and Frankfurt Stock Exchange
56 (93.3%) 2 (3.3%) 3.63*
Firms with foreign listing in other markets 
(excluding the UK, USA and Germany)
11 (18.3%) 1 2 (20%) —
5 years’ average market capitalisation (€ 
m., end of financial year)
77,563,541.23 51,775,308.80 1.52
5 years’ average numbers of equity shares 
issued
6,846,664 1,431,722 0.93
5 years’ average book value of total assets 
(€ m., end of financial year)
64,856,313 105,700,908 -1.42
5 years’ average total number of 
employees
44,794 67,228 -0.46
Number of firms 60 60 -
Source: Data compiled from DataStream. The values for assets and market capitalisation are reported in a common 
currency (the euro). Average values are reported for the whole sample chosen from each country. * indicates that 
the results are statistically significant at 10 % level. The results indicate that the mean differences for the number 
of cross-listed firms in the UK and Germany are significantly different. This confirms the evidence shown in 
columns 2 and 3 above that the total number of cross-listed firms in the UK sample is higher than that in the 
German sample. Cross-listing was measured by a dummy variable, which takes a value o f one if  a firm is cross­
listed and zero otherwise.
This will provide an opportunity to analyse separately and compare the quality of 
explanations reported by the domestic UK and German companies. Focusing only on the 
domestic companies, the findings would be helpful in understanding the impact of institutional 
differences on corporate governance disclosure of firms across these two countries. As 
presented in Table 4.1, the sample of UK and German firms exhibit differences in terms of 
average market capitalisation, number of equity shares issued, book value of total assets and
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average total number of employees. However, these differences are statistically insignificant, 
which means that the sample UK and German firms share similar characteristics in terms of 
their size, as measured by their average market capitalisation, number of equity shares issued, 
book value of total assets and average total number of employees. This further justifies the 
sample selection criteria as discussed in the methodology chapter and it shows that the sample 
includes larger firms from the UK and Germany. The prevailing differences in legal systems, 
ownership structures, board structures and capital markets have been already debated in the 
literature review chapter. The next section presents the empirical results and explains how these 
differences have affected the level of compliance and the quality of explanations for non- 
compliance with The UK Corporate Governance Code and The German Corporate Governance 
Code.
4.3 Findings
The codes of corporate governance in the UK and Germany are based on the principle of 
‘comply or explain’. Companies in both countries are required to disclose their position on how 
they have implemented the code of best practice or otherwise explain and justify the reasons for 
any deviation. German companies are required by law to publish separately a ‘declaration of 
conformity’ and to disclose whether a company has fully complied or if not, list and explain the 
provision(s) with which it has not complied. In the case of the UK, the compliance statement is 
part of the corporate governance statement which is published in the company’s annual report.
Table 4.2 below shows the level of compliance with The UK Corporate Governance 
Code and The German Corporate Governance Code. The results indicate that the level of 
compliance with the corporate governance codes has been significantly different across the UK
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and Germany. During the sample period (2007-2011), the percentage of full compliance with 
the German Corporate Governance Code has decreased in the first four years. The highest 
percentage of full compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code is 21.7 per cent in 
2007. On the other hand, on average, around 50.3 per cent of the samples of UK firms are fully 
compliant with the requirements of the UK Corporate Governance Code for the period 2007- 
2011. One possible reason for these significant differences in the compliance rate could be a 
result of the timing differences in the development and implementation of formal corporate 
governance codes in the UK and Germany. In the UK, the first corporate governance code was 
implemented in 1992. On the other hand, the German code of corporate governance came into 
force in July 2002. For the UK sample, the finding is consistent with a recent corporate 
governance review of FTSE 350 companies (see Grant Thornton, 2012, p. 8), which shows that 
the level of compliance in the UK remained at around 50 per cent during 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
A higher level of compliance in the UK could also be due to the fact that 93.3 per cent of the 
sample UK firms are cross-listed in Germany, and 23 per cent of the UK sample firms are listed 
in the United States. This finding is in line with the literature, which shows that firms listed on 
foreign stock exchanges are more likely to adopt strong corporate governance mechanisms 
because they are subject to additional disclosure requirements (Klapper and Love, 2004, p. 
713).
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Table 4.2 The level of compliance with The German Corporate Governance Code
and The UK Corporate Governance Code___________________________________
Panel A: German firms 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total number of firms 60 60 60 60 60
Number of fully compliant firms 
Percentage of fully compliant
13 11 9 5 12
firms
Panel B: UK firms
21.7 18.3 15 8.3 20
Total number of firms 60 60 60 60 60
Number of fully compliant firms 
Percentage of fully compliant
27 33 31 29 31
firms 45 55 51.7 48.3 51.7
For the remaining, non-complying firms, the reported explanations for non-compliance 
are classified in ten different categories. Ten categories are used because some of the categories 
already identified in the literature (Arcot and Bruno, 2011; Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 2011; 
Hooghiemstra, 2012; Seidl et al., 2012) either overlap or there are only marginal differences 
between them. In addition, two new categories emerged after analysing the compliance 
statements, which makes the number of categories and the categorisation scheme different from 
previous studies. The two new categories are (a) partial non-compliance; and (b) assurance of 
future compliance. The ten categories are:
(1) Partial non-compliance;
(2) No explanation for non-compliance;
(3) Explanation of alternative corporate governance practices;
(4) Generic or standard explanation;
(5) Assurance of future compliance;
(6) Explanations regarding company size, board size or company structure;
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(7) Explanations regarding a company’s foreign listings or international operations;
(8) Company, industry or market related specific explanations;
(9) Code provision conflicts with laws; and
(10) Firm-specific issues with Code implementation or less effectiveness of the Code 
provision.
The content analysis procedures have been explained in Section 3.4. The literature 
review section (Section 2.3.1) also emphasised the importance of corporate governance 
disclosure and explained how corporate governance disclosure, particularly the quality of 
explanations for non-compliance with the Code, reduces the asymmetric information problems 
between owners and managers. The Financial Reporting Council in the UK encourages all 
investors (individual as well as institutional investors) to pay attention to the quality of 
explanations reported by non-compliant firms.
Table 4.3 below provides examples of each category of these explanations taken from 
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Based on the categories of explanations given in Table 4.3, the results for the German 
companies are reported in Table 4.4. The total number of explanations collected from the 
compliance statements are reported in absolute numbers, while each category of explanation 
represents a percentage of the total number of explanations reported by the sample firms in a 
given year. The last column in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 highlights the five years’ average for 
each category of explanation. The findings show that a total number of 777 explanations for 
non-compliance have been reported by the German firms, which is significantly higher than the 
corresponding 241 explanations provided by the sample UK firms, as reported in Table 4.5 (see 
final row in Table 4.5). An increase in the ‘assurance of future compliance’ category from 8.8 
per cent in 2007 to 16.2 per cent in 2010 (Table 4.4, Category 5) indicates that some companies 
have shown interest in complying with the required provisions of the Code in the following year 
or in the near future. However, the majority of such kinds of explanations are repeatedly given 
in the compliance statements over the sample period 2007-2011. As a result, it is difficult to 
determine whether such promises about future compliance will be fulfilled in the near future or 
not. A number of companies in Germany has either commented on the Code’s conflict with 
laws or societal norms, or on the ineffectiveness of the Code provisions. However, no such 
explanations have been found in the corporate governance statements of UK companies (refer 
to Table 4.5, Category 9). This finding is in line with the literature, which reveals that ‘the 
German code of good governance includes some controversial, and not so popular, 
recommendations that are not followed by the majority of companies, such as personal liability 
and compensation of the management and/or supervisory board’ (Bebenroth, 2005, cited in 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, p. 384).
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Other controversial aspects of the German code of corporate governance relate to the 
disclosure of management board and supervisory board members’ remuneration -  the Code 
requires disclosure of remuneration on an individual basis, while the Stock Exchange 
Admission Regulations require companies to publish its board remuneration on an aggregate 
basis (Goergen et al., 2008, p. 190). These controversial provisions in the German corporate 
governance code provide an apparent incentive for firms to deviate, which would potentially 
distort the quality of explanations because companies would constantly refer to these provisions 
while justifying their position for non-compliance (see an increase in category 9 from 4.7 per 
cent to 12.4 per cent in Table 4.4). As highlighted in Table 4.4, the percentage of ‘no 
explanations for non-compliance’ category is substantially decreased from 31.2 per cent in 2007 
to 3.9 per cent in 2011. On the other hand, the percentage of ‘generic or standard 
explanations’52 has gradually increased from 20 per cent in 2007 to 34.1 per cent in 2011 (refer 
to Table 4.4, Category 4). In fact, the whole idea of the ‘comply or explain’ is undermined if 
companies do not provide high quality explanations for non-compliance with the recommended 
code provisions (Seidl et al., 2012, p. 23). This increase in the ‘generic or standard 
explanations’ category indicates that, irrespective of the corporate governance systems in 
different locations, non-compliant firms do exploit the ‘explain’ option and flexibility of the 
‘comply or explain’ principle and they prefer to give the kind of explanations that can just fulfil 
the minimum disclosure requirements53 of the regulators. Another possible explanation related 
to this high degree of uninformative explanations may be that non-compliance does not imply
52 Explanations which provide generic statements, such as ‘we believe that’.. .‘in our opinion’....‘in the best 
interest of the company’, etc. These explanations are largely subjective and it is very difficult to determine the 
quality of these explanations.
53 Until 2012, the Financial Reporting Council in the UK did not explicitly focus on the ‘explain’ element of the 
‘comply or explain’ principle. The recent UK Corporate Governance Code of 2012 provides guidelines on what 
constitutes an acceptable explanation and what does not (Financial Reporting Council, 2012b).
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bad governance if a firm implements an alternative and better governance practices instead of 
those provisions being recommended by the Code. However, failure to provide informative 
explanations would be considered a signal of poor corporate governance disclosure 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As reported in Table 4.4 on the previous page and Table 4.5 on the following page, the 
percentage of firm-specific explanations or more informative explanations is relatively low 
compared with ‘generic or standard explanations’ and ‘no explanations’ categories in both 
countries. However, the overall percentage of firm-specific explanations or more informative 
explanations is comparatively higher in the UK. The idea of voluntary self-regulation (through 
‘comply or explain’) is to give a choice to firms if they can alternatively implement strong 
internal corporate governance mechanisms, in response to those provisions recommended by a 
code of corporate governance, thereby avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach to corporate 
governance (Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 2011). However, repeated non-compliance with ‘no 
explanation’ or ‘standard explanation’ would mean that firms have chosen a one-size-fit-all 
approach to the explanations for non-compliance.
Table 4.5 shows the different categories of explanations for a sample of 60 non-financial 
UK firms over the period 2007-2011. The table indicates that partial non-compliance 
(temporary deviation) with the UK Corporate Governance Code has significantly increased 
from 1.9 per cent in 2007 to 13.6 per cent in 2011 (refer to Category 1). Hooghiemstra and Van 
Ees (2011, p. 492) argue that firms may temporarily deviate from a Code provisions and the 
external market players (such as a firm’s shareholders and media groups) are likely to accept it 
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The findings indicate that no company in the UK has commented on the Code provision 
being in conflict with other laws or about the ineffectiveness of the Code provision. A similar 
finding has been reported by Seidl et al. (2012, p. 17) and they argue that such implementation 
and compatibility issues arise when the Code itself or any of its provisions are new to the firm. 
Seidl et al. (2012, p. 18) further explain that ‘the longer a code and its individual code 
provisions have been in place the more likely it is that these issues will have been resolved’. In 
the context of the UK, it can be argued that since 20 years has passed since the Cadbury Report 
(1992) and the Financial Reporting Council has regularly engaged all stakeholders (investors 
and companies) in the consultation process when developing and amending the Code therefore, 
with the passage of time no such conflicting provisions now exist in the UK code of corporate 
governance.
When analysing the corporate governance reports, a new category of explanation 
(‘assurance of future compliance’) emerged from the compliance statements. In some cases, 
companies repeatedly give assurance to the investors’ community that in future they will 
comply with a particular Code provision. For instance, the 2008 compliance statement of 
Wacker Chemie AG explains a deviation regarding the ‘severance pay cap’54 as recommended 
by the German Corporate Governance Code 2007 (Commission of the German Corporate 
Governance Code, 2007) in the following way:
‘ With regard to new appointments to the executive board as well as the re-appointment 
o f executive board members, we will comply with this recommendation o f  the Code ’.
(Wacker Chemie AG, 2008)
54 Provision 4.2.3 paragraph 4 of the German Corporate Governance Code 2007 requires that ‘in concluding 
management board contracts, care shall be taken to ensure that payments made to a management board member on 
premature termination of his contract without serious cause do not exceed the value of two years’ compensation 
(severance payment cap) and compensate no more than the remaining term of the contract’.
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Interestingly, the same explanation giving assurance of future compliance to investors is 
consistently repeated from 2008 to 2011 and no specific time frame is provided by the 
company. On the other hand, some companies clearly indicate at the beginning that in future 
they will not comply with a specific Code recommendation. For example, in response to the 
Code recommendation to award fixed as well as performance-based compensation to the 
supervisory board members, Fresenius Medical Care AG (a German company) provides the 
following explanation in its 2007 compliance statement:
‘Fresenius Medical Care AG does not pay any performance-related compensation 
to the members o f  the supervisory board in addition to the annual fixed  
compensation. For now, we do not intend to deviate from this compensation 
procedure as a performance-related compensation linked to the long term 
performance o f  the company is not common in our worldwide competitive 
environment’. (Fresenius Medical Care AG, 2007)
In the above case, the company also refers to the global context of its operation and 
hence it does not consider the Code’s provision being compatible with regulations in different 
regions of the world. In this particular case, the company consistently deviates from the 
required provision of the Code over the period 2007-2011.
Good governance practices (in terms of compliance with the corporate governance 
codes) provide positive signals to the capital markets, which gives an opportunity for firms to 
report better governance, which may potentially compensate the firm in the form of various 
external benefits. For example, Kingfisher PLC provides the following explanation in its 2011 
corporate governance statement:
‘The Board has agreed to voluntarily adopt the following principles ahead o f the 
implementation o f the new Code: (a) all directors will stand for re-appointment at 
the company’s annual general meetings with effect from 2011; and (b) the
179
evaluation o f  the board will be externally facilitated at least once every three 
years, commencing with the review carried out in 2010 ’. (Kingfisher PLC, 2011)
The explanation provided in the Kingfisher PLC (2011) compliance statement indicates 
that a firm may adopt good governance practices beyond those required by the existing 
recommended code of best practice. This may also give an assurance that the company would 
be likely to adopt the Code’s provision in the following year.
In some circumstances companies do provide convincing explanations to justify their 
position and argue that the Code provision cannot be implemented owing to conflict with laws 
or societal norms. For example, the 2010 compliance statement of Fresenius Medical Care AG 
provides the following explanation for non-compliance with the ‘severance pay cap’ provision 
of the Code:
‘Such severance payment arrangements would be contrary to the concept practiced 
by Fresenius Medical Care in accordance with the German Stock Corporation Act, 
according to which employment contracts o f  the members o f  the management 
board are, in principle, concluded for the period o f their appointment. Therefore, a 
premature termination o f  the employment contract in principle requires a serious 
cause ’. (Fresenius Medical Care AG, 2010)
For non-compliance with a similar recommendation of the Code (severance cap), two 
companies (i.e., Fresenius Medical Care AG and Wacker Chemie AG) have provided different 
explanations, which provides a good comparison of explanations across different firms.
The quality of explanations for non-compliance may also be driven by other external 
factors, such as a firm’s competitors operating in a same ‘comply or explain’ environment. 
Hooghiemstra and Van Ees (2011, p. 492) find that ‘similar to compliance, explanations for 
non-compliance appear not to be idiosyncratic to a specific firm but tend to be similar across 
clusters of firms operating in the same organizational field’. For this study, an example would
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be Axel Springer AG, which does not disclose its board remuneration on an individual basis and 
provides the following explanation for non-compliance over the period 2007 to 2009:
‘Such itemized information is not disclosed because as the competitors o f  Axel 
Springer AG also do not publish any such information
(Axel Springer AG, 2007)
In addition, some explanations in the compliance statements are very brief and 
uninformative. A good example is Lanxess AG, which has a long record of non-compliance 
with Section 3.8, paragraph 2 of The German Corporate Governance Code 2006 (Commission 
of the German Corporate Governance Code, 2006). The Code recommends: 4if a company takes 
out a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance policy for its management board and 
supervisory board, a suitable deduction shall be agreed by the company’ (Commission of the 
German Corporate Governance Code, 2006, p. 6). In response, Lanxess AG put forward the 
following explanations in different years:
2007 -  ‘LANXESS believes that a deduction is not a suitable way to influence the 
sense o f  responsibility o f  the management board and supervisory board’.
2008 -  ‘LANXESS believes that a deduction is not a suitable way to influence the 
sense o f  responsibility o f  the management board and supervisory board’.
(Lanxess AG, 2007)
Similarly, in the UK, Associated British Foods PLC provides the following explanations 
over the period 2007-2011, for non-compliance with provision B.2.1 of The Combined Code 
2006 (Financial Reporting Council, 2006), which recommends that the chairman of a company 
should not chair the remuneration committee.
2007 -  ‘The board o f Associated British Foods PLC does not accept this 
recommendation as it considers that Martin Adamson, due to his experience, is 
best suited to chair this committee ’.
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2008 -  ‘The board o f  Associated British Foods PLC does not accept this 
recommendation as it considers that Martin Adamson, due to his experience, is 
best suited to chair this committee
2009 -  ‘The board o f Associated British Foods PLC does not accept this 
recommendation as it considers that Charles Sinclair, due to his experience, is best 
suited to chair this committee
2010 -  ‘The board o f Associated British Foods PLC does not accept this 
recommendation as it considers that Charles Sinclair, due to his experience, is best 
suited to chair this committee
2011 -  ‘The board o f  Associated British Foods PLC considers that Charles 
Sinclair, due to his experience, is best suited to chair this committee
(Associated British Foods PLC, 2012)
In the above case, a possible reason for such a consistent deviation could be the 
ownership structure55 of the company, because firms with concentrated ownership structure 
would be less likely to have principal-agent issues and therefore they are less concerned about 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Empirical studies (such as Bauwhede and 
Willekens, 2008; Arcot and Bruno, 2011) have also reported a negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and voluntary corporate governance disclosure, while Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997, p. 754) argue:
‘Large shareholders thus address the agency problem in that they both have a 
general interest in profit maximization, and enough control over the assets of the 
firm to have their interests respected’
However, the explanations given by Lanxess AG and Associated British Foods PLC 
provide very little information. Some other companies have also repeatedly used phrases, such 
as ‘in the best interest of the company’... ‘we believe that’. . .‘in our opinion’ and so on, while 
the content of the reported explanations also remain unchanged over the time. This finding is
55 As of 17 September 2011, Wittington Investments Limited and its subsidiary Howard Investments Limited, held 
in aggregate 54.5 per cent (2010 -  54.5%) of the total issued ordinary share capital of Associated British Foods 
PLC (Associated British Foods PLC, 2011, p. 106).
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also consistent with a recent study (Hooghiemstra and Van Ees, 2011, p. 493), which finds that 
firms report similar explanations to justify non-compliance over the time. As a result, 
uninformative explanations create ‘serious doubts’ over the quality of disclosure and 
subsequently affect the assessment made by investors on the basis of this information (MacNeil 
and Li, 2006, p. 489). In December 2013, the Financial Reporting Council reviewed the quality 
of selected explanations published in the FTSE 350 annual reports. The FRC concludes that:
‘The standard of explanations was variable. While the majority of examples 
reviewed provided at least some of the information the FRC expects, in a number 
of cases the company simply asserted that the governance arrangements it had 
adopted were appropriate for its circumstances’.
(Financial Reporting Council, 2013, p. 19) 
Regulators, such as the Financial Reporting Council in the UK, the Commission of the 
German Corporate Governance Code and investors are the primary stakeholders in respect of 
these compliance statements and they have the ultimate responsibility of assessing the quality of 
these explanations. The FRC has warned that, if  the quality of explanations does not improve in 
2014, then it would take necessary steps to ensure the implementation of the ‘comply or 
explain’ principle.
From the content analysis of UK and German corporate governance reports, it was 
found that the volume, structure, content and language of the reports also vary across these two 
countries. For instance, all the compliance statements published by German companies are on 
average slimmed down to one page or two pages and these statements are simultaneously 
published on companies’ websites as well as on the website of the Commission of the German 
Corporate Governance Code (e.g., Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code, 
2012b). In contrast, the corporate governance sections of UK companies contain full details
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about the role of the board of directors, board committees, and a remuneration report. Although 
non-compliance is now limited in the UK, however, in some cases, it is difficult to pin down the 
explanations for non-compliance in the corporate governance reports. For example, when 
explaining their position on a particular deviation, some companies frequently refer to the next 
sections (or pages) of their corporate governance reports, rather than addressing the 
explanations for non-compliance in the first instance. This makes corporate governance 
reporting more complex and the objective may be to hide non-compliance information. There is 
no doubt that companies are complex in terms of their operations and organisation structure but 
this does not necessarily mean that the reported information should also be ‘complex’ and 
‘bulky’.
4.4 Discussion
This chapter contributes to the existing corporate governance literature and investigates 
an important aspect of the ‘comply or explain’ principle (the quality of explanations), which has 
been largely ignored in the governance literature, as prior corporate governance studies have 
predominantly focused on the ‘compliance’ aspect of the ‘comply or explain’ principle. The 
chapter also reports how institutional differences across different corporate governance systems 
affect the compliance as well as the disclosure behaviour of firms. The content analysis of 600 
corporate governance statements provides a detailed overview of how large companies across 
the UK and Germany reported the explanations for non-compliance with The UK Corporate 
Governance Code and The German Corporate Governance Code. Furthermore, a new category 
of explanation, ‘assurance of future compliance’, was found, which indicates that non-
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compliant firms repeatedly give an assurance to investors that in future they would like to 
implement a specific provision of the corporate governance code -  but do not necessarily do so.
The differences in the compliance rate across the UK and Germany could be linked with 
a variety of institutional differences as mentioned in the literature review section, such as 
differences in the ownership structures, board structures, capital markets, legal systems and the 
timing differences in the development and implementation of formal corporate governance 
codes. There are differences in the requirements (provisions) of The UK Corporate Governance 
Code and The German Corporate Governance Code. For example, the 2006 version of The UK 
Corporate Governance Code includes 48 provisions (Financial Reporting Council, 2006), while 
the 2006 version of The German Corporate Governance Code contains 82 provisions 
(Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code, 2006). This implies that a higher 
number of provisions in The German Corporate Governance Code could also be considered as 
a potential barrier in terms of compliance with a code of best practices.
The findings imply that improvement in compliance does not necessarily lead to 
improvement in the quality o f explanations for non-compliance. The findings also document 
complexity and ambiguity in the nature of corporate governance reporting. These findings are 
consistent with the recent research of Shrives and Brennan (2014), which has raised similar 
concerns about the.location, completeness and verifiability of the explanations reported by the 
UK firms. A principles-based system of corporate governance would not fulfil the desired 
objectives if non-compliant companies provide a very limited description and rationale for non- 
compliance with a specific code provision.
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This thesis has provided a robust analytical framework that may be used to examine 
empirical evidence from other countries that use the ‘comply or explain’ system of corporate 
governance. The ‘comply or explain’ principle has now been widely implemented in the 
majority of the EU member countries and Commonwealth countries.
The results also contribute to the on-going policy debate in the UK (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2012c) and in the EU (European Commission, 2006; European Commission, 2012; 
European Commission, 2014) about the quality of explanations reported by the listed 
companies. A mixed quality of explanations reported by the UK and German companies 
suggests that regulators need to develop clearer and comprehensive guidelines about the quality 
of explanations. In conclusion, it seems that non-compliant companies in the ‘comply or 
explain’ regimes exploit the spirit of compliance and the discretion granted by a principles- 
based system of corporate governance.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has focused on the ‘explain’ element of the ‘comply or explain’ principle 
and has examined the different types of explanation reported by non-compliant firms. Using a 
mechanistic (quantitative) content analysis approach, 600 corporate governance reports were 
analysed for a sample of 120 UK and German firms for the period 2007-2011. This chapter 
aimed to achieve three main objectives. First, the chapter attempted to quantify the level of 
compliance with The UK Corporate Governance Code and The German Corporate Governance 
Code. For the sample period (2007-2011), the results suggest that the average compliance rate 
in the UK is 50.3 per cent, which is higher than a compliance rate of 16.7 per cent in Germany. 
The findings related to the UK firms are consistent with a recent survey of FTSE 350
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companies by Grant Thornton (2012), which shows that the level of compliance in the UK 
remained at around 50 per cent during 2010, 2011 and 2012. There are two possible reasons for 
such significant differences in the compliance rate across the UK and Germany. First, majority 
of the sample UK firms are cross-listed in foreign markets and the literature suggests that firms 
listed on foreign stock exchanges are subject to additional disclosure requirements and therefore 
they are more likely to adopt strong corporate governance mechanisms (Klapper and Love, 
2004). Second, the timing differences in the development and implementation of formal 
corporate governance codes across the UK and Germany could also be a reason for such 
differences in the overall compliance behaviour of firms in these two countries. For instance, in 
the UK, the first corporate governance code was introduced in 1992, while the German code of 
corporate governance came into force in 2002. As codes evolve over time, there is improvement 
in compliance, although, increased compliance does not necessarily lead to better explanation as 
shown by the mixed quality of explanations in the UK sample.
Second, the chapter attempted to classify the reported explanations for non-compliance 
into different categories. The results suggest that irrespective of the corporate governance 
systems in different locations, non-compliant firms do exploit the ‘explain’ option and 
flexibility of the ‘comply or explain’ principle. The findings also reveal that non-compliant 
firms across the UK and Germany either provide no explanations for non-compliance or they 
choose to provide generic or standard explanations.
Third, the chapter also aimed to provide examples of individual firm-specific 
explanations extracted from the corporate governance reports of the UK and Germany 
companies. The individual explanations reported by many of the non-compliant firms are
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largely uninformative and the content of such explanations mostly remained similar over the 
time and across the firms. The complex and ambiguous nature of the reported explanations for 
non-compliance makes it more difficult for investors to assess the quality of these explanations 
and make an informed decision. Furthermore, the lack of engagement by regulators in assessing 
the quality of these explanations eventually transfers the burden of assessment to the hands of 
only one player (investors) in the capital market.
The next chapter reports the relationship between internal corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance. The ‘comply or explain’ index used in the following chapter 
takes into account the level of a firm’s compliance as well the quality of explanations reported 
for non-compliance with The UK Corporate Governance Code and The German Corporate 
Governance Code.
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Chapter 5. Econometric Analysis
Section 5.2 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
Section 5.1 Introduction
Section 5.6 Robustness tests
Section 5.7 Discussion and summary of key findings
Section 5.5 Regression results using GMM
Section 5.3 Correlation matrix for German and UK firms
OLS)
Section 5.4 Corporate governance and firm performance (results from
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the empirical results from the econometric analysis. It fulfils four 
main objectives. First, it examines the second research question identified in the literature 
review section (Chapter 2, Section 2.11) -  how have different internal corporate governance 
mechanisms affected firm operating and financial performance across corporate governance 
systems (the UK and Germany)? The internal corporate governance variables include: (a) 
‘comply or explain’ index; (b) board size; (c) board structure; (d) the number of board 
meetings; (e) gearing; (f) institutional blockholders’ ownership; and (g) non-institutional 
blockholders’ ownership. Control variables are: (a) firm size; (b) firm-specific risk (beta); (c) 
foreign listing; (d) research and development expenditure (R&D); and (e) industry dummy. The 
dependent variables represent the accounting-based and market-based measures of firm 
performance: (a) ROA; and (b) Tobin’s Q, respectively. Second, the chapter reports descriptive 
statistics and correlation coefficients for the sample firms. Third, a generalised method of 
moments (GMM) estimation technique is applied to analyse and compare the govemance- 
performance relationship across the UK and German firms. Section 3.5 in the methodology 
chapter provides justification for choosing a generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation 
technique over other econometric techniques (such as, ordinary least squares regression, fixed- 
effects or random-effects models). Fourth, the chapter also presents robustness tests, which 
include an alternative measure for the ‘comply or explain’ index and an additional control 
variable to examine the sensitivity of the results.
The sample consists of the same 60 non-financial firms selected each from the UK and 
Germany over the period 2007-2011 (120 firms in total) as used in the content analysis of
190
corporate governance reports of UK and German companies. The remainder of the chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 5.2 reports the descriptive statistics and the results from the 
univariate analysis for the UK and German firms; Section 5.3 discusses the correlations 
between explanatory variables; Section 5.4 reports the results from OLS; Section 5.5 presents 
the regression results from GMM; Section 5.6 reports the results from robustness tests; and 
Section 5.7 summarises the key findings.
5.2 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables of the sample firms from 
the UK and Germany. Table 5.1 also shows whether there are statistically significant 
differences in corporate governance mechanisms and firm-specific characteristics between the 
two samples (a T-test was used to determine whether mean differences are significantly 
different across the UK and German sample). The ‘comply or explain’ index (as explained in 
Section 3.6.1) is the main explanatory variable for both UK and German firms. The minimum 
value of the ‘comply or explain’ index is one for both the UK and German firms. A minimum 
value of one indicates that a firm is non-compliant and it provides no explanations for non- 
compliance. The maximum value of the ‘comply or explain’ index is five for both the UK and 
German firms. A maximum value of the ‘comply or explain’ index shows that a firm is either 
fully compliant or, if it is non-compliant, fully explains and justifies the reasons for non- 
compliance, with reference to its specific circumstances. Consistent with the literature, a higher 
value on the ‘comply or explain’ index indicates better corporate governance practices (in terms 
of compliance and the quality of reported explanations for non-compliance) and vice versa 
(Hooghiemstra, 2012). The ‘comply or explain’ index is significantly higher for the UK sample
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as compared with the German sample. This index assigns a higher score to compliance and, 
owing to a higher compliance rate in the UK (as reported in Table 4.2), the mean value of the 
index for the UK firms is significantly higher than that for the German firms (UK = 4.129; 
Germany = 2.811).
For board size, the results show that the boards of German firms are significantly larger 
and the average board size for German firms is 14.483, which is very close to the mean value of 
15.06 reported by De Andres et al. (2005) for German firms. The maximum value for the board 
size is 22. One reason for a larger board size is the two-tier board structure in Germany; another 
reason is the German codetermination law, which requires that one half of the supervisory 
boards of listed companies should be comprised of only employees’ representatives (Du Plessis 
et al., 2012). Board structure is a ratio of non-executive to total board members. For board 
structure, the results show that German companies have a significantly higher percentage of 
non-executive directors compared with their UK counterparts (UK = 45.703; Germany = 
83.910). One possible explanation could be that the German supervisory boards, which consist 
of non-executive directors, are relatively larger than the management boards. Similarly, the 
employees’ representation as well as the shareholders representation on the German supervisory 
boards increases the overall size of the Germany supervisory boards. A mean value of 45.703 
for the UK firms is a little lower than the mean value of 48.0 reported by De Andres et al. 
(2005) for UK firms. The codes of corporate governance in the UK require at least 50 per cent 
of the board members to be independent non-executive directors (Financial Reporting Council, 
2008; Financial Reporting Council, 2010a). There are two possible explanations for the low 
percentage of non-executive directors in the UK sample. First, the 2011 Grant Thornton review
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on compliance with the corporate governance code in the UK shows that 19.1 per cent of the 
UK companies had an insufficient percentage of independent non-executive directors on their 
boards (Grant Thornton, 2011, p. 8).56 Second, board structure data is taken from DataStream, 
which only considers strictly independent non-executive directors57 in computing the ratio of 
non-executive directors to total board members. This implies that the presence of non-executive 
directors on a company’s board does not necessarily mean that they are also independent. The 
UK companies have a significantly higher number of board meetings and the average number of 
annual board meetings for the German and UK firms are 5.923 and 8.793, respectively. German 
companies have a significantly higher gearing ratio (Germany = 0.254; UK = 0.223), which 
supports the argument that German banks contribute significantly in the German corporate 
governance system (Gorton and Schmid, 2000).
The UK companies have a significantly higher percentage of institutional blockholders’ 
ownership (UK =14.153 per cent; Germany = 10.130 per cent), while German companies have 
a significantly higher percentage of non-institutional blockholders’ ownership compared with 
the UK firms (UK = 8.468 per cent; Germany = 38.456 per cent). The literature review (Section 
2.6) explains that one of the key differences between corporate governance in the UK and 
Germany is the ownership structure of companies. The empirical literature also shows that 
German companies have a highly concentrated ownership structure (Goergen et al., 2008). Prior
56 The Grant Thornton survey covered a time period of ten years (2002-2011), which also covers the sample period 
chosen for this study (e.g., 2007-2011).
57 According to DataStream, strictly independent non-executive directors are those directors who meet the 
following criteria for independence: (a) have not been employed by the company in the last five years; and (b) have 
not served on the board for more than ten years; (c) have no cross-board membership; (d) have no recent, 
immediate family connections with the company; (e) are not representing a major shareholder with more than five 
per cent of shares ownership; and (g) are not accepting any other type of remuneration apart from the compensation 
(fees) received for board service (DataStream, 2015). Corporate governance codes in the UK define similar criteria 
for independent non-executive directors (Financial Reporting Council, 2008; Financial Reporting Council, 2010a).
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research on the ownership and control of German companies (Franks and Mayer, 1997) shows 
that non-institutional blockholders play an important role in the German corporate governance 
system. Franks and Mayer (1997, p. 32) find that ‘although there is a commonly held view that 
banks control corporate Germany, banks actually come far down the list of large stakeholders.’ 
They find that the majority of the large share ownership in the German companies is held by 
large corporations, the second largest share ownership is held by families, followed by trusts, 
institutional investors, and foreign companies.
For firm-specific characteristics, there are no significant differences between these two 
countries in terms of firm size and firm-specific risk. Firm-specific risk (beta) measures the 
volatility in firm-specific risk across these two corporate governance systems. The mean values 
of firm-specific risk (beta) are very similar in both countries (UK — 1.000; Germany = 0.993) 
and the mean differences are insignificant. The UK companies have significantly higher R&D 
expenditure as compared with the German firms (UK = 0.044; Germany = 0.023).
For the UK firms, ROA has an average of 11.9 per cent compared with the average 
value of 9.3 per cent for the German sample. This shows that the UK firms have significantly 
higher operating performance. For the UK firms, Tobin’s Q has an average value of 51.1 as 
compared with the average value of 61 for the German sample. This shows that the German 
firms have significantly higher market valuation, as evidenced by the higher value of Tobin’s Q.
For the DataStream corporate governance score, the UK firms have an average value of 
60.674 as compared with the average value of 48.522 for the German sample. The UK 
companies have significantly higher corporate governance ratings, as evidenced by the higher
194
value of corporate governance score. This score reflects the quality of a firm’s corporate 
governance (as rated by an external agency, such as DataStream) across these two countries. 
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5.3 Correlation matrix for German and UK firms
Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 report the Pearson correlation coefficients for independent 
variables. The results are reported separately for the UK and Germany. The highest correlation 
is between board size and firm size (UK = 0.653; Germany = 0.498). This is in line with 
previous studies (Yermack, 1996; Guest, 2009; Hooghiemstra, 2012) and it suggests that larger 
firms have larger boards. The second highest correlation is between board structure (percentage 
of non-executive directors) and firm size (UK = 0.315; Germany = 0.247). From the agency 
theory perspective, it is argued that larger firms require more monitoring and controlling, 
therefore the percentage of non-executive directors may be relatively larger for large firms (Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2003, p. 193).
The purpose of correlation analysis is to determine whether or not multi-collinearity 
exists in the data. If the correlation coefficients are below the threshold of 0.80, as has been 
suggested by Field (2009, p. 224), then there is no concern for multi-collinearity. The highest 
correlation coefficients for board size and firm size (UK = 0.653; Germany = 0.498) are less 
than 0.80, which suggests that multi-collinearity is not a problem. Therefore, it was deemed 
appropriate to include all independent variables in the regression analysis. Further diagnostics 
tests for multi-collinearity show that the variance inflation factors (VIFs) are below 2.5. 
Variance inflation factors (VIFs) below 10 confirms no concern for multi-collinearity across the 
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5.4 Corporate governance and firm performance (results form OLS)
Owing to its wide use in prior govemance-performance research, an OLS analysis was
carried out for the dependent variables ROA and Tobin’s Q, and the results for the UK and German 
firms are separately reported in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5. However, following Schultz et al. (2010) 
and Wintoki et al. (2012), before interpreting the results from OLS regression, a test for endogeneity 
was carried out to determine whether the results reported under the OLS models are consistent or 
not. A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was used to detect endogeneity in the OLS regression. The 
methodology chapter (Section 3.4) explains why the GMM method could be considered as an 
alternative approach to OLS and how it controls the different kinds of endogeneity issues. Following 
Beiner et al. (2006, p. 267), Schultz et al. (2010) and Wintoki et al. (2012), the following two-step
process was adopted to carry out the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity:
a. To test whether an independent variable (for example board size) is endogenous or 
exogenous, a regression was estimated on each independent variable with all other 
independent variables and control variables to predict the residuals.
b. In the second step, the coefficients for the residuals were estimated to test whether the 
residuals are significant or not. The null hypothesis states that corporate governance 
mechanisms are exogenous and they are uncorrelated with the residuals.
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‘Comply or explain’ index - 0.000347 0.0232**
(0.00663) (0.0113)
Board size -0.00904** -0.0123
(0.00438) (0.00748)
Board structure 0.00182*** -0.00168*
(0.000516) (0.000881)




Institutional blockholders (%) -0.000590 -0.00343*
(0.00105) (0.00180)
Non-institutional blockholders (%) 0.000265 -0.000480
(0.000873) (0.00149)
Firm size 0.0266*** 0.00664
(0.00618) (0.0105)
Firm-specific risk (beta) -0.0191 0.000774
(0.0220) (0.0376)







R-squared 0.177 . 0.145
Definitions of variables are provided in Tables 3.5 and 5.1. Standard errors are reported 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5.5 Corporate governance and the performance of German firms (OLS results)
(Model 3) (Model 4)
Variables_____________________________________ ROA Tobin’s Q
‘Comply or explain’ index 
Board size 
Board structure 
Number of board meetings 
Gearing
Institutional blockholders (%) 


































Definitions of variables are provided in Table 3.5 and Table 5.1. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
For the majority of the independent variables in all four regression models reported in Table
5.4 and Table 5.5, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test turns out to be significant. Table 5.6 below reports 
the results from the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and it reports which variable is endogenous in each of 
the four OLS regression models. If the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is significant for a variable, it 
indicates that the variable is endogenous (Beiner et al., 2006; Guest, 2009; Schultz et al., 2010; 
Wintoki et al., 2012).











‘Comply or explain’ index 8.06*** 6.04** 0.12 7.58***
Board size 4.26** 2.7 y j ***
Board structure 12.49*** 3.66* 0.14 1.25
Number of board meetings 7 08*** 4.59** 0.07 0.94
Gearing 0.09 12.02*** 12 31*** 20.82***
Institutional blockholders (%) 0.31 3.64** 1.67 g 3 7***
Non-institutional blockholders (%) 0.09 0.10 10 71*** 0.10
Firm size 18.53*** 0.4 12.81*** 1.48
Firm-specific risk (beta) 0.76 0.50 0.40 23.06***
R&D 0.95 1.77 0.10 2.50
Foreign listing 8.06*** 6.04** 0.12 7.58***
Definitions of variables are provided in Tables 3.5 and 5.1. This table reports Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistics 
(abbreviated as DWH) for each independent/control variable used in the OLS models reported in Table 5.4 and 
Table 5.5 (e.g., Model 1- Model 4). The null hypothesis states that all regressors (corporate governance 
mechanisms) are exogenous. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test was carried out for all independent/control variables. 
STATA (1999) provides guidelines about how to cany-out a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test in STATA for each 
individual variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In Model 1, the endogenous variables include: (a) the ‘comply or explain’ index; (b) board 
size; (c) board structure; (d) number of board meetings; (e) firm size; and (f) foreign listing. In 
Model 2, endogenous variables include: (a) the ‘comply or explain’ index; (b) board structure; (c) 
number of board meetings; (d) gearing; (e) institutional blockholders’ ownership; and (f) foreign 
listing. In Model 3, endogenous variables include: (a) board size; (b) gearing; (c) non-institutional 
blockolders’ ownership; and (d) firm size. In Model 4, the endogenous variables include: (a) the 
‘comply or explain’ index; (b) board size; (c) gearing; (d) institutional blockholders’ ownership; (e) 
firm-specific risk; and (f) foreign listing. The methodology chapter (refer to Section 3.4) explains in 
detail that some of the corporate governance mechanisms could be endogenously determined. For 
example, a firm with poor performance in one year may change its board size or board structure (the 
percentage of non-executive directors) in the following year (Beiner et al., 2006; Schultz et al., 
2010; Wintoki et al., 2012). Similarly, firms with poor performance are likely to have more 
meetings in the following year (Vafeas, 1999; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010), and poorly 
performing firms are likely to take more risks in the following years (Bromiley, 1991). Consistent 
with Beiner et al. (2006), the ‘comply or explain’ index is endogenous (except in Model 3), which 
suggests that a firm’s past performance affects its level of compliance with a corporate governance 
code in the following years. Overall, the results from Table 5.6 show that endogeneity is a major 
problem in all four OLS models. If only one variable is endogenous in a regression model, the 
results reported from OLS are inconsistent (Yermack, 1996; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et 
al., 2006; Guest, 2009; Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012). This implies that the results 
reported from OLS are inconsistent because of the endogeneity issues. As discussed in the 
methodology section, the GMM controls for endogeneity by internally transforming the data and by 
including lagged values of the dependent variable. In this way, the GMM offers a superior
estimation technique compared with the OLS. The next section reports a revised analysis of the 
govemance-performance relationship, using a GMM method. As the GMM control for endogeneity 
and includes lagged values and applies internal transformation process, the results reported under 
the GMM could be significantly different than those reported under OLS. For instance, using an 
OLS approach, Schultz et al. (2010) find a significantly negative relationship between executive 
remuneration and the performance of Australian firms. However, after controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity by using GMM, Schultz et al. (2010) did not 
find any significant impact of executive remuneration on the performance of firms. The results from 
GMM are reported in the next section.
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5.5 Regression results using GMM
Section 3.5 in the methodology chapter discusses the justification for choosing the 
generalised method of moments estimation (GMM) technique over other regression models. 
The GMM controls for different kinds of endogeneity by including previous financial 
performance (lagged values of the dependent variables ROA or Tobin’s Q) as an explanatory 
variable in the model. The GMM model controls for three major sources of endogeneity: (i) 
unobserved heterogeneity; (ii) simultaneity; (iii) dynamic endogeneity (refer to Section 3.5 for 
more details about GMM). In fact, the use of the GMM model could be considered as part of 
the methodological developments in corporate governance research, after it was recently 
employed by Wintoki et al. (2012) in the govemance-performance research. The nature of the 
data (panel data) and the dynamic nature of the govemance-performance relationship suggest 
that a GMM model offers more efficient and consistent estimates for the coefficients as 
compared with other estimation techniques. When applying the generalised method of moments 
model, researchers need to apply two post-estimation tests to determine that an appropriate 
econometric model is applied. These tests are: (i) the Sargan test; and (ii) the Arellano-Bond 
test for first-order and second-order correlation. The results for these two tests are also reported 
in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8.
5.5.1 Corporate governance and the accounting-based measure of performance (ROA)
Table 5.7 reports the results for the govemance-performance relationship, based on the 
accounting-based measure of firm performance (ROA) for both the UK and German firms. The 
main explanatory variable, the ‘comply or explain’ index, is significantly positively associated 
with operating performance (ROA) of German firms. This finding is consistent with prior
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German-based govemance-performance research (e.g., Goncharov et al., 2006), which also 
reports a positive relationship between compliance with The German Corporate Governance 
Code and the performance of firms. This finding also confirms the results reported in previous 
studies (Klapper and Love, 2004; Bauwhede, 2009), which shows that compliance with a code 
of corporate governance has a positive impact on a firm’s operating performance (ROA). 
However, I did not find any evidence to support the notion that the ‘comply or explain’ index 
has a positive impact on the operating performance of the UK firms. This is consistent with the 
prior research of Weir and Laing (2000) and Weir and Laing (2001), who found that full 
compliance with the Cadbury Report may not necessarily improve the operating performance of 
firms. Weir and Laing (2000, p. 279) argue that a tendency towards full compliance may 
restrain firms in utilising the effectiveness of alternative corporate governance mechanisms, 
which could be beneficial for firms. Table 5.7 also shows the relationship between individual 
corporate governance mechanisms and the performance of firms. Board size has a significantly 
negative impact on the operating performance (ROA) of UK and German firms. The findings 
related to this negative relationship between board size and firm operating performance (ROA) 
are in line with previous studies (Yermack, 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001; Guest, 2009). 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) have raised concerns about the communication and 
co-ordination problems of larger boards. This negative relationship can be interpreted from an 
agency theory perspective, which assumes that larger boards are costly and the overall benefits 
associated with larger boards may not outweigh the potential costs of larger boards. In light of 
the similar findings related to the negative impact of board size on the operating performance 
(ROA) of firms in both countries, it can be argued that, irrespective of the institutional
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differences across the UK and Germany, larger boards are costly owing to their increasing 
coordination and communications problems.









‘Comply or explain’ index 0.000874 0.00559**
(0.00172) (0.00261)
Board size -0.00619*** -0.00346***
(0.00203) (0.000721)
Board structure 0.000979*** 0.000799
(0.000211) (0.000530)




Institutional blockholders (%) 0.000698* 0.000151
(0.000412) (0.000273)
Non-institutional blockholders (%) -0.000132 0.000733***
(0.000232) (0.000125)
Firm size -0.00416 -0.0106***
(0.00352) (0.00342)
Firm-specific risk (beta) -0.0209* -0.00863*
(0.0109) (0.00459)




Constant 0.0225 * 0.108**
(0.0890) (0.0541)
AR( 1) test (p-values) 0.0174 0.0021
AR(2) test (p-values) 0.4596 0.3871
Sargan test of overidentification 48.684 43.13
Observations 238 230
Number of firms 60 60
This table shows results of two-step generalised method of moments estimation for 60 German and UK non- 
financial firms (total 120 firms) over the period 2007-2011. The dependent variable is the operating performance 
measure of firm performance -  return on assets (ROA). L.ROA indicates lagged values of the dependent variable 
ROA. Only one lag of the dependent variable is included in both models. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond
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test statistics for first-order and second-order correlation, under the null hypothesis of no serial auto-correlation. 
The Sargan test statistic is a test of over-identifying restrictions, under the null hypothesis that all instruments are 
valid. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Definitions of variables are provided in Tables 3.5 and 5.1. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Board structure (defined by the percentage of non-executive directors) has a 
significantly positive impact on the operating performance (ROA) of UK firms. This finding is 
consistent with prior research of Dahya and McConnell (2007) in the UK, who also reported a 
positive impact of non-executive directors on the profitability of UK companies. This finding is 
consistent with the assumptions of agency theory, which suggests that a greater role is played 
by non-executive directors in monitoring a firm’s management. However, for the German 
sample, I did not find any significant impact of the percentage of non-executive directors on the 
operating performance of firms. This finding is consistent with the findings of Bermig and Frick
(2010), who also reported no significant impact of board structure on the performance of 294 
large and medium-size German firms.
The number of board meetings is significantly negatively associated with the operating 
performance of firms in the UK. This finding is consistent with the findings reported by Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006), who reported a significantly negative impact of the number of board 
meetings on the operating performance of firms. One possible explanation for this negative 
relationship could be that boards are usually proactive and board activities are likely to be 
higher in times of poor corporate performance and vice versa (Vafeas, 1999). For the German 
sample, I did not find any significant impact of board meetings on the operating performance of 
firms.
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Table 5.7 shows that gearing (defined by a ratio of total debt to total assets) has a 
significantly positive impact on the operating performance of German firms. The results 
indicate that, in the context of Germany, debt financing serves as an important internal 
corporate governance mechanism. Prior corporate governance research (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997) also shows that debt financing serves as an important corporate governance 
mechanism in mitigating agency problems. On the other hand, for the UK firms, I found that the 
impact of gearing is significantly negative on the operating performance (ROA) of firms. This 
finding is consistent with prior research in the UK by Weir and Laing (2000) and Weir et al. 
(2002), who also reported a negative impact of debt financing on the operating performance of 
UK firms. The negative relationship between gearing and firm performance confirms the 
agency costs of debt financing, and the findings suggest that debt financing may not necessarily 
improve the operating performance of UK firms. In a comparative study on the effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms in the EU countries, Essen et al. (2013, p. 201) criticised the 
‘universality of good corporate governance prescriptions’ and they argue that ‘the efficacy of 
governance mechanisms may be contingent upon organisational and environmental 
circumstances.’
Following prior empirical research (Short and Keasey, 1999; Weir and Laing, 2000; 
Gugler et al., 2008), external blockholders were further classified into institutional blockholders 
and non-institutional blockholders. For the UK firms, the results show that institutional 
blockholders’ ownership has a positive impact on the operating performance of firms 
(significant at ten per cent). This finding is consistent with the findings reported by Short and 
Keasey (1999), who also reported a weakly significant impact of institutional shareholders’
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ownership and the performance of UK firms. However, I did not find any significant impact of 
non-institutional blockholders’ ownership on the operating performance of UK firms. For the 
German sample, the findings show that non-institutional blockholders have a significantly 
positive impact on the operating performance of firms. This finding is consistent with the 
finding of Andres (2008) in Germany, who shows that non-institutional blockholders have a 
significantly positive impact on the operating performance of German firms. However, I did not 
find any significant evidence to support the argument that institutional shareholders also have a 
positive impact on the operating performance of German firms.
As expected, control variable, such as firm size has a negative impact on the operating 
performance of German firms. For the German sample, the significantly negative relationship 
between firm size and ROA is consistent with the findings reported by Lehmann and Weigand 
(2000) in Germany. The negative relationship between firm size and ROA supports the notion 
that larger firms are complex, they have severe agency problems and they need additional 
monitoring, which results in higher operating costs. For the UK firms, firm size is negatively 
related with the operating performance of UK firms and this relationship is statistically not 
significant.
Firm-specific risk has a negative impact (significant at ten per cent) on the performance of 
UK and German firms. This finding is consistent with the findings reported by Bromiley 
(1991). Traditional finance theory suggests that higher risk taking should improve the 
performance of firms. However, Bromiley (1991) argues that increasing a firm’s risk exposure 
may not necessarily result in better operating performance. Similarly, Ayuso et al. (2014) also 
reported a negative relationship between risk taking (as measured by beta) and the operating
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performance of firms (including the UK and German firms in their sample). In the context of 
the UK, Weir and Laing (2000) have also reported a negative relationship between firm-specific 
risk and the operating performance (ROA) of UK firms.
Foreign listing has a positive impact on the operating performance of the UK and German 
firms.58 This finding is consistent with the findings of Klapper and Love (2004) and Ammann et 
al. (2011). This finding is consistent with the notion that foreign-listed firms are subject to 
additional regulatory/disclosure requirements in the overseas countries which improves the 
governance mechanisms and performance of foreign-listed firms.
R&D expenditure has a significant positive impact on the operating performance (ROA) 
of UK and German firms. This finding is consistent with the findings of Short and Keasey 
(1999), who find that investment in R&D has a positive impact on the performance of firms. 
The findings indicate that knowledge-based industries have substantial investment in R&D 
expenditure, which has positive implications for the earnings of firms. The findings imply that 
R&D has asset-like qualities, and, similar to capital expenditure, investment in R&D results in 
growth opportunities and profitability. The next section discusses the results for the market- 
based measure of firm performance (Tobin’s Q).
5.5.2 Corporate governance and the market-based measure of performance (Tobin’s Q)
Table 5.8 shows that the ‘comply or explain’ index is significantly positively associated 
with Tobin’s Q for the UK sample. This finding is also consistent with prior research in the UK 
(Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Arcot and Bruno, 2011), which shows a positive relationship
58 The coefficients for the UK sample are weakly significant at 10% level.
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between compliance with The UK Corporate Governance Code and the market valuation of 
firms. For the UK sample, the positive relationship is consistent with the on-going corporate 
governance literature which suggests that compliance with the recommendations of corporate 
governance codes has a positive effect on the market valuation of firms, as measured by Tobin’s 
Q (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Drobetz et al., 2004; Klapper and Love, 2004; Dumev and Kim, 
2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009). The findings also support the idea 
of self-regulation through a ‘comply or explain’ principle in the UK because capital markets 
play a significant role by rewarding adherence to or punishing deviation from the ‘comply or 
explain’ principle.
The positive relationship between the ‘comply or explain’ index and the performance of 
UK firms is also consistent with a recent study of Luo and Salterio (2014) in the Canadian 
context, which shows a positive impact of corporate governance compliance and disclosure 
index59 on the market value of Canadian firms. However, for the German firms, I did not find 
any evidence to support the contention that compliance with The German Corporate 
Governance Code significantly affects the market valuation of German firms.
Table 5.8 shows that the relationship between board size and firm financial performance 
is significantly negative for UK firms. The significantly negative relationship between board 
size and Tobin’s Q is in line with the results reported by Florackis (2005) and Guest (2009) for 
a sample of UK firms. This finding is also consistent with the findings reported by Yermack 
(1996), who finds a negative relationship between board size and the market valuation of firms 
(as measured by Tobin’s Q).
59 Similar to the ‘comply or explain’ index, the index used by Luo and Salterio (2014) also measures compliance as 
well as the quality of explanations reported by non-compliant firms.
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Table 5.8 Regression results for corporate governance mechanisms and market-based 






L.Tobin’s Q 0.0485*** 0.238***
(0.00910) (0.0310)
‘Comply or explain’ index 0.0151*** 0.0389567
(0.00490) (.03492)
Board size -0.0146*** 0.00143
(0.00308) (0.00142)
Board structure -0.00126*** 0.00119**
(0.000364) (0.000508)




Institutional blockholders (%) -0.00159* -0.00448***
(0.000936) (0.000754)
Non-institutional blockholders (%) 0.00133*** 0.00136***
(0.000306) (0.000208)
Firm size 0.0264*** 0.0436***
(0.00972) (0.00836)
Firm-specific risk (beta) 0.0355** 0.0743***
(0.0166) (0.0104)






AR(1) test (p-values) 0.0848 0.0021
AR(2) test (p-values) 0.3054 0.3871
Sargan test of overidentification 51.48 43.13
Observations 238 230
Number of firms 60 60
This table shows results of two-step generalised method of moments estimations for 60 German and UK non- 
financial firms (total 120 firms) over the period 2007-2011. In Model 2 and Model 3, the dependent variable 
includes the market-based measure of firm performance -  Tobin’s Q. L.Tobin’s Q means lagged values of the 
dependent variable Tobin’s Q. L.Tobin’s Q is included as an independent variable in Model 4. Only one lag of the 
dependent variable is included in both models. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond test statistics for first- 
order and second-order correlation, under the null hypothesis of no serial auto-correlation. The Sargan test statistic 
is a test of over-identifying restrictions, under the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses. Definitions of variables are provided in Tables 3.5 and 5.1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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The negative impact of board size on the performance of UK firms also supports the 
assumptions of agency theory, which suggests that larger boards are ineffective owing to their 
increasing coordination and communication costs. For the German sample, I did not find any 
significant impact of board size on the market valuation of German firms.
For the UK sample, the relationship between board structure (the percentage of non­
executive directors) and the performance of firms is significantly negative. The negative 
relationship between the percentage of non-executive directors and the performance of firms is 
consistent with the findings reported by Weir and Laing (2000) for the UK firms, and, Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996) and Francis et al. (2012) findings for firms listed in the USA. The role of 
non-executive directors in the UK and USA has been recently criticised. Particularly, the 
failures of Northern Rock and Lehman Brothers have raised serious questions about the 
effectiveness of the non-executive directors in identifying a firm’s exposure to risk (Tricker, 
2012). It is also argued that the non-executive directors may not fully understand the complex 
corporate governance structure and the underlying business model of larger firms (Tricker, 
2012). The finding is also consistent with recent research studies, which has reported a 
significantly negative relationship between the percentage of non-executive directors and the 
performance of banks (e.g., Erkens et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013). Interestingly, for 
German firms, I found a significantly positive impact of board structure (the percentage of non­
executive directors) on the performance of German firms. In the context of Germany, the 
positive relationship between the percentage of non-executive directors and the market 
valuation of firms supports the assumptions of agency theory and resource dependence theory. 
A number of previous studies (Yermack, 1996) have also reported a positive relationship
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between the percentage of non-executive directors and the market valuation of firms (measured 
by Tobin’s Q). The positive impact of non-executive directors on the performance of firms in 
Germany and the negative impact in the UK suggest that the monitoring role of non-executive 
directors is perceived differently in different capital markets. This finding is also consistent with 
the notion that the implications of corporate governance mechanisms are context-specific, 
which indicates that corporate governance mechanisms may not yield similar results in different 
corporate governance systems (Essen et al., 2013).
Table 5.8 shows a significantly positive relationship between the number of board 
meetings and the market valuation of the UK and German firms. The results are consistent with 
those reported by Brick and Chidambaran (2010). Brick and Chidambaran (2010) argue that 
board activities are likely to increase as a result of regulatory and capital market pressures and 
these activities are value-relevant for shareholders. The findings indicate that an increase in 
board activities (proxied by the number of board meetings) enhances a firm’s monitoring and 
control functions more effectively. The UK Corporate Governance Code of 2012 also 
recommends that each firm should disclose its board activities (including board meetings and 
board attendance) in its annual report, so that shareholders may assess the board of directors’ 
performance (Financial Reporting Council, 2012b, p. 30).
The results show that gearing has a significantly positive impact on the market valuation 
of UK and German firms. This finding is consistent with the findings reported by Goncharov et 
al. (2006) for a sample of German firms and with the findings reported by McKnight and Weir 
(2009) and Dahya et al. (2002) for the UK firms. The significantly positive impact of gearing
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suggests that the capital markets in the UK and Germany consider gearing as an important 
corporate governance mechanism.
Results for the blockholders’ ownership show that institutional blockholders’ ownership 
has a negative impact on the market valuation of UK60 and German firms. This finding is 
consistent with the findings reported by Gugler et al. (2008) in their comparative research on 
Anglo-Saxon and relationship-based corporate governance systems. In the context of the UK, 
Mura (2007) has reported a significantly negative relationship between institutional 
blockholders’ ownership and the market valuation of UK firms, as measured by Tobin’s Q. 
Recently, regulators in the UK have raised concerns over the monitoring role played by the UK 
institutional shareholders and the Financial Reporting Council have issued The UK Stewardship 
Code for the institutional investors in the UK (Financial Reporting Council, 2010b; Financial 
Reporting Council, 2012a). The negative relationship between institutional blockholders’ 
ownership and the market valuation of firms suggests that the capital markets in the UK and 
Germany do not consider institutional investors as effective monitors, as evidenced by the 
negative relationship between institutional blockholders’ ownership and Tobin’s Q.
Interestingly, non-institutional blockholders’ ownership has a significantly positive 
impact on the market valuation of the UK and German firms and this finding is consistent with 
the findings reported by Lehmann and Weigand (2000) for German firms and the findings of 
Short and Keasey (1999) for the UK sample. This finding implies that non-institutional 
blockholders (individuals, families, corporations) also exert a significant influence in 
monitoring their investee companies.
60 The results are significant at ten per cent for the UK firms.
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The results for control variables show that firm size has a positive impact on the market 
valuation of UK and German firms. This finding is consistent with the findings reported by 
Short and Keasey (1999), Weir and Laing (2000), Dahya et al. (2002) and Florackis (2005) in 
the UK, Beiner et al. (2006) in Switzerland, Yermack (1996) in the USA, and De Andres et al. 
(2005) in the OECD countries. The finding supports the contention that larger firms get higher 
market valuation from the capital markets in both countries.
Foreign listing has a significant positive impact on the market valuation of German 
firms. This finding is consistent with the findings reported in prior research (Klapper and Love, 
2004; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2010; Ammann et al., 2011), which 
shows that cross-listed firms are subject to additional regulatory requirements in foreign 
countries and they exhibit strong corporate governance mechanisms, which have positive 
implications for their market valuations. For the UK firms, the relationship between foreign 
listing and the performance of firms is statistically not significant.
Firm-specific risk (beta) has a significantly positive impact on the market valuation 
(Tobin’s Q) of the UK and German firms and this is consistent with the findings reported by 
Beiner et al. (2006).
As expected, R&D expenditure has a significantly positive impact on the market 
valuation of firms in the UK and Germany. This finding is consistent with the findings reported 
by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) in the USA, Short and Keasey (1999) in the UK, Durnev and 
Kim (2005) in the emerging market economies, and Aggarwal et al. (2010) and Ammann et al.
(2011) in the context of developed countries, including the UK and Germany firms. This
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suggests that investment in R&D expenditure is value-relevant and investors are willing to pay 
premiums for companies with higher R&D expenditure.
The results from Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 show that some of the findings are different 
for the accounting-based and market-based measures of firm performance. For instance, in the 
UK sample, board structure has a positive impact on the operating performance, while for the 
market-based measure of firm performance, this relationship is significantly negative for the 
UK sample. The positive impact of board structure supports the assumptions of agency theory, 
while a negative relationship can be explained through the lens of a stewardship theory. Weir 
and Laing (2000, p. 279) argue that ‘the choice of performance measure has important 
implications for understanding the impact of governance structures.’
The results in Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 also show that the impact of some internal 
corporate governance mechanisms is different in the UK and Germany. For example, gearing 
has a positive impact on both the accounting-based and market-based measures of firm 
performance in Germany. In the context of the UK, gearing has a significantly negative impact 
on the operating performance and this relationship is significantly positive for the market-based 
measure of firm performance. Similarly, board structure has a negative impact on the market 
valuation of firms in the UK, while in Germany this relationship is significantly positive. This 
suggests that, besides the govemance-performance relationship being explained by different 
theories of corporate governance (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007b), corporate governance and the 
performance of firms is also context-specific (Essen et al., 2013).
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Firm specific characteristics (such as firm size,61 firm-specific risk (beta), foreign 
listing62 and investment in R&D) generally have a similar impact on the operating and market- 
based measures of firm performance in the UK and Germany.
The next section discusses the results from the robustness tests.
5.6 Robustness tests
In order to examine the robustness of the results and the sensitivity of the ‘comply or 
explain’ index, the DataStream corporate governance score (CGVSCORE) is used as an 
explanatory variable. According to DataStream ‘a corporate governance score is a number 
between 0 and 100 showing how the company performs compared with the entire ASSET463 
universe based on the “ value”  in the related indicator’. The current ‘ASSET4 universe’ covers 
more than 2,500 companies including the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) World 
Index,64 Standard & Poor’s 500, MSCI Europe and FTSE 350. Corporate governance studies 
have widely used commercially available ratings and indices as a proxy for a firm’s corporate 
governance practices. These studies and ratings which are already discussed in the literature 
review section include: (a) the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) data on 
corporate governance (Gompers et al., 2003); (b) the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) 
governance index (Klapper and Love, 2004); (c) the Deminor corporate governance rating for 
EU firms (Bauer et al., 2004; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008); and (d) the Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) data on corporate governance (Aggarwal et al., 2010).
61 Except for the UK sam ple in M odel 5, the relationship between firm size and ROA is statistically not significant.
62  Except for the UK sam ple in M odel 7, the relationship between foreign listing and Tobin’s Q is statistically not significant.
63 ASSET4 AG provides investment research data on the economic, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
aspects of its constituent companies.
64 The MSCI World Index covers 1,604 large and medium size companies from 24 developed market countries 
(MSCI, 2013).
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DataStream has recently started reporting corporate governance data, therefore only a 
few studies have used the DataStream corporate governance score (CGVSCORE). Consistent 
with the previous studies using commercially available ratings (such as Gompers et al., 2003; 
Klapper and Love, 2004; Bauer et al., 2004; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 
2010), this study also uses commercially available ratings (the DataStream corporate 
governance score) to test whether the results reported under the ‘comply or explain’ index are 
also robust when an alternative measure of the quality of a firm corporate governance has been 
used (refer to previous paragraph about details on commercially available corporate governance 
indices).
The ‘comply or explain’ index and the DataStream corporate governance score are 
developed in different ways. For instance, the ‘comply or explain’ index focuses on compliance 
as well as the quality of explanations for non-compliance and the index assigns a score from 
one to five to each firm. On the other hand, the DataStream corporate governance score is a 
composite index, which takes into account compliance as well as other aspects of a firm’s 
internal corporate governance mechanisms, such as: (a) board functions; (b) compensation 
policy; (c) shareholder rights; (d) anti-takeover measures. The DataStream corporate 
governance score assigns a score from 0 to 100 to each firm. These two indices rank firms 
based on the effectiveness of their internal corporate governance mechanisms. A higher score 
on both indices reflects good corporate governance practices and vice versa.
In the robustness test, a GMM model was used and the ‘comply or explain’ index was 
replaced by the DataStream corporate governance score. Sales growth was also included as an 
additional control variable in the robustness test. Empirical research shows that firms with
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better protections for investors (better corporate governance practices) have higher sales growth 
and higher market valuation (Gompers et al., 2003, p. 107). Empirical studies have reported a 
positive relationship between sales growth and firm performance (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; 
Dumev and Kim, 2005; Klapper and Love, 2004; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Aggarwal et 
al., 2010). Sales growth is added as a control variable to control for potential endogeneity 
because growth opportunities are likely to affect a firm’s corporate governance mechanisms, 
operating performance and the market valuation (Dumev and Kim, 2005, p. 1481). Consistent 
with prior research (Gompers et al., 2003; Drobetz et al., 2004; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 
2009), sales growth is calculated as:
(Current year’s sales -  Previous year’s sales)
Previous year’s sales
Following prior empirical research (Gompers et al., 2003; Dumev and Kim, 2005; 
Klapper and Love, 2004; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Aggarwal et al., 2010), it is expected 
that there will be a positive relationship between sales growth and the performance of firms. 
The results are reported in Table 5.9. The findings are robust when an alternative measure of the 
quality of corporate governance is used. The signs and significance of all explanatory variables 
remain the same. However, in the UK sample (Model 9), firm-specific risk (beta) is now 
significantly negative at one per cent level compared with the previous significance level of ten 
per cent (refer to Table 5.7). In the UK sample (refer to Model 10), the impact of board size and 
board structure is now significant at ten per cent, compared with a one per cent significance 
level reported in Table 5.8. As expected, sales growth is significantly positively related with the
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operating performance (ROA) and market valuation (Tobin’s Q) of the UK and German firms, 
and this finding is consistent with the findings reported by Short and Keasey (1999) in the UK 
and the findings reported by Drobetz et al. (2004) in Germany. The post estimation tests, 
including the Sargan test and the Arellano-Bond test for auto-correlation suggest that 
instruments/models are valid.
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L.ROA1 Tobin’s Q 0.186*** 0.0759*** 0.383*** 0.294***
(0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0402) (0.0217)
Corporate governance score 0.00773 0.000684** 0.000429*** 0.00160
(0.00635) (0.000286) (0.000108) (0.00111)
Board size -0.0101*** -0.00657* -0.00355*** 0.00115
(0.00162) (0.00398) (0.00129) (0.00173)
Board structure 0.00134*** -0.000818* 0.0334 0.00116**
(0.000288) (0.000483) (0.0287) (0.000541)
Number of board meetings -0.00613*** 0.0235*** -0.000235 0.00546***
(0.00101) (0.00341) (0.00136) (0.0015)
Gearing -0.0879*** 0.149** 0.0594** 0.0937***
(0.0238) (0.0636) (0.0298) (0.0344)
Institutional blockholders (%) 0.000427** -0.00292** 0.00591 -0.00432***
(0.000194) (0.00133) (0.00458) (0.000785)
Non-institutional blockholders (%) -0.0000615 0.00142*** 0.00107*** 0.00107***
(0.000289) (0.000423) (0.000317) (0.000211)
Firm size -0.00209 0.0373*** -0.0205*** 0.0265***
(0.00371) (0.0114) (0.00446) (0.00797)
Firm-specific risk (beta) -0.0252*** 0.0526*** -0.0209** 0.0916***
(0.00827) (0.0189) (0.00916) (0.00884)
Foreign listing 0.0904** 0.0477 0.0689*** 0.0345***
(0.0401) (0.0708) (0.0142) (0.00175)
R&D 0.163*** 0.576*** 0.356*** 0.565***
(0.0402) (0.0648) (0.121) (0.123)
Sales growth 0.322*** 0.316*** 0.434*** 0.392***
(0.0851) (0.0676) (0.03069) (0.0652)
Constant 0.131* -0.24 0.246*** -0.14
(0.0748) (0.17) (0.0763) (0.118)
Observations 238 240 230 230
Number of firms 60 60 60 60
AR(1) test (p-values) 0.0145 0.0721 0.0163 0.0012
AR(2) test (p-values) 0.431 0.1703 0.4503 0.3139
Sargan test 46.7 47.939 44.08 41.872
This table shows results of two-step generalised method of moments estimation for 60 German and UK non-fmancial 
firms over the period 2007-2011. The dependent variable includes the operating performance measure of firm 
performance -  return on assets (ROA) and the market-based measure of firm performance Tobin’s Q. L.ROA indicates 
lagged values of the dependent variable ROA. L.Tobin’s Q indicates lagged values of the dependent variable Tobin’s Q.
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Only one lag of the dependent variable is included in both models. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano-Bond test 
statistics for first-order and second-order correlation, under the null hypothesis of no serial auto-correlation. The Sargan 
test statistic is a test of over-identifying restrictions, under the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Definitions of variables are provided in Table 3.5 and Table 5.1. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
5.7 Discussion and summary
This chapter analysed the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms on the 
performance of UK and German firms. The results from univariate analysis show that there are 
significant differences in the corporate governance mechanisms and firm-specific 
characteristics across the UK and German firms (refer to Table 5.1). For instance, the ‘comply 
or explain’ index is significantly higher for the UK firms, while German firms have 
significantly larger boards with a significantly higher percentage of non-executive directors 
compared with the UK firms. There are significant differences in the ownership and control of 
companies across these two countries. For instance, non-institutional blockholders’ ownership 
is 38.456 per cent in the sample German companies, while in the UK, institutional 
blockholders’ ownership is 14.153 per cent in the sample UK companies. The econometric 
analysis also reveals how the differences in corporate governance mechanisms and firm-specific 
characteristics have implications for the performance of firms.
The ‘comply or explain’ index has a significantly positive impact on the operating 
performance of German firms, and for the UK sample, the ‘comply or explain’ index has a 
significantly positive impact on the market valuation (Tobin’s Q) of UK firms. This provides 
some support for the assumption that compliance with the corporate governance codes has 
positive implications for the performance of firms in the UK and Germany. The coefficients for
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the ‘comply or explain’ index are statistically not significant with ROA for the UK sample and 
with Tobin’s Q for the German sample.
Consistent with the assumptions of agency theory, board size has a significantly 
negative impact on the operating performance (ROA) of firms in both countries. This is 
consistent with the notion that larger boards are costly in terms of the co-ordination and 
communication problems associated with the larger boards (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 
1993). For the UK sample, board size has a negative impact on the market valuation of UK 
firms, while for German firms, I did not find any significant impact of board size on the market 
valuation of German firms.
Consistent with Dahya and McConnell (2007) and in line with the assumptions of 
agency theory, I found that board structure (the percentage of non-executive directors) has a 
positive impact on the operating performance of the UK firms. However, for the German firms, 
I did not find any significant impact of board structure on the operating performance of German 
firms. This finding is consistent with the findings reported by Bermig and Frick (2010) for a 
sample of German firms. Interestingly, the results for the market-based measure of firm 
performance show that board structure (the percentage of non-executive directors) has a 
negative impact on the market valuation (Tobin’s Q) of UK firms. This finding is consistent 
with the findings reported by Weir and Laing (2000) for the UK firms, Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) and the findings reported by Francis et al. (2012) for firms listed in USA. This suggests 
that investors in the UK may not necessarily reward companies with a higher percentage of 
non-executive directors and they may not consider all non-executive directors as truly 
independent. This finding supports the stewardship theory perspective, which suggests an
227
increasing role for executive directors in terms of the board composition. In the context of 
Germany, board structure has a significantly65 positive impact on the market valuation of 
German firms. This finding is consistent with the assumptions of agency theory and resource 
dependence, which suggest that firms with a higher percentage of non-executive directors get 
higher market valuation.
The number of board meetings’ variable is significantly negatively related with ROA for 
the UK firms, which suggests that increasing the number of board meetings may not improve 
the profitability of firms, and this finding is consistent with the findings reported by Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006). For the German firms, I did not find any significant impact of the number of 
board meetings on the operating performance of German firms. The relationship between the 
number of board meetings and Tobin’s Q is significantly positive for both the UK and German 
firms. Recent evidence (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010) shows that board activities (measured 
by the number of board meetings) are value-relevant for shareholders (as measured by the 
market-based measure of firm performance, Tobin’s Q).
The impact of gearing is significantly positive on the operating performance (ROA) and 
the market valuation (Tobin’s Q) of German firms. This finding is consistent with the findings 
reported by Goncharov et al. (2006) for Germany. This finding is consistent with the notion that 
gearing serves as an important corporate governance mechanism in Germany. Jensen (1986) 
and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also suggest a positive impact of gearing on the performance of 
firms. In the UK, gearing has a negative impact on the operating performance of firms. This 
finding is consistent with the findings reported by Weir and Laing (2000) and Weir et al.
65 Results are significant at five per cent only.
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(2002). The findings suggest that gearing may not necessarily improve the operating 
performance of firms in the UK, as evidenced by the negative impact of debt financing on the 
operating performance of UK firms. However, gearing has a significantly positive impact on the 
market valuation of UK firms, and this finding is consistent with the findings reported by Dahya 
et al. (2002) and McKnight and Weir (2009) for the UK firms. In fact, the empirical evidence 
on the impact of gearing supports the arguments for both the positive and negative impact of 
gearing on the performance of firms.
The findings show that non-institutional blockholders play a significant monitoring role 
in the German corporate governance system. In the UK, institutional blockholders have a 
positive impact on the operating performance of firms, while non-institutional blockholders 
have a positive impact on the market valuation of UK firms. Interestingly, institutional 
blockholders’ ownership has a negative impact on the market valuation of firms in both 
countries. The negative impact of institutional shareholders’ ownership on the market valuation 
of firms is consistent with the findings reported by Gugler et al. (2008) in their comparative 
study on the impact of blockholders’ ownership in the relationship-based system and market- 
based corporate governance system.
There are similarities across these two countries in terms of the implications of firm- 
specific characteristics (control variables). In other words, some firm-specific characteristics 
have a similar impact on the performance of firms in both countries. Firm size has a negative 
impact on the operating performance (ROA) of firms in Germany, which suggests the higher 
operating and monitoring costs of larger firms. Similarly, firm size has a positive impact on the 
market valuation of firms in both countries, which suggests that larger firms get higher market
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valuations in both countries. Contrary to expectations, firm-specific risk (beta) has a negative 
impact on the operating performance of firms in the UK and Germany. This finding is 
consistent with the findings reported by Bromiley (1991), which suggest that increasing a firm’s 
risk exposure may not necessarily enhance the operating performance. On the other hand, firm- 
specific risk has a significantly positive impact on the market valuation (Tobin’s Q) of firms in 
both countries and this finding is consistent with the findings reported by Beiner et al. (2006). 
The findings also show that foreign-listed firms have better operating performance and they get 
higher market valuation (the relationship between foreign listing and the market valuation of 
UK firms is statistically not significant). These results are consistent with prior research (e.g., 
Aggarwal et al., 2010), which shows that cross-listed firms are subject to additional regulatory 
requirements in the foreign countries and they are likely to adopt stronger corporate governance 
mechanisms. The findings also show that investment in R&D expenditure has a significantly 
positive impact on the operating performance and the market valuation of firms in the UK and 
Germany. This finding is consistent with the findings reported in prior corporate governance 
research (Short and Keasey, 1999; Aggarwal et al., 2010; Ammann et al., 2011). This implies 
that investment in R&D is a significant determinant of firm performance in the UK and 
Germany.
The next chapter summarises the findings reported in chapters 4 and 5. The chapter also 
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6.1 Introduction
This thesis has had two main objectives. The first has been to examine the quality of 
corporate governance disclosure in two different corporate governance systems -  the UK and 
Germany. The second has been to analyse the relationship between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. These two questions were examined using a 
sample of 120 firms from the UK and Germany for the period 2007-2011. The first question 
was addressed by carrying out a quantitative content analysis for 600 corporate governance 
reports from the UK and Germany and the quality of reported explanations for non-compliance 
were analysed. To answer the second question, an econometric analysis was conducted by 
employing a generalised method of moments estimation technique. Chapter 3 provided 
justification for choosing these two methods and the empirical results are reported in Chapters 4 
and 5.
The UK and Germany were chosen because they exhibit significant differences in terms 
of legal systems, ownership structures, board structures and capital markets, and there are 
timing differences in the formation, development and implementation of formal corporate 
governance codes.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 summarises the main 
findings of this study; Section 6.3 discusses the implications of this research; Section 6.4 
discusses the limitations of the study; and Section 6.5 suggests avenues for future research.
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6.2 Summary of empirical findings
6.2.1 Findings related to the content analysis of corporate governance reports
Chapter 4 aimed to answer the first research question -  how do the types, quality and 
pattern of explanations for non-compliance with the corporate governance codes vary across the 
UK and Germany? Using an agency theory perspective, Chapter 2 explained how corporate 
governance disclosure could be beneficial for firms as well as shareholders. Recent policy 
initiatives by the Financial Reporting Council in the UK and the European Union Company 
Law and Corporate Governance Action Plan (2012) also emphasised the improvement of 
corporate governance disclosure, particularly the quality of reported explanations for non- 
compliance with the corporate governance codes.
For a sample of 120 firms over the period 2007-2011, the results suggest that the 
average compliance rate in the UK is 50.3 per cent, which is relatively higher than a compliance 
rate of 16.7 per cent in Germany (refer to Figure 6.1). The timing differences in the 
development and implementation of formal corporate governance codes across the UK and 
Germany could be a reason for such significant differences in the overall compliance behaviour 
of firms across the UK and Germany. For instance, the first UK code of corporate governance 
was introduced in 1992, while the German corporate governance code came into force in 2002. 
Second, the majority of the sample UK firms are cross-listed in foreign stock markets and the 
governance literature shows that cross-listed firms are subject to additional regulations and 
therefore they are more likely to adopt strong corporate governance mechanisms.
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Compliant firms -  UK Compliant firms -  Germany
Source: Developed from Table 4.2.
For non-compliant firms, the reported explanations for non-compliance were analysed
into ten categories. In addition to the existing eight categories, two new categories emerged 
after analysing the corporate governance reports. These categories include: (a) partial non- 
compliance -  when a firm is non-compliant over a specific period of time during the reported 
period or it fails to implement all aspects o f a Code provision; and (b) assurance of future 
compliance -  where a firm intends to implement a C o d e ’s provision in the following year or in 
the near future. Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 summarise the different categories o f explanations 
reported for non-compliance with The German Corporate Governance Code and The UK  
Corporate Governance Code. Overall, the results show that the individual explanations reported 
by non-compliant firms are largely uninformative and the content of such explanations mostly 
remained similar over the time and across the firms. The results suggest that, irrespective o f the 
corporate governance systems in different locations, non-compliant firms do exploit the
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‘explain’, option and flexibility of the ‘comply or explain’ principle. The findings show that a 
total number of 777 explanations for non-compliance have been reported by the German firms, 
compared with 241 explanations provided by the sample UK firms. Table 6.1 shows that the ‘no 
explanation for non-compliance’ category has substantially decreased from 31.2 per cent in 
2007 to 3.9 per cent in 2011. A number of German firms has constantly raised concerns about 
the controversial provisions in The German Corporate Governance Code or the ineffectiveness 
of the Code provisions for them. Compared with Germany, no company in the UK has 
commented on any Code provision being in conflict with other laws or about the ineffectiveness 
of the Code provision. In fact, these implementation and compatibility issues arise only when 
the Code itself or any of its provisions are new to the firm. However, as 23 years have passed 
since the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Financial Reporting Council has constantly engaged 
investors as well as companies in the consultation process when developing or amending the 
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6.2.2 Findings related to the relationship between internal corporate governance
mechanisms and firm performance
Chapter 2 discussed how multiple theories (agency theory, stewardship theory, resource 
dependence theory and stakeholder theory) inform the empirical literature on the relationship 
between internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 
summarise the empirical results for the accounting-based and market-based measures of firm 
performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q). These findings are also reported in Chapter 5.
The ‘comply or explain’ index is positively associated with ROA for German firms. On 
the other hand, the ‘comply or explain’ index has a positive impact on the market valuation 
(Tobin’s Q) of UK firms. However, I did not find any significant relationship between the 
‘comply or explain’ index and the operating performance of UK firms. Also, I did not find any 
significant relationship between the ‘comply or explain’ index and the market valuation 
(Tobin’s Q) of German firms. The findings provide some evidence to support the argument that 
compliance with the corporate governance code has a positive impact on the operating 
performance of German firms and, in the context of the UK, compliant firms get higher market 
valuation in the capital market.
Consistent with the assumptions of agency theory, board size has a significantly 
negative impact on the operating performance of firms in the UK and Germany. The negative 
impact of board size supports the notion that larger boards are costly in terms of their 
communication and co-ordination problems, as suggested by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and 
Jensen (1993). For the UK sample, board size has a significantly negative impact on the market
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valuation of firms, however, in the context of Germany, board size has no significant impact on 
the market valuation of German firms.
Consistent with Dahya and McConnell (2007) and in line with the assumptions of 
agency theory, board structure (the percentage of non-executive directors) has a positive impact 
on the operating performance of UK firms. However, I did not find any significant impact of 
board structure on the operating performance of German firms and this finding is consistent 
with the findings reported by Bermig and Frick (2010). Interestingly, board structure has a 
significantly negative impact on the market valuation of UK firms, and this finding is consistent 
with the findings reported by Weir and Laing (2000). This finding supports the assumptions of 
stewardship theory, and it suggests that the UK firms with a higher percentage of non-executive 
directors may not necessarily get higher market valuation. In the context of Germany, board 
structure has a positive impact on the market valuation of firms. This finding supports the 
assumptions of agency theory and resource dependency theory, and it suggests that German 
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The number of board meetings has a significantly negative impact on the operating 
performance of UK firms and this finding is consistent with the findings reported by Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006). For German firms, I did not find any significant impact of the 
number of board meetings on the operating performance of firms. Similarly, the number of 
board meetings has a significantly positive impact on the market valuation (Tobin’s Q) of 
firms in the UK and Germany. This finding is consistent with the findings reported by 
Brick and Chidambaran (2010). The positive impact of board meetings on Tobin’s Q 
indicates that board activities are value-relevant for investors in both corporate governance 
systems.
The impact of gearing is significantly positive on the operating performance (ROA) 
and the market valuation (Tobin’s Q) for German firms. This indicates that debt financing 
serves as an important corporate governance mechanism in the German corporate 
governance system. In the UK, gearing has a significantly negative impact on the operating 
performance of firms and this finding is consistent with the findings reported by Weir and 
Laing (2000) and Weir et al. (2002). On the other hand, gearing has a significantly positive 
impact on the market valuation of UK firms. The positive relationship is consistent with the 
findings reported by Dahya et al. (2002) and McKnight and Weir (2009) for the UK firms. 
This suggests that the capital market in the UK considers debt financing as an important 
monitoring mechanism.
The findings show that non-institutional blockholders play a significant monitoring 
role in the German corporate governance system, as evidenced by the positive impact of
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non-institutional blockholders’ ownership on the operating performance and the market- 
based measure of firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q). Interestingly, institutional 
blockholders’ ownership has a negative impact on the market valuation (Tobin’s Q) of 
firms in the UK and Germany, and this finding is consistent with the findings reported by 
Gugler et al. (2008). In the UK, institutional blockholders’ ownership has a positive impact 
on the operating performance of UK firms.
The results for control variables show that firm size has a significantly negative 
impact on the operating performance of German firms. For the market-based measure of 
firm performance (Tobin’s Q), firm size has a significantly positive impact on the market 
valuation of firms in the UK and Germany, which suggests that larger firms get higher 
market valuation in both countries. Firm-specific risk has a negative impact on the 
operating performance of firms in the UK and Germany. On the other hand, firm-specific 
risk has a significantly positive impact on the market valuation (Tobin’s Q) of firms in both 
countries. Foreign listing has a positive impact on the market-based measure of firm 
performance in the UK and Germany, which suggests that foreign-listed firms obtain higher 
market valuation in both countries. R&D expenditure has a significantly positive impact on 
the operating performance as well as on the market valuation of firms in the UK and 
Germany, and this finding suggests that R&D is a significant determinant of firm 
performance in both countries.
6.3 Implications
The econometric results reported for the governance-performance relationship are 
largely similar across the UK and Germany. However, the results reported under the
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accounting-based measure of performance (ROA) are significantly different from those 
reported under the market-based measure of firm performance (Tobin’s Q). This shows the 
sensitivity of different measures of firm performance. There is no universal measure of firm 
performance. In fact, ROA and Tobin’s Q are the most common and widely used measures 
of a firm’s operating and financial performance. However, the governance literature has 
also used other measures, such as: (a) return on equity; (b) net profit margin; (c) total 
shareholders’ return; (d) price/eamings ratio; (e) price/sales ratio.
The results for the governance-performance relationship are explained by different 
theories of corporate governance, such as agency theory, resource dependence theory, 
stewardship theory and stakeholder theory. This indicates that the governance-performance 
relationship cannot be examined through the lens of a single and. universal corporate 
governance theory, and researchers need to adopt multiple theoretical perspectives to 
investigate the underlying complex relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance.
The negative impact of institutional blockholders’ ownership on the market 
valuation of firms in the UK and Germany suggests that regulators in both countries need to 
develop comprehensive corporate governance regulations for the institutional investors.66
This study has used two methods to explore the governance-performance 
relationship and the quality of reported explanations for non-compliance with the corporate 
governance codes. The concept of methodological pluralism has recently been embraced by
66 The UK has recently issued The UK Stewardship Code for institutional investors, while Germany has 
already issued The German Capital Investment Code.
243
the governance researchers. In fact, examining the governance-performance relationship 
using multiple theories and multiple methods may take us closer to developing a more 
comprehensive theory of corporate governance.
The findings of this thesis have potential implications for policy makers. For 
instance, if compliance is a listing requirement, then there should be a mechanism to 
monitor the explanations for non-compliance and regulators should not leave the burden of 
assessment in the hands of only one player (investors) in the capital market. In other words, 
the Financial Reporting Council needs to engage all stakeholders (investors, companies and 
auditors) in developing any regulations to address the quality of corporate governance 
disclosure. Although, the level of compliance in the UK has improved in the past 23 years, 
enforcing compliance could be a partial solution to improve the quality of explanations 
reported for non-compliance. However, any proposed regulations should not be mandatory 
and should be based on the fundamental principles of the principles-based system. 
Adopting an alternative or a short-cut approach will have long-term implications, as 
Shrives and Brennan (2014, p. 99) argue:
‘To encourage a move towards compliance simply because it solves the problem 
of badly crafted explanations is likely to result in unforeseen consequences and 
may permanently damage the system of which the UK is seemingly proud and 
which the rest of the world is keen to emulate’.
The findings about the quality of corporate governance disclosure also have 
implications for listed companies. For example, owing to the external pressures from 
shareholders as well as other interest groups, some UK companies have now established a 
separate sub-committee of the board (known as a disclosure committee) to scrutinise the
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information reported in their annual reports. Although, this is not a formal requirement in 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2014), however as 
discussed before, companies may adopt better corporate governance practices beyond those 
recommended by a corporate governance code.
In the case of Germany, the Code issuer, the Commission of the German Corporate 
Governance Code, needs to review those provisions which are in conflict with other laws 
and regulations in the country. If these conflicting provisions remain in the German 
Corporate Governance Code, it would provide a valid excuse for non-compliant firms to 
refer to such provisions while explaining and justifying their position.
Corporate governance reporting needs to be very simple and informative in terms of 
the language, volume and structure of the compliance statements, so that investors can 
easily make their judgment on the basis of such available information.
Finally, comparative corporate governance research has implications for regulators 
in both corporate governance systems, and, using a cherry-picking approach, regulators 
should adopt best corporate governance practices from other (alternative) corporate 
governance systems. For example, German companies publish a separate ‘declaration of 
conformity’ or a ‘compliance statement’ in addition to its publication in their annual 
reports. The UK can benefit from this unique approach of dual reporting and adopting such 
practices could partly mitigate the accessibility issues relating to the location of the 
compliance statements of the UK listed companies.
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6.4 Limitations of the study
This study has used a generalised method of moments (GMM) model which is more 
robust in terms of controlling for different kinds of endogeneity issues and thus provides 
unbiased estimates. Discussing the limitations of difference and system GMM Roodman 
(2009, p. 87) argues:
‘they are complicated and so can easily generate invalid estimates. Implementing 
them with a Stata command stuffs them into a black box, creating the risk that 
users, not understanding the estimators’ purpose, design, and limitations, will 
unwittingly misuse it’.
Second, the thesis only focuses on the reported non-compliance and the 
explanations for non-compliance. In reality, the actual level of compliance may be 
different.
Third, the sample includes only 120 companies from the UK and Germany for the 
period 2007-2011, which is still large enough for comparison with prior comparative 
studies on the UK and Germany (Franks and Mayer, 1997; Jungmann, 2006). In the context 
of Germany, the annual reports of small-sized German companies (SDAX) are in German, 
and this was one of the reasons to include only those German companies for which the 
governance data was available in financial databases and the annual reports were also in 
English.
Fourth, this study excludes financial firms, as financial firms are highly regulated 
and their governance arrangements are significantly different from non-financial firms. The 
selection of non-financial firms is consistent with the leading governance-performance
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studies (Weir et al., 2002; Dahya and McConnell, 2007). This implies that the findings of 
the study could not be generalised in the context of the financial institutions.
6.5 Future research
Like many other studies, this research has some limitations, which suggest avenues 
for future research. Future comparative studies may extend the time period beyond the 
2007 financial crisis to compare the disclosure behaviour of firms and the governance 
performance relationship with a pre-crisis or post-crisis period.
Second, future studies may use an interview-based qualitative approach to examine 
the determinants of corporate governance disclosure. This may include interviewing the 
compliance officers of serial non-compliant firms, particularly those firms that have 
reported either ‘no explanations’ or ‘boiler-plate explanations’. Alternatively a survey- 
based approach could also examine this phenomenon at a relatively larger scale across 
different countries.
Third, future studies could also investigate the relationship between the ‘comply or 
explain’ index (or DataStream corporate governance score) and analysts’ recommendations 
(buy, hold, sell). This would provide a better understanding about the interaction between 
various internal and external corporate governance mechanisms.
Fourth, this study used a quantitative content analysis which was suitable for a 
relatively large sample to examine the quality of corporate governance disclosure. Future 
studies may use a qualitative content analysis (discourse analysis) for a small sample to 
understand the disclosure behaviour of firms from the underlying themes in the written text.
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Finally, governance research has so far been restricted to only public listed 
companies. Another interesting and emerging area for future research could be exploring 
governance issues in small and medium sized private companies, which could potentially 
‘go public’ in the near future. A good example is the UK alternative investment market 
(AIM), which started in 1995 with only 10 companies and having a market capitalisation of 
£82.2 million. As at August 2013, the FTSE AIM market includes 1,086 companies with a 
market value of £67 billion (London Stock Exchange, 2013).
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Appendices






Rest of the world 30.7 43.4 53.2 460.9 760.9 935.1
Insurance companies 21.6 8.8 6.2 325.5 153.8 109.2
Pension funds 21.7 5.6 4.7 325.8 98.7 82.7
Individuals 16.7 10.2 10.7 250.8 179.0 187.2
Unit trusts 2.0 8.8 9.6 30.1 153.8 167.9
Investment trusts 1.3 2.1 1.7 19.2 37.5 30.7
Other financial institutions 2.7 12.3 6.6 40.4 215.0 115.3
Charities, church, etc 1.4 0.8 0.6 20.4 14.9 10.7
Private non-financial companies 1.4 2.3 2.3 20.9 40.1 39.8
Public sector 0.1 3.1 2.5 1.4 54.4 44.1
Banks 0.6 2.5 1.9 8.4 44.3 33.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 1503.7 1752.3 1756.3
Source: Adapted from Office for National Statistics (2013).
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Appendix B: List of German companies
Name Industrial name Primary index Foreign listing
BASF Chemicals Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
BAYER Chemicals Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
FRESENIUS MED CARE Health Care & Pharmaceutical Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
FRESENIUS Health Care & Pharmaceutical Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
K + S Chemicals Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
LINDE Chemicals Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
MERCK KGAA Health Care & Pharmaceutical Frankfurt Stock Exchange . No
FUCHS PETROLUB PREF. Chemicals Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
GERRESHEIMER Health Care & Pharmaceutical Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
LANXESS Chemicals Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
RHOEN-KLINIKUM Health Care & Pharmaceutical Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
STADA ARZNEIMITTEL Health Care & Pharmaceutical Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
SYMRISE Chemicals Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
WACKERCHEMIE Chemicals Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
ADIDAS Personal & Household Goods Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
BMW Aiitnmnhil^c gr Parts Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
BEIERSDORF Personal & Household Goods Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
CONTINENTAL Automobiles & Parts Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
DAIMLER Automobiles & Parts Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
HEIDELBERGCEMENT Construction & Materials Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
INFINEON
TECHNOLOGIES
Technology Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
SAP Technology Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
VOLKSWAGEN PREF. Automobiles & Parts Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
GERRY WEBER INTL. Personal & Household Goods Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
BOSS (HUGO) Personal & Household Goods Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
PUMA Personal & Household Goods Frankfurt Stock Exchange No •
RHEINMETALL Automobiles & Parts Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
AURUBIS Basic Resources Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
KLOCKNER & CO Basic Resources Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
SALZGITTER Basic Resources Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
DEUTSCHE POST Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
SIEMENS Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
THYSSENKRUPP Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
BILFINGER BERGER Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
DUERR Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
275
Appendix B continued
FRAPORT Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
GEA GROUP Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
GILDEMEISTER Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
HAMB.HAFEN
UD.LOGISTIK
Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
KRONES Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
KUKA Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
LEONI Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
MAN Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
MTU AERO ENGINES 
HLDGT
Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
RATIONAL Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
SGL CARBON Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
VOSSLOH Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM Telecommunications Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
SUEDZUCKER Food & Beverage Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA Travel & Leisure Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
HENKEL PREF Personal & Household Goods Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
AXEL SPRINGER Media Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
CELESIO Retail Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
DEUTSCHE EUROSHOP Real Estate Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
DOUGLAS HOLDING Retail Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
LEONI Industrial Goods & Services Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
METRO Retail Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
PROSIEBENSAT 1 MEDIA Media Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
TUI Travel & Leisure Frankfurt Stock Exchange No
BRENNTAG Chemicals Frankfurt Stock Exchange Yes
276
Appendix C: List of UK companies
Name Industry Name Primary index Foreign
listing
ASTRAZENECA Health Care & 
Pharmaceutical
London Stock Exchange Yes
BTG Health Care & 
Pharmaceutical
London Stock Exchange Yes
CARCLO Chemicals London Stock Exchange Yes
CRODA INTERNATIONAL Chemicals London Stock Exchange Yes
DECHRA
PHARMACEUTICALS
Health Care & 
Pharmaceutical
London Stock Exchange Yes
ELEMENTIS Chemicals London Stock Exchange Yes
GENUS Health Care & 
Pharmaceutical
London Stock Exchange Yes
GLAXOSMITHKLINE Health Care & 
Pharmaceutical
London Stock Exchange Yes
HIKMA
PHARMACEUTICALS
Health Care & 
Pharmaceutical
London Stock Exchange Yes
JOHNSON MATTHEY Chemicals London Stock Exchange Yes
OPTOS Health Care & 
Pharmaceutical
London Stock Exchange No
OXFORD BIOMEDICA Health Care & 
Pharmaceutical
London Stock Exchange Yes
SHIRE Health Care & 
Pharmaceutical
London Stock Exchange Yes
SMITH & NEPHEW Health Care & 
Pharmaceutical
London Stock Exchange Yes
SYNERGY HEALTH Health Care & 
Pharmaceutical
London Stock Exchange No
VECTURA GROUP Health Care & 
Pharmaceutical
London Stock Exchange Yes
VICTREX Chemicals London Stock Exchange No
SYNTHOMER Chemicals London Stock Exchange Yes
AGGREKO Industrial Goods & Services London Stock Exchange Yes
ANGLO AMERICAN Basic Resources London Stock Exchange Yes
ANTOFAGASTA Basic Resources London Stock Exchange Yes
ARM HOLDINGS Technology London Stock Exchange Yes
ASSOCIATED BRIT.FOODS Food & Beverage London Stock Exchange Yes
BABCOCK INTL. Industrial Goods & Services London Stock Exchange Yes
BAE SYSTEMS Industrial Goods & Services London Stock Exchange Yes
BHP BILLITON Basic Resources London Stock Exchange Yes
BRITISH AMERICAN 
TOBACCO
Personal & Household 
Goods
London Stock Exchange Yes
BT GROUP Telecommunications London Stock Exchange Yes
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Appendix C continued
BUNZL Industrial Goods & Services London Stock Exchange Yes
BURBERRY GROUP Personal & Household 
Goods
London Stock Exchange Yes
CAPITA Industrial Goods & Services London Stock Exchange Yes
CRH Construction & Materials London Stock Exchange Yes
DIAGEO Food & Beverage London Stock Exchange Yes
EURASIAN NATRES.CORP Basic Resources London Stock Exchange Yes
EXPERIAN Industrial Goods & Services London Stock Exchange Yes
FRESNILLO Basic Resources London Stock Exchange Yes
G4S Industrial Goods & Services London Stock Exchange Yes
GKN Automobiles & Parts London Stock Exchange Yes
IMI Industrial Goods & Services London Stock Exchange Yes
IMPERIAL TOBACCO GP. Personal & Household 
Goods
London Stock Exchange Yes
INTERTEK GROUP Industrial Goods & Services London Stock Exchange Yes
KAZAKHMYS Basic Resources London Stock Exchange Yes
MEGGITT Industrial Goods & Services London Stock Exchange Yes
MELROSE INDUSTRIES Industrial Goods & Services London Stock Exchange Yes
RANDGOLD RESOURCES Basic Resources London Stock Exchange Yes
RECKITT BENCKISER 
GROUP
Personal & Household 
Goods
London Stock Exchange Yes
REXAM Industrial Goods & Services London Stock Exchange Yes
RIO TINTO Basic Resources London Stock Exchange Yes
ROLLS-ROYCE HOLDINGS Industrial Goods & Services London Stock Exchange Yes
SABMILLER Food & Beverage London Stock Exchange Yes
AMEC Oil & Gas London Stock Exchange Yes
BG GROUP Oil & Gas London Stock Exchange Yes
BP Oil & Gas London Stock Exchange Yes
BRITISH LAND Real Estate London Stock Exchange Yes
CARNIVAL Travel & Leisure London Stock Exchange Yes
COMPASS GROUP Travel & Leisure London Stock Exchange Yes
EVRAZ Basic Resources London Stock Exchange Yes
HAMMERSON Real Estate London Stock Exchange Yes
ITV Media London Stock Exchange Yes
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